Embedded Files
Team Members: N. Collier, A. Fischman, and S. Russ*
*Note: The team members contributed equally and are listed in alphabetical order.
833952-2463657 - Ainsley Fischman - Jan 28, 2022 551 PM - INTL 4240 Infographic FINAL.pdfInfographic
Infographic
Please look at the infographic for the topic explored by the team.
Advocacy Letter
Advocacy Letter
Please read the team's letter to the WHO Executive-Director for External Relations, Jane Ellison.
WHO_StateParcipation_Letter.pdfBlog Post
Blog Post
WHO Changes & Reform
BUREAUCRATIC POLTICIS &
STATE INVOLVEMENT:
The WHO’s executive board consists of 34 “technically qualified members” who are elected for 3-year terms. As the bureaucrats behind the operations of the WHO, the executive board members determine the agenda and resolutions to be considered by the world health assembly. Every member state sends a representative to the annual world health assembly to determine the policies of the organization, appoint the Director General, supervise financial policies, and review proposed budget programs (World Health Organization 2022). Because the 34 bureaucrats on the executive board determine all motions upon which the general assembly votes, there is minimal room for states to offer propositions that may benefit the WHO from an operational or management standpoint. Without the ability to provide such insight, it is less likely states will consistently comply with WHO policies to the extent that they may disagree with a policy but be in the minority on a vote (Johnson 2013). They could further not feel the need to comply as the policies set forth in the organization do not apply to their constituency. Furthermore, with minimal involvement, states cannot oversee the compliance or enforcement of said policies, limiting the overall effectiveness of the international organization. We recommend states become more involved in the WHO to promote health rights, as it applies to human rights, without turning over total control to states, but rather enabling them to voice opinions and provide rational suggestions under bureaucratic management. One such example of the issue described above can be seen in the WHO's uncoordinated response to COVID-19 (figure 1).
THE FINANCING ISSUE:
Some issues with a lack of compliance further stem from IO autonomy. Specifically, the lack of funding proves challenging for the WHO’s ability to encourage compliance because of misalignment of the budgets and member states' financial contributions, the unpredictability of WHO’s financing, the lack of transparency in finances, and the vulnerability of 20 contributors currently funding 75% of the WHOs budget. Scholars have, “argued that WHO’s reliance on voluntary and earmarked contributions creates a situation where external donors dictate the organization’s priorities and action agenda” (Reddy, Srikanth K., Mazhar, and Lencucha 2018). One argument to ensure sustainable funding in the WHO is that member states must see themselves as the shareholders. Likewise, the greatest weakness in the WHO is the lack of transparency and accountability in regard to their financial spending. The WHO also lacks flexible funding in order to be able to respond to health emergencies.
Figure 1. (Lee 2021)
One proposed solution is, “establishing an external independent governance committee for WHO,” or “the establishment of such committees and transparency enhancement mechanisms for WHO.” (Reddy, Srikanth K., Mazhar, and Lencucha 2018). IO funding is competitive, and the WHO is no
exception, so the conflict of interest in funding diverts from cooperation with the WHO’s policies. Without cooperation, compliance becomes virtually impossible. This visual below depicts the top contributors to the WHO to represent what countries have influence over bargaining (figure 2). The more a country contributes outside the required portion of GDP indicates greater power and control in the WHO for that state.
RESOLUTIONS:
To further our argument that state involvement is the primary source of compliance issues within the IO, we propose the decentralized
Figure 2 (The WHO 2019).
governance of the WHO consisting of, “small independent organizations set up for limited periods to perform specified functions.” These independent organizations would be overseen by member states and the secretariat while having their own finances. Scholars have suggested that “improving the transparency, flexibility, predictability of the WHO’s financing and upholding organizational autonomy are at the centre of WHO financing reform.” (Reddy, Srikanth K., Mazhar, and Lencucha 2018). The purpose of this proposition is to address the management issues that create a poor capacity for compliance and to encourage states’ reliance on the WHO for global health challenges. When shifting management to smaller bodies with greater governing power and more effectiveness, achieving state compliance without force or strict enforcement mechanisms becomes plausible.
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