Areas of Interest
Primary Research Interests: Behavioral Economics, Quantitative Consumer Behavior, Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Sentiment Analysis
Secondary Research Interests: Family Economics, Game Theory, Labor Economics and Circular Economics
Publications: Refereed Journal Articles
Malhotra, S. Impact of Divorce Law Liberalisation on Domestic Violence. Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, May 2022.
Abstract: I examine the extent to which a shift from a mutual consent divorce regime to a unilateral divorce regime (UDR) succeeds in preventing domestic violence. In my framework, a partner may be inclined to violence but dislikes being subjected to a partner’s violence. I find that, when payoff from marriage is positive, both parties choose the maximum level of violence under a mutual consent regime (MCR). There is a parameter zone within which domestic violence falls as a transition is made to a UDR. Further, I find that policymakers can reduce the cost of filing for divorce. I also find that the marriage rate changes with the switch in the regime.
Working Papers
Diamonds or Documents? Prenuptial Agreements as Efficient Signals in Marriage Markets
Abstract: I model marriage markets with asymmetric information about men’s income, where women screen partners through conspicuous consumption during courtship. Men signal wealth by spending on status goods, but this is socially wasteful as it depletes marital assets. Introducing prenuptial agreements (prenups) as an alternative signalling device, I show that when prenup costs are lower than courtship costs, high-income men separate by accepting prenups, while low-income men reject them and resort to conspicuous spending. In equilibrium, prenups reduce aggregate conspicuous consumption and improve matching efficiency. Legalizing prenups could thus curb inefficient signaling and increase household savings. My results persist even when women have heterogeneous preferences over income, provided prenups include income-verification clauses.
Signaling Safety: How Violence Clauses in Prenuptial Agreements Improve Marital Matching.
Abstract: I analyze how prenups mitigate domestic violence by serving as screening tools in marriage markets with two-sided incomplete information. Women vary in their preferences over partners’ income versus non-violence, while men differ in income and propensity for violence. Prenups with enforceable violence penalties allow women to screen for both traits: high-α women tolerate higher violence for income, while low-α women demand strict penalties. Men accept prenups only if penalties outweigh their utility from violence. I identify conditions under which prenups reduce violence and increase marriage rates for safety-preferring women, even when legal enforcement is weak. The model explains low prenup uptake in countries like India, where stigma and unenforceability persist, and suggests policy reforms to standardize violence clauses.
Does the option to sign Prenuptial Agreements affect Domestic Violence? A Game Theoretic Analysis (Available at SSRN)