Research

Abstract: This paper develops a structural model where strategic buyers choose purchase timings under price dynamics and stockout risk, whereas sellers optimize initial inventory size. To estimate the model parameters, I use granular data on a wholesale flower market. In a counterfactual analysis, I simulate market outcomes under uniform pricing and perform a welfare analysis. The counterfactual results indicate that sellers would raise the initial inventory size and set lower prices under uniform pricing. In terms of welfare, uniform pricing would benefit sellers relative to uniform pricing, especially when they can optimally choose initial inventory size. In contrast, uniform pricing would hurt buyers relative to dynamic pricing.

Abstract: This paper documents the impact of a simple and universally applicable auction innovation: moving online. We leverage bid-level data from an offline-to-online transition of state mineral lease auctions, the features of which facilitate a detailed study. Controlling for auction heterogeneity, we find a large revenue difference in favor of online auctions, explained by a large increase in the number of bidders. Examining bidders' identities reveals an inflow of new participants who had not participated before the transition. We do not detect different post-auction outcomes between new and existing participants. Where not yet adopted, online auctions are well worth consideration. 

Abstract: This study quantifies how contract duration influences buyers' willingness-to-pay (WTP) when they hold real options that allow them to flexibly time consumption in response to changing market conditions. Using contract data from the US timber industry, we show that buyers delay consumption to manage payoff risk. This behavior generates heterogeneous WTP across buyers. We use structural estimation to uncover the key parameters underlying the incentive to delay consumption. Using these estimates, we conduct counterfactual simulations to measure how longer contract durations shift WTP and to clarify the boundary conditions linked to project size, buyer composition, and market trends. The counterfactual simulations reveal that extending contract duration from 3 to 4 years raises seller revenue by 9-13%, with effects amplified for larger projects and high-type buyers during the upward market trend.