"Strategic Buyers and Inventory Choice under Dynamic Pricing in the Flower Market" Job Market Paper [draft available upon request]
Abstract: This paper develops a structural model where strategic buyers choose purchase timings under price dynamics and stockout risk, whereas sellers optimize initial inventory size. To estimate the model parameters, I use granular data on a wholesale flower market. In a counterfactual analysis, I simulate market outcomes under uniform pricing and perform a welfare analysis. The counterfactual results indicate that sellers would raise the initial inventory size and set lower prices under uniform pricing. In terms of welfare, uniform pricing would benefit sellers relative to uniform pricing, especially when they can optimally choose initial inventory size. In contrast, uniform pricing would hurt buyers relative to dynamic pricing.
Abstract: This paper documents the impact of a simple and universally applicable auction innovation: moving online. We leverage bid-level data from an offline-to-online transition of state mineral lease auctions, the features of which facilitate a detailed study. Controlling for auction heterogeneity, we find a large revenue difference in favor of online auctions, explained by a large increase in the number of bidders. Examining bidders' identities reveals an inflow of new participants who had not participated before the transition. We do not detect different post-auction outcomes between new and existing participants. Where not yet adopted, online auctions are well worth consideration.
"Consumption Periods in Advance Selling Auctions: Evidence from US Timber Market" with Suguru Otani [draft]
Abstract: This study investigates products sold before consumption and examines how the duration of the consumption periods and the choice of selling mechanism influence sellers' revenue. Using empirical data from timber auctions, we identify buyers' tendency to delay consumption to resolve payoff uncertainty and reveal heterogeneous motivations among buyers. Through structural estimation, we uncover key parameters for each buyer type, including sensitivity to realized payoffs and consumption-related costs. Leveraging these estimates, we perform counterfactual analyses to propose revenue-enhancing consumption periods and selling mechanisms. Our findings suggest that extending the consumption periods is likely to increase revenue, with the magnitude depending on the selling mechanism, the composition of buyer types, and the number of interested buyers.
"Firm-Specificity of Human Capital: Process of its Endogenous Determination" with Hodaka Morita, Cheng-Tao Tang, and Kumpei Akiyama (in Japanese). The Economic Review, 2019, 70 (4), 312 - 330.
"Inter-Firm Alliances Accompanied by Partial Equity Ownership: Theoretical Analyses" with Hodaka Morita, Kumpei Akiyama, Tomohiro Ara, and Arghya Ghosh (in Japanese). The Economic Review, 2022, 73 (2), 97 - 116.
"Dynamic Bargaining with Wholesale Price Discrimination'' with Junichiro Ishida, Shin Kanaya, Hidenori Takahashi