The junior seminar aims at gathering PhD students and post-docs whose research topics deal with game theory in a broad sense. During the seminar, the participants may present their works, advanced or in progress, to their peers. They may also present articles they believe are interesting (in a journal club fashion). They can be theoretical economists, mathematicians or computer scientists.
The seminar takes place around every two weeks on Mondays before the senior game theory seminar, at 10am.
Participants who would like to give a talk are most welcome and are encouraged to contact the organizers. If you would like to join the seminar mailing list, please do not hesitate to contact the organizers as well.
Next Monday, October 12th, at the Institute Henri Poincaré (IHP) (room Maryam Mirzakhani 201), 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 75005, at 10:00 to 11:00.
Víctor Pérez will come to present his work, whose title and summary are:
Title : Multidimensional Bayesian Monopoly Regulation: Price-Caps and Pricing Below Marginal Cost.
Abstract : We characterize optimal Bayesian regulation of a monopolist with private marginal-cost and demand information, solving the continuous multidimensional problem left open by Lewis and Sappington (1988b) and Armstrong (1999). We disprove the conjecture that exclusion is generic. Optimal regulated prices follow a generalization of the adjusted-marginal-cost formula of Baron and Myerson (1982). Two novel and robust phenomena emerge. First, the regulator caps the firm's price, inducing bunching that arises independently of the distribution. Second, the optimal regulated price lies strictly below marginal cost for some firm types. Both arise because multidimensional incentive compatibility creates a systematic conflict between socially and privately desirable prices. We analyze how optimal policy responds to the regulator's efficiency-redistribution preferences and relative cost-demand uncertainty. The solution recovers Baron and Myerson (1982) and Lewis and Sappington (1988a) as opposite scalar limits. Finally, we identify common features and differences with the robust approach of Guo and Shmaya (2025).
Expected schedule:
28/09/2026 : Anne Reulke
12/10/2026 : Víctor Pérez
19/10/2026 : Sayan Mukherjee
26/10/2026 :
09/11/2026 : Ivan Conjeaud
23/11/2026 : Chang Wang
07/12/2026 : Alex Tordjamn
21/12/2026 :
Organizers:
Julian Chitiva (julian.chitiva[at]hec[dot]edu),
Francesco Giordano (francesco.giordano@hec.edu),
Melissa González García (melissa.gonzalez-garcia@dauphine.eu),
Emmanuel Lagrée (emmanuel.lagree[at]assas-universite[dot]fr),
Cyril Rouault (cyril.rouault[at]universite-paris-saclay[dot]fr).
Former Organizers: Felipe Garrido-Lucero, David Lurie.