Egalitarianism in Preference Aggregation under Uncertainty
Vassili Vergopoulos (Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas)
Egalitarianism in Preference Aggregation under Uncertainty
Vassili Vergopoulos (Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas)
This paper puts forward a theory of preference aggregation under uncertainty that incorporates egalitarian concerns both ex ante and ex post and accommodates heterogeneity in individual utilities and beliefs. Existing approaches often appeal to a compromise between an ex ante perspective committing to the Pareto Condition (PC) and an ex post perspective committing to Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). In contrast, we maintain each of PC and SEU in their full force on adequately restricted domains. Key to our approach is Choquet integration and its Fubini-like properties.
(joint work with F. Ceron, UJM Saint Etienne)