Research 

Working Papers

The Effect of Electoral Competition on Candidate Selection: Evidence from Indian State Elections (Job Market Paper) [Link]

[Presented at APSA 2024, PolMeth 2024, Texas Methods 2025, SoWEPS-9 2025]

Abstract: The paper examines the causal effect of electoral competition on the political selection of candidates by parties in Indian state-level elections. I study how the self-financing capacity of candidates interacts with electoral competition in influencing candidate selection (and allocation) choices of political parties in the world’s largest democracy. However, identifying the effect of competition is challenging due to reverse causality: politician and/or party activities before an election determine the competitiveness of a race. Also, the analysis may suffer from issues related to omitted variable bias because more wealthier candidates might be attracted to often run in more competitive constituencies than otherwise. Using a panel data of Indian State-level Elections (2009 – 2023), I address these challenges by first, running a z-score regression model (with both party and party-state fixed-effects) and then test its robustness to these sources of bias with a shift-share instrumental variables design. I find that incumbent parties respond strategically to competition prior to an election by selecting wealthier candidates and reallocating resources to swing constituencies. I consider implications on the impact of such selection decisions on the political strategies of non-incumbent parties and how inter party political competition shapes the quality of democratic institutions and political representation in Indian elections and first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems at large. 

Electoral Competition with Credible Promises and Strategic Voters (Under Review) [Link]

[Presented at MPSA 2023, CPFT 2023, and the Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory 2023]

Abstract: How can voters induce politicians to put forth more proximate (in terms of policy preference) as well as credible platforms (in terms of promise fulfillment) under repeated elections? I study how reputation and re-election concerns affect candidate behavior and its resultant effect on voters' beliefs and their consequent electoral decisions. In doing so, I reflect upon a crucial rider in the benchmark models of Downsian political competition, where the winning (moderate) candidate (in a two-candidate electoral system) can promise a platform that lies closer to his ideal point (and thus further from the median voter) and yet win an election while keeping his reputation intact. Voters in such a setup fail to push candidates to their maximal incentive-compatible promise, which would not only unanimously raise their utility but also protect the candidate's reputation. I term voters who engage in such behavior as naïve. Thus, I present a formal model where, instead of assuming voters to be naïve, I tackle the question by completely characterizing a set of subgame perfect equilibria by introducing non-naive (or strategic) voting behavior in the mix. I find that non-naïve voting behavior - via utilizing the candidate’s reputation as an instrument of policy discipline post-election - aids in successfully inducing candidates to put forth their maximal incentive-compatible promise (amongst a range of such credible promises) in equilibrium. Through the credible threat of punishment in the form of a loss in reputation for all future elections – non-naïve voters can gain a unanimous rise in their expected utility than when they behave naively. Comparative statics show that candidates who are more likely to win are more likely to keep their promises. In such a framework, voters are not only able to better bargain for more credible promises but also end up raising their expected future payoffs in equilibrium. Including such forms of strategic behavior thus reduces cheap talk by creating a credible electoral system where candidates do as they say once elected.

Strategic Nominations and Party Organization under Maximal Voter Discipline

Abstract: Models of electoral promises usually treat candidate types as exogenous, even though nomination institutions and party organization jointly shape which promises voters can rationally trust. I develop an infinite-horizon model in which parties choose nominees, voters coordinate on maximal discipline, and party organizations sustain internal discipline through relational contracts. In contested states, maximal discipline is self-limiting: the more moderation voters require on path, the less valuable it is for nominees to remain trusted, so the credibility frontier contracts. When primaries become more permissive, parties therefore, substitute toward more extreme nominees, but only when reform-induced entry compresses the effective moderation frontier toward the base. Endogenous discipline qualifies that result. Stronger organizations choose the least costly sustainable discipline needed to preserve moderation, so permissive primaries lead them to tighten discipline rather than fully accept more extreme implemented policy. When only one party can do so, its organizational advantage shifts the weaker rival toward more extreme nominations. The framework yields a compact set of predictions about nominee types, credible promises, implemented policy, and the heterogeneous effects of primary reform.

Do Personal (Campaign) Assets Affect Party Switching? Evidence from Indian State Elections 

Abstract: Why do candidates switch parties before elections, and how do private resources shape this mobility? This paper examines electoral party switching in Indian state assembly elections, defining switching as a candidate’s change in ballot-facing party label between consecutive contests. I develop a theory in which wealth can either enable mobility, by increasing candidate autonomy and attractiveness to rival parties, or discourage it, by improving nomination security within the current party. Using an original candidate-level panel of Indian assembly elections from 2004 to 2023, linked to legally mandated affidavit disclosures, I estimate how within-candidate changes in declared assets predict party switching. The results show little support for a simple resource-enabled mobility account. In linear models with state-by-year fixed effects, higher prior wealth and increases in wealth are associated with lower switching probabilities, consistent with a “ticket insurance” mechanism in which wealth stabilizes party ties. Incumbency is the strongest predictor of stability. However, binned and quadratic specifications reveal important nonlinearities: large positive and negative wealth shocks are both associated with higher switching rates. Robustness checks further show that results depend on whether switching is measured broadly as party-label change or narrowly as “turncoat” defection. The findings suggest that candidate wealth stabilizes ordinary political careers while enabling high-stakes mobility in exceptional cases. 

Works in Progress 

The Black Sheep Effect: Can Ingroup Homogeneity Cause Outgroup Polarization? [Presented at APSA 2023]

Disentangling Political Manifestos for Issue-Specificity in Indian General Elections (with Madhavi Devasher, University of New Hampshire) [Accepted for presentation at MPSA 2026]

The Effect of Fox News Entry on the Slant in Local Newspaper Coverage (with Koustuv Saha, American University, Sharjah and Jayanta Talukder, NCAER, New Delhi)

Political Networks and Campaign Fundraising in the US Congress 

Incumbency and the Strategic Allocation of Special Interest Money: Evidence from India