Welcome to my webpage!
I am an Assistant Professor of Finance at the Aarhus University's Department of Economics and Business Economics.
My research interest lie in empirical corporate finance with a focus on climate finance and innovation.
Welcome to my webpage!
I am an Assistant Professor of Finance at the Aarhus University's Department of Economics and Business Economics.
My research interest lie in empirical corporate finance with a focus on climate finance and innovation.
Publications
Impact of Regulation on Firm Value: Evidence from the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2024, 59(4), 1659 - 1691
Abstract: Using the 2016 US presidential election result as a shock to the expectations about the future regulatory environment, I find that most regulated firms earned approximately 4% higher cumulative abnormal stock returns than least regulated firms during the first 10 trading days after the election. Exploring economic mechanisms, I find evidence consistent with the explanation that more regulations disproportionately harm high-growth firms and allow incumbent firms to extract rents through lower competition and political favoritism. Stock returns are also followed by a shift in firm fundamentals over the three years after 2016, consistent with the economic mechanisms.
Other Publications
Reproducibility in Management Science (with Miloš Fišar, Ben Greiner, Christoph Huber, Elena Katok, Ali I. Ozkes, and the Management Science Reproducibility Collaboration) -- As member of the Management Science Reproducibility Collaboration
Working Papers
Presented at the AFA 2024 PhD Poster Session, Conference on Climate & Energy Finance 2023, NFA 2023, Corporate Finance Days 2023, ESF PhD Workshop 2023, FMA Europe 2022, GRASFI 2022, DGF 2022
Abstract: I document the existence of a novel market for internal resource reallocation within firms, specifically, internal carbon markets in the European Union Emissions Trading System. Firms transfer carbon permits to subsidiaries that have received insufficient free permits from the regulator to help offset their additional emissions. In response to a policy change that restricts the supply of free carbon permits, subsidiaries of firms with internal carbon markets emit more carbon, consistent with the cross--subsidization of carbon permits internally. Further analysis suggests that this behavior is driven by efforts to reduce differences in divisional profitability and to manage uncertainty about future carbon prices. Overall, the paper highlights a novel mechanism that limits the effectiveness of market--based climate policies even without carbon leakage.
Nature-Related Risks in Syndicated Lending (with Aras Canipek, Jiri Tresl, Lukas Zimmermann)
Presented at the AEA 2025, AFA 2026 (scheduled), GRASFI 2025 (scheduled), Third Aarhus Workshop on Strategic Interaction 2025 (scheduled), Conference on Biodiversity in Finance and Accounting 2025 (scheduled)
Abstract: This study examines how nature-related risks are considered in syndicated lending, showing that firms highly dependent on ecosystem services (nature–dependent firms) incur higher financing costs. Using U.S. syndicated loan data and a novel nature dependency measure, we find a 1% rise in nature dependency results in a 0.32% increase in loan spreads. Leveraging the 2019 Endangered Species Act (ESA) amendment as an exogenous shock, we show regulatory relaxation lowered spreads for nature–dependent firms. Regulating ecosystem services – vital to environmental stability – exert the most influence on lending costs, suggesting that natural capital risks are increasingly internalized by financial markets. We also highlight the role of refinancing risk in how banks price nature dependency of borrowers.
Angels and Demons: The Negative Effect of Employees' Angel Investments on Corporate Innovation (with Clemens Mueller)
Presented at the EFA 2022, NFA PhD Symposium 2021, AOM 2021, EFMA 2021, AFFI 2021, WEFI 2021, Eastern FA 2021, FMCG Conference 2021, RISE3 Workshop 2020
Abstract: We link data on angel investors in the US to their employment history and show that employers’ innovation output decreases when their employees personally invest in start-ups. Our evidence is consistent with agency conflicts as the reason for lower innovation output. Angel investors divert time and effort from their employer to their personal investments. The effects are more pronounced when angel investments offer stronger financial incentives. In contrast, start-ups benefit from financing by angel investors employed at public firms. We highlight a trade-off between the benefits of angel investors for start-ups and the costs for their employer.
Project supported by INQUIRE Europe
Presented at Aarhus University, University of Technology Sydney, University of New South Wales, University of Sydney, ISCFS Conference 2024, ISF Conference Northwestern 2025
Abstract: Emission trading systems (ETS) are an important policy tool to reduce carbon emissions and fight climate change. However, the local nature of all existing ETSs gives rise to the possibility of carbon leakage, i.e., that firms emit more in regions not subject to an ETS to save costs. We use satellite-based production facility location data and provide evidence that firms from the cement and steel industry (which are responsible for more than a third of all industrial carbon emissions) with production facilities within the EU leak emissions to countries not affected by the EU ETS. They do so by emitting more in their non-EU facilities and by acquiring new facilities outside the EU. Emissions are more likely to be leaked to pollution havens. Additionally, firms headquartered in countries with more developed financial markets and in civil law countries as well as private firms leak more emissions. Financially constrained firms are more likely to leak emissions within their existing network of facilities, while unconstrained firms are more likely to acquire new non-EU facilities.
Work in Progress
Public Participation and Pollution Control (with Stefan Ruenzi)