Research

During the first wave of democratization, authoritarian elites expanded the franchise while imposing or maintaining stringent officeholding requirements, limiting access to top state positions to the affluent and educated. Although definitions of democracy assume citizens can vote and stand for election, the right to seek office is rarely considered in measures of democracy. This paper emphasizes this omission and examines its implications for the political economy of democracy. Leveraging historical government spending data from 27 countries in Western Europe and the Americas (1800-1975), I find that suffrage expansion consistently predicts redistributive spending only when broad eligibility rules are present. I also provide evidence for the political selection mechanism underlying this relationship. Taking officeholding requirements seriously offers a new perspective on elite capture and underscores the partial nature of first-wave democratization.

This chapter traces the trajectory of state power in Argentina since its formation, revealing a paradox of high-capacity moments overshadowed by chronic fragility. Despite periods of robust governance—evident in sophisticated tax systems, public health initiatives, and industrial policies—the Argentine state has failed to sustain prosperity and inclusion. The chapter argues that this stems from the intractability of Argentina’s economy and territory, where abundant resources prove insufficient to govern a fragmented mosaic of regions and social classes. This dynamic explains the state’s mixed record: bursts of brilliance eclipsed by persistent powerlessness. Dissecting debates on state power, the analysis shows that Argentine weakness derives more from a lack of autonomy—constrained by powerful classes and regional elites—than from deficient capacity, such as an undereducated bureaucracy or inadequate fiscal resources.