Research

"When Should We Reward Creativity: A New Perspective on Creativity Types"

Job market paper

with Angelo Ditillo and Alexandra Van den Abbeele

Abstract: This study investigates the effects of different types of reward on the performances of two types of creativity. First, we challenge the assumption that creativity is a homogeneous concept by classifying creativity into responsive creativity (for close-ended, presented problems) and expected creativity (for open-ended, self-discovered problems) (Unsworth, 2001). We design novel experimental tasks to examine whether the relationship between reward and creativity depends on the types of creativity. We predict and find that monetary reward (relative to no reward) positively affects creativity performance in the case of responsive creativity task, but negatively affects creativity performance in the case of expected creativity task. Second, we challenge the underlying assumption in the literature that reward always take the form of monetary reward by categorizing it into monetary and social-recognition reward. The experiment results show that compared to monetary reward, social-recognition reward leads to better performance in the expected creativity tasks, but not in the responsive creativity tasks. These results suggest that, when seeking to stimulate different types of creativity performance, it is important for managers to decide not only whether to use a reward, but also how the reward should be provided.

Presented at:

WU Vienna Creativity, Innovation and Entrepreneurship Symposium (2019); 2nd European Network for Experimental Accounting Research Conference (2019); AAA Management Accounting Section Midyear Meeting (2019); 11th Conference on New Directions in Management Accounting (2018); IE Business School Doctoral Consortium (2018)

"The Effect of Contract Framing on Different Stages of Creativity Performance"

Abstract: In this study, I experimentally examine the effects of incentive contract framing on two stages of the creativity process: idea generation and idea selection. For idea generation performance, I find that participants under the penalty contract outperform those under the bonus contract. Specifically, I predict and find that the penalty contract leads to a higher level of cognitive flexibility and greater novelty in the ideas generated. I further find that the positive effects of the penalty contract lead to better performance in the initial phase but not the later phase of the idea generation process. For the idea selection performance, I predict and find that participants under the penalty contract are more likely to select extreme novel ideas rather than balanced ideas that are both moderately novel and useful. This study contributes to the management control literature and the creativity literature by bringing to the forefront the neglected role of framing incentive contracts and the effects of such contracts on the performance of creative idea selection.

Presented at:

AAA Management Accounting Section Midyear Meeting (2020); Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association (2018); Doctoral Colloquium of the European Accounting Association (2018); 1st European Network for Experimental Accounting Research Conference (2017); IE Business School Doctoral Consortium (2017);