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Abstract: Advanced technologies that mitigate global biological threats, such as vaccines for tropical diseases, are chronically underprovided because the countries able to develop them bear little of the burden. We ask how innovation responds when climate change pushes such biological threats into those countries. In our spatial dynamic game, a reproducing threat diffuses across borders; while every country controls the threat locally, only one can innovate, generating technology that spills over internationally. Our analysis yields two main findings. First, the primary catalyst for innovation is not a threat's inherent severity, but rather its underlying biology: innovation arises only when the biology makes sustained eradication infeasible. Second, technology spillovers drive innovation exclusively through their interaction with threat diffusion, as technology deployed abroad curbs the threat flowing back across borders. Applying this framework to the climate-driven expansion of dengue-transmitting mosquitoes into the U.S., structural estimates suggest that self-interested U.S. vaccine innovation could cut cases in the Americas by 54% compared to a fixed-innovation benchmark, ultimately leaving Latin America better off than before the expansion.
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Abstract: Many policy contexts, from fisheries management to epidemic control, are governed by nonlinear reproduction dynamics and by strategic interaction among multiple decision makers. This combination has historically made structural estimation computationally forbidding. We develop a tractable Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework for dynamic resource games with heterogeneous agents and fully nonlinear, interactive state dynamics. We provide sufficient conditions under which the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium admits analytical optimality conditions, and establish consistency and asymptotic normality of the resulting GMM estimator. Applying the framework to the Japanese anchovy fishery shared by China, Japan, and Korea, we recover each country's implicit ecological valuation and simulate the equilibrium effect of climate-driven shifts in fish migration patterns. We further show that linearizing the equations of motion, the standard route to tractability, substantially understates these ecological values.
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Abstract: Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are widely used to promote wildlife conservation on private lands, yet standard designs often ignore a fundamental ecological reality: wildlife moves across lands. We develop a spatial dynamic game between a network of landowners and a PES provider to examine how transboundary mobility shapes conservation incentives and welfare. We show that species mobility induces strategic complementarities in management decisions, causing PES contracts to systematically miss the social optimum. The direction of this inefficiency depends on whether the species is privately viewed as a “good” (e.g., bees) or a “bad” (e.g., wolves) by landowners: mobility generates under-conservation of privately good species and, paradoxically, over-conservation of privately bad species relative to the first-best. The latter arises because dispersal costs borne by neighboring landowners are not internalized by the PES contracts. Furthermore, voluntary PES programs for privately bad species can constitute an entrapment equilibrium—landowners participate rationally once others have joined, yet find themselves collectively worse off than they were without PES because payments merely deter unilateral deviation. It provides a rational foundation for why certain PES programs face local resistance while others are accepted. We propose a community voting mechanism that resolves this coordination failure.
Abstract: We price the transboundary externality of mobile public bads such as diseases and invasive species. We focus on the marginal cost to country B of an increase in the stock (i.e., an outbreak) in country A. These cross-jurisdiction marginal costs depend not only on economic, ecological, and spatial features of both jurisdictions but also on jurisdictions’ strategic reactions to the outbreak. Using a spatial dynamic game, we calculate the “cross-jurisdiction shadow costs” of an outbreak of mobile public bad under the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium of control efforts. We find that under reasonable conditions, the source country has private incentives to control the outbreak itself, which can lead to a situation where the cross-jurisdiction shadow cost is, in fact, zero. We also derive conditions where a country optimally fails to control the outbreak (for example, damages in that country are small), in which case cross-jurisdiction shadow costs are positive. Finally, we note that since cooperative control of the mobile public bad delivers substantially higher welfare than non-cooperative control, we derive an externality pricing instrument that perfectly internalizes the externality and induces cooperative control among all countries.