About Me
About Me
Embedded Files
I am Assistant Professor at WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management.
My research focuses on topics in personnel economics and managerial accounting. I study the effects of managerial discretion and algorithmic decision-making using field experiments in firms, online experiments, surveys and existing non-experimental firm data.
You can find my CV here.
Email:
saskia.opitz[at]whu.edu
Research
Research
The Algorithmic Assignment of Incentive Schemes
with Dirk Sliwka, Timo Vogelsang and Tom Zimmermann
Management Science, 2025, 71(2):1546-1563, Working Paper [here ]
Abstract: The assignment of individuals with different observable characteristics to different treatments is a central question in designing optimal policies. We study this question in the context of increasing workers’ performance via targeted incentives, using machine learning algorithms with worker demographics, personality traits, and preferences as input. Running two large-scale experiments we show that (i) performance can be predicted by accurately measured worker characteristics, (ii) a machine learning algorithm can detect heterogeneity in responses to different schemes, (iii) a targeted assignment of schemes to individuals increases performance significantly above the level of the single best scheme, and (iv) algorithmic assignment is more effective for workers who have a high likelihood to repeatedly interact with the employer, or who provide more consistent survey answers.
Highlighting Benefits in Job Ads: Field Experimental Evidence
Journal of Management Accounting Research, 2026, 1–23 [here ]
Abstract: In this study, I investigate the impact of visually highlighting specific information in job advertisements on the number of applicants and the composition of the applicant pool. In collaboration with a recruiting service provider, I conducted field experiments with job ads from over 40 firms on social media platforms where potential candidates see job ads that highlight working-from-home options, flexible working hours, or no job characteristic. Using the results from 3,348 applications for 176 ads, I find that highlighting either of these flexible work options, compared with not highlighting any job characteristic, significantly increases the number of applicants. Additionally, an analysis of the applicant pool shows that the share of female applicants is higher when flexible working hours are highlighted. Finally, I do not find evidence that visually highlighting either flexibility option reduces applicant quality, measured in terms of candidate-job fit, or continuation in the application process.
Discretion Over Bonus Timing
with Sidney T. Block, Dirk Sliwka, and Timo Vogelsang
Working Paper [here ]
Abstract: We study bonus assignments by managers who have discretion over bonus timing. We first illustrate in a formal model that there is a basic tension between providing timely recognition to employees and assigning bonuses based on reliable information. We show that the latter rationally causes a delay in bonus assignments as managers aim at gathering more information to assess performance signals correctly. Analyzing extensive personnel records and linked survey data from a multinational firm, we find that – even in a bonus system intended to provide timely rewards throughout the year – managers award most bonuses at the end of a year and provide evidence for the importance of the information acquisition channel. However, our survey results also reveal that employees who receive bonuses earlier in the year perceive a stronger recognition compared to those receiving late bonuses. Thus, firms face a trade-off between collecting reliable information and providing timely recognition.
Shaping Habits in Organizations: A Field Experiment
with Leonhard Grabe and Dirk Sliwka
Working Paper [here ]
Abstract: We investigate whether organizations can shape work habits through monetary incentives. In a field experiment with 829 service technicians in 15 firms, we randomly allocated half of the technicians in each firm to a treatment group receiving bonuses for regularly performing sales activities for 12 weeks. We find a significant increase in sales activities not only during but also after the incentive phase. Using data from a post-experimental survey, we compare different behavioral channels. We find no evidence for increased automaticity, human capital acquisition, or signals about task priorities, but strong evidence for the role of acquired taste: Technicians in the treatment group report higher levels of intrinsic motivation to perform sales activities even after the incentive has been discontinued.
Work in Progress
Targeting Targets
with Dirk Sliwka, Marina Talantceva, Timo Vogelsang and Tom Zimmermann
Who Should Receive Relative Feedback? And Why?
with Dirk Sliwka, Timo Vogelsang and Tom Zimmermann
The Role of Bad Managers
Page updated
Google Sites
Report abuse