# Working Papers

**Comparative Advertising: The role of prices**

In markets where firms sell similar goods to their competitors, firms may be able to free-ride off the costly price signalling of competitor firms by engaging in price comparative advertising. As the goods are similar consumers can reason that if one good is high quality (revealed for instance through price signalling) then so is the other. This paper models this phenomenon and finds that in equilibrium there will be firms price signalling as well as freeriding firms that signal through advertising. Surplus is strictly higher in markets where advertising firms are active relative to pure price signalling markets. In some cases advertising markets can be even more efficient than full information markets as advertisers surrender market power to avoid costly price signalling.

**JEL Codes: D82, D83, M37 **

**Keywords: Comparative advertising, Price Signalling**

**Version as MPRA Paper No. 79872**

For a nontechnical explanation of this paper please press here

**It's good to be bad: A model of low quality dominance in a full information consumer search market** **(with Margaryta Klymak)**

This paper examines a consumer search market exhibiting vertically differentiated firms, heterogeneous consumers and endogenous consumer market entry. In an asymmetric information setting high and low quality firms make equal sales and profit in this market. Conversely when there is full information, search frictions induce an unravelling mechanism that leads to a unique refined equilibrium where all consumers approach low quality firms and high quality firms make no sales or profit. This presents a rationale for why low quality firms may disclose their quality and high quality firms may not even when disclosure is costless.

**JEL Codes: D82, D83, L15 **

**Keywords: Quality Disclosure, Consumer Search**

**Version as Edinburgh School of Economics discussion paper 280**

For a nontechnical explanation of this paper please press here

**Fixed Point Acceleration in R**** (with Margaryta Klymak)**

A fixed point problem is one where we seek a vector X for a function f(x) such that f ( X ) = X . The solution of many such problems can be accelerated by using a fixed point acceleration algorithm. With the release of the FixedPoint package there is now a number of algorithms available in R that can be used for accelerating the finding of a fixed point of a function. These algorithms include Newton acceleration, Aitken acceleration and Anderson acceleration as well as epsilon extrapolation methods and minimal polynomial methods. This paper demonstrates the use of fixed point accelerators in solving numerical mathematics problems using the algorithms of the FixedPoint package as well as the squarem method of the SQUAREM package.