About Me
I am a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Cologne.
My research focuses on topics in personnel economics and managerial accounting. I study the effects of managerial discretion and algorithmic decision-making using field experiments in firms, online experiments, surveys and existing non-experimental firm data.
You can find my CV here.
Email:
opitz[at]wiso.uni-koeln.de
Research
The Algorithmic Assignment of Incentive Schemes
with Dirk Sliwka, Timo Vogelsang and Tom Zimmermann
Management Science (forthcoming), Working Paper [here ]
Abstract: The assignment of individuals with different observable characteristics to different treatments is a central question in designing optimal policies. We study this question in the context of increasing workers’ performance via targeted incentives, using machine learning algorithms with worker demographics, personality traits, and preferences as input. Running two large-scale experiments we show that (i) performance can be predicted by accurately measured worker characteristics, (ii) a machine learning algorithm can detect heterogeneity in responses to different schemes, (iii) a targeted assignment of schemes to individuals increases performance significantly above the level of the single best scheme, and (iv) algorithmic assignment is more effective for workers who have a high likelihood to repeatedly interact with the employer, or who provide more consistent survey answers.
Discretion Over Bonus Timing
with Sidney T. Block, Dirk Sliwka, and Timo Vogelsang
Revision requested at The Accounting Review, Working Paper [here ]
Abstract: We study bonus assignments by managers who have discretion over bonus timing, analyzing extensive personnel records and linked survey data from a multinational firm. We find that – even though the bonus system is intended to provide timely rewards – managers award most bonuses at the end of a year. However, employees report significantly higher levels of perceived recognition when receiving a bonus during rather than at the end of the year. We explore potential mechanisms driving bonus timing and employee reactions. Results from a field experiment suggest bonus delay is not due to managerial inattention. Rather, our evidence suggests that delay is driven by a precautionary savings motive and procrastination, leading to a "use-it-or-lose-it" spending spike at the end of the year. We furthermore provide evidence indicating that the strong association between earlier bonuses and recognition is not driven by their more surprising nature but rather by more immediate feedback provision.
Work in Progress
Habit Formation in Organizations
with Leonhard Grabe and Dirk Sliwka
Who Should Receive Relative Feedback? And Why?
with Dirk Sliwka, Timo Vogelsang and Tom Zimmermann
The Role of Bad Managers
Highlighting Benefits in Job Ads