Policy Work
Bruegel Working Paper 15/2023 (joint with Prof. Armin Steinbach)
We explore legal leeway for two approaches to debt-financing European Union spending: creation of extra budgetary, one-off and temporary EU funds to finance European public goods (similarly to NextGenerationEU), and debt-financing the EU’s regular budget, hence creating an on-budget, permanent borrowing capacity at EU level. We find that NGEU could in principle be replicated. This would require an amendment to the Own Resources Decision (ORD) – a unanimous Council decision that designates the main sources of EU financing and requires ratification by each member state – to authorise borrowing and specify how the borrowing proceeds are to be used. However, this approach would be constrained by the legal requirement that financing EU spending through ‘other revenues’ (as opposed to ‘own resources’ designated as such in the ORD) remain exceptional. As a result, no permanent EU tasks could be financed through NGEU-like funds and NGEU-like financing could not exceed financing through ‘own resources’ . We also find that, while EU primary law does not stop the EU from debt-financing its budget, the scope for EU borrowing would remain severely limited compared to a sovereign state. The permissible amount of borrowing must be specified in the ORD and the EU must be able to meet its debt service in any year, which must be secured by a sufficient amount of (non-borrowed) own resources. Finally, considerable flexibility exists for the spending of borrowed funds, regardless of whether this occurs through new NGEU-like extrabudgetary funds or on budget. Borrowed funds could be allocated to climate funding, cohesion policy, infrastructure or research. In the event that borrowing proceeds are established as an ‘own resource’ in an appropriately amended ORD, borrowed funds could even be used for general financing of the EU budget.
ECB Occasional Paper No. 251 (December, 2020)
As a response to the global financial crisis that started in 2008, many countries established dedicated resolution regimes that seek to limit the use of taxpayer money while maintaining the functions of failing banks that are critical for financial stability. This paper extends the existing research by zooming in on the specific topic of liquidity provision to banks in resolution. It examines the provision of liquidity in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada and the banking union of the European Union (thereafter: the “banking union”). The paper observes the differences and commonalities of policy choices across jurisdictions with regard to both the relationship between private prefunding and temporary public liquidity provision and the roles of the public budget and the central bank. The comparison also reveals that the role of fiscal authorities is strong and that guarantees from a public budget are a common feature. The framework for the provision of liquidity in the banking union is not yet complete as the construction of a public sector backstop of sufficient size and speed is comparatively more complex in the banking union than in other jurisdictions. Therefore, the idea of establishing a European-level guarantee framework – which would allow access to Eurosystem liquidity for banks coming out of resolution with limited collateral – is being further investigated.
VoxEU (Apr. 5, 2020)
To ensure that all EU countries can do what is necessary to fight the economic fallout of the pandemic, the fiscal costs of this crisis must be shared. This column proposes that the EU give member states €440 billion in grants to support health care, liquidity to the private sector, short-time work schemes and stimulus packages. The EU should raise the funds in bond markets backed by guarantees. It also shows how this is could work under EU law.
Press Coverage:
Financial Times
Reuters
Handelsblatt
El Pais
Die Presse
Jacques Delors Centre, Policy Brief (Mar. 25, 2020)
The ECB has announced a 750-billion-euro purchase programme to fight the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. But like all ECB programmes in recent years, the new Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) will likely be challenged in court. Sebastian Grund assesses in this Policy Brief whether the PEPP will likely survive a legal challenge. He argues that the PEPP is compatible with EU law because it meets the three criteria the Court of Justice of the EU has established to check the legality of monetary policy measures: First, the PEPP falls within the ECB’s mandate. Second, it respects the principle of proportionality. And third, it does not violate the prohibition of monetary financing. This assessment even holds if the ECB were to relax some of the constraints in the PEPP like the issuer limit.
Press Coverage:
The Economist
Financial Times
Publico
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung