Does Situated Knowledge Provide a Critical Standpoint?   by Sally Haslanger

One strategy for illuminating and addressing structural injustice is to call for diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) in the process of knowledge production and dissemination. Because this approach rightly assumes that one’s social position affects what one knows, it is sometimes defended as a form of “standpoint epistemology.” However, the term ‘standpoint epistemology’ emerged as an effort to address the problem of ideology, and situated knowledge is not itself sufficient to establish a critical standpoint.  Because ideology, when successful, recruits us into fluent participation in an unjust structure, some of those who are subject to subordination will not develop or accept a critique of it.  Critique may take aim at deeply held identities that both enable one to coordinate with others and provide a basis for self-esteem. So although the claim that “all knowledge is situated” is true, and although efforts to include diverse knowers in inquiry is important, this will not always (or even usually) be enough to disrupt ideological practices. Situated knowledge may just provide knowledge of the practice, without knowledge of what makes it problematic or what would be better.  What’s needed is situated critical knowledge – not just knowledge of the practice, or knowledge from within the practice - which offers insight into the ideological function of the practice and a space of alternatives.  What, then, would critical knowledge production and dissemination practices look like?  How would they go beyond standard practices of diversity, equity, and inclusion to promote anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-ableist, anti-colonial, anti-capitalist knowledge?

Incorporating diversity dimensions in philosophy research     by Eugénie Hunsicker

Philosophy, along with mathematics and the physical sciences, is often seen as aiming to understand truths that are independent of humanity and human cultures.  For this reason, it is often difficult to understand or see the relevance either of calls (eg, by ERC) to consider the sex/gender dimension in research or the demands of decolonisation in research and teaching.  In this talk, I will talk about the context of these calls, the reactions that researchers may have to these, and some suggestions of how to incorporate these concerns productively into a research programme.

Endometriosis and Source Based Epistemic Injustice   by Lara Jost

Endometriosis is a common gynaecological disorder where the lining of the womb grows outside of it, causing inflammation, pain and subfertility. In the UK, patients suffering from endometriosis have to wait an average of 7.5 years between the first time they report symptoms and the time they get a diagnosis (Endometriosis UK). Other countries do not fare much better, as patients around the world have to wait an average of 5.5 years in individual or private-insure funded healthcare or an average of 8.3 years with government-funded healthcare. Despite increased discussions about epistemic injustice in the domain of healthcare, one phenomenon around endometriosis cannot be explained by the currently available framework: the discrepancy in diagnostic time between patients consulting for pelvic pain and those consulting for infertility. Indeed, patients who consult primarily for infertility wait on average 3.4 years less than patients who consult for pelvic pain. Why is there such an important discrepancy in the diagnostic time between these patients who have the same illness? To answer this question, I first provide an expansion to the concept of epistemic injustice, called source based epistemic injustice, which highlights the unfairness towards knowers who use epistemic methods based on currently unapproved sources of knowledge, like pain and other types of affective experience. I then use this new framework to highlight why patients consulting for pelvic pain suffer from an additional form of epistemic injustice, thus explaining the diagnostic delay. Ultimately, I explain how clinical methods relying on ‘mechanical objectivity’ put endometriosis patients with pelvic pain in an irreconcilable epistemic tension that can only be resolved by reforming our epistemological theories and incorporating affective experience within our approved sources of knowledge. 

Epistemic inclusion of marginalized groups in physics   by Vlasta Sikimić

Research in social epistemology emphasizes the importance of cognitive diversity in physics and science in general. On the other hand, without inclusion, the positive potential of cognitive diversity cannot be obtained. Moreover, epistemic inclusion, as a process of incorporating diverse opinions of others, is dependent on the social inclusion of marginalized groups in science. Gender imbalance is common in STEM and early-career researchers are fundamentally dependent on their mentors. I will present the results from an empirical study of job satisfaction and satisfaction with the academic system among physicists (N=123) mainly working in large laboratories. The satisfaction with the academic system scale measures experience of research autonomy, opportunities to use one's knowledge, and appreciation of the research by the general public. According to the findings, physicists are less satisfied with the academic system than with their work setting. Furthermore, female scientists and junior researchers are more dissatisfied with their jobs. The findings highlight the importance of improving work and research conditions for marginalized groups in physics. Some of the ways of achieving this are promoting inclusiveness and transforming the dominating masculine culture in the field. Finally, physicists feel that the general public does not understand their work. Since science plays an important role in contemporary society,  this is also an aspect that requires our attention.