Working Papers
Title: Have I seen you before? Measuring the value of tracking for digital advertising (with G. Cecere)
Abstract: We investigate the effect of privacy protection rules on targeting efficiency and ad prices. We use a change in Apple's privacy policy (the App Tracking Transparency) which was introduced in Spring 2021, as a natural experiment. This new feature of the iOS 14 is aimed at providing users with more control over their privacy by requiring app developers to request explicit permission to track users beyond the app in use. However, it is expected to reduce ad effectiveness. We use an original database of Facebook ad estimated performance to measure the effect of Apple's new policy on ad targeting efficiency and ad prices. Our empirical strategy allows us to measure variations in both of these aspects by comparing the outcomes of ad campaigns targeting iOS versus Android users in the US. The results suggest that the privacy policy reduces targeting efficiency and ad prices for ads targeting iOS users compared to Android users. Our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of a simple monopoly model affected by a quality shock to one of its products.
Title: Hitting the Right Target? Pricing and Advertising Strategies in Digital Markets (with G. Cecere & W. Sand-Zantman)
Abstract: We investigate how a monopoly network should organize and price advertising campaigns for commercial firms. We assume that the network is better able to identify the right target audience but that this requires it to learn the characteristics of the firms. Differences in firms' private information such as the value that they can generate and their characteristics, generate some non-standard incentive issues. We show how the ad network copes with these differences by altering both the efficiency of the targeting process and the prices charged to different types of firms. Preliminary empirical evidence based on ad pricing for different audiences, ranging from broad to narrow targeting, confirms our predictions.
Other papers (work in progress)
Title: Coopetition between platforms
Abstract: In this paper I develop a model in which two platforms are substitutable on one side but can all the range from perfect substitutes to perfect complements on the other side. I analyze the optimal strategies and cooperation incentives of the platforms and assess whether cooperation is socially desirable. The paper shows that when platforms are rather complementary on this second side, they are able to choose a price that optimizes their demand-margin trade-off, leaving some surplus to consumers. Moreover, cooperation incentives of platforms are aligned with the best interest of consumers. However, when platforms are close substitutes on this second side, they are constrained in their choice of price and choose to extract all the consumer surplus. In this case, even though firms have an incentive to cooperate, this is detrimental to consumers.
Title: Self-regulation in the data industry
2023: Digital Economy Workshop (Lausanne)
2022: Doctoral Workshop on the Economics of Digitization (Munich)
EEA-ESEM (Milan)
2021: EARIE Conference (Bergen)
2019: EARIE Conference (Barcelona)
Business Economics, Master (English): 2016, 2018 & 2019, Toulouse School of Management
Game Theory, Master (English): 2018, Toulouse School of Economics
Microeconomics 1, 2 & 3, Bachelor (French and English): 2015, 2017 & 2020, Toulouse School of Economics
