Post-Truth pertains to the interaction between subjective beliefs and factual information. We study this interaction through a behavioral application of Bayesian technology. Agents do not learn but wish to validate their subjective beliefs around a topic of interest. When exposed to data that conflicts with their subjective prior beliefs, agents experience cognitive dissonance, measured via the overlap between prior and posterior beliefs. The dissonance can be reduced by acquiring (potentially biased) information which validates the subjective prior. In a multi-agent strategic setting, agents have incentive to provide conflicting information. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the two-player version of the game, which represents a bilateral debate between opposing views, is characterized by over-investment in biased information acquisition. This, in turn, leads to a distorted ex-post revealed distribution of information, exhibiting over-representation of extreme views. Said phenomenon is particularly pronounced when the cost of information acquisition is low, which arguably mimics debating in online social media.  

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