About Me
I am a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Cologne.
My research focuses on topics in personnel economics and managerial accounting. I study the effects of managerial discretion and algorithmic decision-making using field experiments in firms, online experiments, surveys and existing non-experimental firm data.
You can find my CV here.
Email:
opitz[at]wiso.uni-koeln.de
Research
The Algorithmic Assignment of Incentive Schemes
with Dirk Sliwka, Timo Vogelsang and Tom Zimmermann
Management Science (forthcoming), Working Paper [here ]
Abstract: The assignment of individuals with different observable characteristics to different treatments is a central question in designing optimal policies. We study this question in the context of increasing workers’ performance via targeted incentives, using machine learning algorithms with worker demographics, personality traits, and preferences as input. Running two large-scale experiments we show that (i) performance can be predicted by accurately measured worker characteristics, (ii) a machine learning algorithm can detect heterogeneity in responses to different schemes, (iii) a targeted assignment of schemes to individuals increases performance significantly above the level of the single best scheme, and (iv) algorithmic assignment is more effective for workers who have a high likelihood to repeatedly interact with the employer, or who provide more consistent survey answers.
Discretion Over Bonus Timing
with Sidney T. Block, Dirk Sliwka, and Timo Vogelsang
Revision requested at The Accounting Review, Working Paper [here ]
Abstract: We study bonus assignments by managers who have discretion over bonus timing, analyzing extensive personnel records and linked survey data from a multinational firm. We find that – even though the bonus system is intended to provide timely rewards – managers award most bonuses at the end of a year. As predicted by a rational Bayesian learning model, we find supportive evidence for an information acquisition channel according to which managers delay bonuses because they want to gather more information to assess performance signals correctly. However, our survey results also reveal that employees who receive bonuses earlier in the year perceive a stronger recognition compared to those receiving late bonuses. Thus, the bonus delay - while potentially rational for the managers aiming at allocating bonuses to the most deserving employees - may therefore not be optimal from a company's perspective.
Work in Progress
Highlighting Benefits in Job Ads: A Field Experiment
Abstract: In this study, I investigate the impact of highlighting specific information in job advertisements on the number of applicants and the composition of the applicant pool. In collaboration with a recruiting service provider, I conducted a field experiment with job ads from over 40 firms on social media platforms where potential candidates see job ads that highlight either work-from-home, flexible work hours, or no job characteristic. Using the results from 3,348 applications for 176 job ads, I find that highlighting either of these flexible work options, compared to not highlighting any job characteristic, significantly increases the number of applicants. Additionally, an analysis of the applicant pool shows that the share of female applicants is higher when flexible work hours are highlighted. Finally, by leveraging the diversity of job types included in the experiment, I further show evidence on heterogeneity.
Shaping Habits in Organizations: A Field Experiment
with Leonhard Grabe and Dirk Sliwka
Who Should Receive Relative Feedback? And Why?
with Dirk Sliwka, Timo Vogelsang and Tom Zimmermann
The Role of Bad Managers