Abstract: This paper establishes a structural approach to epistemic reparation, thereby establishing a concept of structural epistemic remedy. I achieve this by employing the structural injustice approach, which identifies unjust or objectionable social structures that enable various types of injustices at a collective level and, importantly, articulates suitable remedies for these unjust and objectionable social structures. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I will establish an intergenerational rights-based approach to epistemic reparation. While doing so, I will identify a gap in the rights-based approach, resulting in a defense of an alternative structural injustice approach. I argue that the rights-based approach and structural injustice approach combined will result in a more complete epistemic justice after wrongdoing. Second, I articulate the structural injustice approach, thereby establishing a concept of structural epistemic remedy. I demonstrate that a successful implementation of epistemic remedy necessitates the acquisition of specific knowledge. I identify three types of knowledge that are required for a genuine structural remedy: One must know (1) which social structures require remedy, (2) how those social structures should be changed, and (3) whether additional reparations must be paid beyond structural remedies. Finally, I will argue that individuals may have distinct types of responsibility, what I call the structural-epistemic responsibility, for obtaining this knowledge for epistemic remedy.

Abstract: Linguistic justice is concerned with the just way of politically regulating linguistic diversity. Today, the linguistic-justice debate may be differentiated into three different domains: interlinguistic justice, intralinguistic justice, and global linguistic justice. Each of these domains has, to a significant extent, attracted different authors and debates, although the normative system underlying them is structurally similar. This introductory piece aims to provide context for our symposium dedicated to linguistic justice and migration by, first, giving an overview of linguistic justice, second, linking linguistic justice to migration, and, finally, providing an overview of the various papers in the symposium, situating them against the background developed in the first two sections.

Abstract: This paper develops a concept of relational linguistic continuity as a new basis to defend the right to linguistic survival. Relational linguistic continuity refers to a condition whereby individuals may continuously form human relations and have social interactions with others with whom they share the language of origin or of socialisation. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 critically engages with two distinct arguments that tackle the issue of linguistic survival: one based on equality of autonomy and another based on equality of dignity. Then, I point out that both arguments are insufficient for a full-fledged defence of linguistic survival. Section 3 develops a concept of relational linguistic continuity. I first introduce the seminal idea of linguistic security proposed by Leslie Green and Denise Réaume, which will be critically revised in order to develop my concept of relational linguistic continuity. I conclude with Section 4 by defending the right to linguistic survival and addressing potential criticisms. I argue that my concept of relational linguistic continuity successfully provides a basis to defend the right to linguistic survival.

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that publicly denying the “comfort women” issue—a case of military sexual slavery—often causes epistemic harms and that denialists have a responsibility to provide backward-looking epistemic repair. My response will extend Page’s contribution to the literature by providing additional arguments that support her claims. I will first provide arguments that defend criminalization in the first section and defend social sanction in the second section. Throughout my reply, I will mainly discuss speech acts that commit denialism and revisionism of the “comfort women” issue, assuming that this is a case of sexual atrocity and that there is an internationally established consensus regarding the case as a historical event that did occur.

Abstract: This article argues that some denialists of Japan’s military sexual slavery are responsible for past epistemic injustices. In the literature on epistemic responsibility, backward- and forward-looking justifications of responsibility are rarely distinguished. Moreover, notions of epistemic responsibility are mostly forward-looking. To fill the gap in the literature, this article offers a notion of backward-looking epistemic responsibility by arguing that some morally responsible agents who committed epistemic injustices are liable to make epistemic amends for past epistemic injustices. The article proceeds as follows. I introduce Japan’s military sexual slavery and how it is denied in two ways (state-led denial and individual-led denial). Both types of denial may involve epistemic injustices. Based on moral responsibility, I argue that some agents are liable to make epistemic amends for past epistemic injustices. I then offer three conditions to discern who is liable, which are conditions of causality, autonomy and epistemic competence. I apply my notion of backward-looking epistemic responsibility to Japan’s military sexual slavery and highlight its limits. Finally, I provide a concept of acknowledgment as a process of making epistemic amends.