Research

My primary research defends novel theories of blame and of blameworthiness and uses them to resolve ethical issues that arise in the aftermath of wrongdoing. According to my theories, roughly put:

Theory of blame. To blame someone for something is to be unwilling to acquiesce to it. 

Theory of blameworthiness. A person is blameworthy for something just in case, and because, it exemplifies her policy some exemplifications of which are impermissible.

For context, my theory of blameworthiness above belongs to quality-of-will theories, a prominent family of theories of blameworthiness. I’ve listed several paper projects below, most though not all of which belong to this primary research. Contact me if you’re interested in talking about any of these or beyond.

“Blame and Acquiescence: How a Quality of Will Theorist Can Handle Exemption, Luck, and Diminution” (Philosophical Studies, 2025) [Penultimate Manuscript][Published Version]

defends my theory of blame by appeal to its unique capacity to explain away several intuitions that notoriously trouble quality-of-will theories as illusory. (A summary appeared in New Work in Philosophy)

“The Inconsistency of a Normative Pluriverse” (The Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming) [Penultimate Manuscript][Online First]

counters a recent influential challenge to normative realism raised separately by Justin Clarke-Doane and Matti Eklund.

A paper on a structural challenge for quality-of-will theories (e-mail me for a full draft)

presents, and draws a lesson from, a general structural challenge for quality-of-will theories.

A paper on my theory of blameworthiness (e-mail me for a detailed outline)

defends my theory of blameworthiness partly by appeal to its potential to address the above challenge.

A paper on forgiveness (e-mail me for a detailed outline)

defends a novel account of forgiveness by appeal to its unique capacity to explain the central normative dynamics of forgiveness.

A paper on manipulation arguments

counters manipulation arguments against compatibilism, to which my theory of blameworthiness belongs.

A paper on collective responsibility

argues that there’s no such thing.

A paper on the prospective conception of permissibility

defends the prospective conception of permissibility, in light of a certain ignored but robust relationship between permissibility and blameworthiness.

A paper on the relationship between permissibility and motives

argues that the permissibility of an action can never depend on its motives.

A paper on expressive actions

argues, against Rosalind Hursthouse’s influential claim to the contrary, that actions expressing emotions are actions done for reasons.

A paper on moral ignorance

argues that moral ignorance never excuses, on the grounds that pure moral beliefs cannot but be alien to the psychological reality (‘will’) whose quality determines blameworthiness.

A paper on hypocritical blame

argues that hypocritical blame is fine, insofar as it is genuine blame, while also arguing that what we take to be instances of hypocritical blame are often not instances of blame.

A paper on self-blame

argues that self-blame is a uniquely higher-order reaction than other-blame.

A paper on the fairness of blame

addresses the charge against compatibilism, to which my theory of blameworthiness belong, that it fails to do justice to the requirement that blame should be fair.

A paper on responsibility for consequences themselves

argues that there’s no such thing.