Research 

Working Papers

The Effect of Electoral Competition on Candidate Selection: Evidence from Indian State Elections (Job Market Paper)

[Presented at APSA 2024, PolMeth 2024, Texas Methods 2025, MPSA 2025]

Abstract: The paper examines the causal effect of electoral competition on the political selection of candidates by parties in Indian state-level elections. I study how the self-financing capacity of candidates interacts with electoral competition in influencing candidate selection (and allocation) choices of political parties in the world’s largest democracy. However, identifying the effect of competition is challenging due to reverse causality: politician and/or party activities before an election determine the competitiveness of a race. Also, the analysis may suffer from issues related to omitted variable bias because more wealthier candidates might be attracted to often run in more competitive constituencies than otherwise. Using a panel data of Indian State-level Elections (2009 – 2023), I address these challenges by first, running a z-score regression model (with both party and party-state fixed-effects) and then test its robustness to these sources of bias with a shift-share instrumental variables design. I find that incumbent parties respond strategically to competition prior to an election by selecting wealthier candidates and reallocating resources to swing constituencies. I consider implications on the impact of such selection decisions on the political strategies of non-incumbent parties and how inter party political competition shapes the quality of democratic institutions and political representation in Indian elections and first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems at large. 

Electoral Competition with Credible Promises and Strategic Voters (Under Review) [Link]

[Presented at MPSA 2023, CPFT 2023, and the Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory 2023]

Abstract: How can voters induce politicians to put forth more proximate (in terms of policy preference) as well as credible platforms (in terms of promise fulfillment) under repeated elections? I study how reputation and re-election concerns affect candidate behavior and its resultant effect on voters' beliefs and their consequent electoral decisions. In doing so, I reflect upon a crucial rider in the benchmark models of Downsian political competition, where the winning (moderate) candidate (in a two-candidate electoral system) can promise a platform that lies closer to his ideal point (and thus further from the median voter) and yet win an election while keeping his reputation intact. Voters in such a setup fail to push candidates to their maximal incentive-compatible promise, which would not only unanimously raise their utility but also protect the candidate's reputation. I term voters who engage in such behavior as naïve. Thus, I present a formal model where, instead of assuming voters to be naïve, I tackle the question by completely characterizing a set of subgame perfect equilibria by introducing non-naive (or strategic) voting behavior in the mix. I find that non-naïve voting behavior - via utilizing the candidate’s reputation as an instrument of policy discipline post-election - aids in successfully inducing candidates to put forth their maximal incentive-compatible promise (amongst a range of such credible promises) in equilibrium. Through the credible threat of punishment in the form of a loss in reputation for all future elections – non-naïve voters can gain a unanimous rise in their expected utility than when they behave naively. Comparative statics show that candidates who are more likely to win are more likely to keep their promises. In such a framework, voters are not only able to better bargain for more credible promises but also end up raising their expected future payoffs in equilibrium. Including such forms of strategic behavior thus reduces cheap talk by creating a credible electoral system where candidates do as they say once elected.

Limited Punishment under Credibility Threats

Abstract: This paper investigates electoral accountability when voters’ sanctions for broken campaign promises are finite rather than permanent. Building on a repeated-elections model of credible promises and candidate reputation (Aragonès, Palfrey, and Postlewaite 2007) and on my thesis's baseline analysis with strategic (non-naive) voters who discipline candidates to deliver their maximal incentive-compatible promise - I replace the standard grim trigger (eternal distrust after reneging) with limited punishment: if a winner reneges once, voters refuse to believe subsequent promises only for k- periods; thereafter, the candidate’s reputation is restored. I show that this seemingly small relaxation has first-order consequences for equilibrium credibility, comparative statics, and the interpretation of empirical heterogeneity in voter forbearance. Under limited punishment, voters' beliefs and candidates' strategies are the natural analogs of the baseline model: good candidates' incentive-compatible promises are believed; bad candidates - those currently under sanction - are thought to implement their bliss points; and reputation is endogenously reset after k- periods. Substantively, the framework formalizes partial voter forbearance - arising from partisanship, identity, or norms of leniency - as a disciplining device of adjustable strength. It yields testable predictions: electorates that restore credibility more quickly should induce smaller ex ante promises and exhibit more frequent post-election drift, while greater patience (higher δ) expands the credible set for given k. Within the broader thesis, the analysis complements a baseline model with strategic voters by showing that accountability hinges not only on forward-looking behavior but also on the duration of reputational sanctions. Relative to existing reputation-based accounts of promise keeping, the contribution is to replace an extreme sanction with a finite one that is both behaviorally plausible and empirically testable.

Do Personal (Campaign) Assets Affect Party Switching? Evidence from Indian State Elections 

Abstract: This paper asks whether and why personal campaign assets make legislators more likely to switch parties while in office. I argue that greater personal wealth lowers the private costs of exit by substituting for party-provided resources and simultaneously raises rival parties’ incentives to recruit self-financing elites. The joint logic yields a clear prediction: wealthier legislators should defect more often, both because they can sustain campaigns without organizational backing and because they are especially attractive targets for political poaching. I test this claim in the Indian State (Assembly) Elections from 2009 to 2023 - a competitive, candidate-centered environment with high rates of elite mobility and wide dispersion in private financing capacity. The research design links individual-level switching during the legislative term (binary outcome) to pre-election personal wealth using a legislator panel. The key predictor is logged wealth, and specifications incrementally control for prior defection, incumbency, and personal vote share. I estimate a linear-probability random-effects model - favoring between-legislator inference given relatively short panels and assess robustness to alternative covariate sets and timing assumptions. Results show a positive, substantively meaningful association between personal wealth and the probability of switching. Prior defection and incumbency reduce defection risk, while personal vote share has a small positive relationship with switching. The pattern is consistent with a mechanism in which self-financing capacity enhances autonomy from party organizations and increases outside options, thereby weakening party discipline. Substantively, the findings connect campaign-finance capacity to elite mobility and party-system (in)stability: when candidates can self-fund, they can credibly threaten exit and are more readily courted by competitors. The paper contributes a microfoundation for personalism’s effects on party discipline and offers generalizable implications for candidate-centered democracies where private money mediates partisan loyalty.

Works in Progress 

The Black Sheep Effect: Can Ingroup Homogeneity Cause Outgroup Polarization? [Presented at APSA 2023]

Disentangling Political Manifestos for Issue-Specificity in Indian General Elections (with Madhavi Devasher, University of New Hampshire)

The Effect of Fox News Entry on the Slant in Local Newspaper Coverage (with Koustuv Saha, American University, Sharjah and Jayanta Talukder, NCAER, New Delhi)

Political Networks and Campaign Fundraising in the US Congress 

Incumbency and the Strategic Allocation of Special Interest Money: Evidence from India