We consider the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents where both agents and items are partitioned into disjoint groups. 

The first part of the talk will deal with diversity constraints. Following previous works on public housing allocation, each item (or house) belongs to a block (or building) and each agent is assigned a type (e.g. ethnicity group). The allocation problem consists in assigning at most one item to each agent in a good way while respecting diversity constraints. In this context, we investigate the issue of stability, understood here as the absence of mutually improving swaps, and we define the cost of requiring it. Then we study the behaviour of two existing allocation mechanisms: an adaptation of the sequential mechanism used in Singapore and a distributed procedure based on mutually improving swaps of items.

The second part of the talk will deal with fairness among groups of agents. More specifically we consider the notion of envy-freeness and investigate how it can be adapted to measure the envy between groups of different sizes in house allocation settings.

Retour page d'accueil du séminaire