Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy
brought to you by Ron Yezzi
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
Minnesota State University, Mankato
© Copyright 2015, 2020 by Ron Yezzi
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Topics
Individuals and Society
Earlier Works
Universities in The Age of Morality
Dialogue: A Confrontation of Values
Dialogue: Pornography Forum
The American Ideal: Its Past and Future
Is It Ethical to Risk the Total Destruction of Humanity?
Energy: A Tale of Two Crises
Some Principles of Social Policy
Meanings of Racism, Sexism, and Discrimination
Generally, you will find some mellowing of my views since the time of these earlier writings. Yet there are also strains of thought that continue. I am less convinced now of the power of rational persuasion. Oftentimes, events are more powerful than arguments in bringing about change. "Less convinced and "oftentimes" are key words here. Rational persuasion is still worth pursuing; and when major events occur, there is a need for rational programs to give direction to any response.
This essay argues that we live in the Age of Morality and that universities should be the dominant institution. It is a manifesto-type document that went nowhere--although it probably explains the direction of a good deal of my subsequent philosophical activity. I offered some reflections on the essay and the status of universities in relation to politics in a retirement lecture. An outline of the lecture can be found In a Personal View.
This is an imaginary dialogue involving President Richard Nixon about the good life and society--written before the Watergate breakin.
Study Guide: sgconfrontationofvalues1a.pdf
This is an imaginary dialogue arguing that pornography is not fully protected by the 1st Amendment and can cause sufficient harm to justify at least some restrictions on the most extreme forms of pornography.
Study Guide: sgpornographyforum1a.pdf
Bicentennial reflections on the United States: After laying out the distinction between negative and positive freedom and between materialistic and humanistic interpretations of the American Ideal, I argued for positive freedom and the humanistic interpretation as our best hope for the future. I used very general interpretations of capitalism and socialism here: Capitalism is an economic system based upon the protection of private property; and socialism is an economic system based upon ascertainment and protection of the common good. The paper was presented as a "Runner-up" Lecture in association with the President's Lecture Series at MSU. An earlier, simpler draft of the paper was presented in a bicentennial symposium at the University of Dayton.)
In the article, I argue that nuclear war is morally unacceptable if it entails the total destruction of humanity--interpreted as "the total destruction of the important values and valued ways of life, created by human beings over the course of many centuries" rather than as "the total destruction of life on earth." More particularly, the article considers whether or not a nation can retaliate when another nation launches an attack, if retaliation will lead to the total destruction of humanity. My title for the article is, "Ethical Ground Zero."
The first crisis, generally recognized, deals with energy shortages and the nation's need to assure sufficient energy supplies. The second crisis, not generally recognized and the one I stressed, is the nation's "addiction" to energy-consumption and the need to overcome that addiction.
Below you will find a list of eight principles that state formally some basic notions about social justice. Although many persons may overlook some of these principles, they all relate to common experience. The principles were worked out because of their relevance to the affirmative action issue.
Human injustice arises directly through the way some human beings treat other human beings. For example, African-Americans have had to endure the past heritage of slavery, intimidation, and discrimination as well as present instances of racism at the hands of whites. Native Americans have had to endure the destructive consequences of the European invasion of the Americas. And women have had to endure centuries of suppression due to male-dominance. Affirmative action is a way of providing compensation for these past human injustices.
Social injustice occurs due to the way social forces, circumstances, and institutions treat human beings. Victimization can occur even without a specific intention by some person(s) to perpetrate an injustice--because a technological innovation or a cultural attitude or an institutional practice harms some group.
For example, a new tanning method in 1871 that rendered buffalo hides suitable for making the same leather goods as cowhide led to the hunting and annihilation, in just fifteen years, of the great buffalo herds of the Western Plains--thereby destroying a central element in the culture of Native Americans living on the Plains.
Generations of white persons, raised within a cultural climate of racial superiority, ascribed the plight of African-Americans to laziness or to mental inferiority rather than to the detrimental effects of their social conditions.
The transition from an agrarian economy with large families and unskilled or semi-skilled workers to an industrialized, affluent economy with fewer children and numerous status positions for a skilled, diverse work force (generally male) lessened the worth of women's traditional role as mothers and homemakers--thereby increasing the inequalities between men and women.
The appreciation of social injustice results from more than a century of inquiry into social conditions as they affect human beings; it corresponds with the rise of the social/behavioral sciences. What is especially significant about social injustice is the obligation to redress injustice even without clear lines of responsibility tracing precisely who discriminated against whom, who benefited from other people's discrimination, and who suffers as a result of past discrimination. The need to rectify social injustice stands as a strong counter to The Specific Victim Position.
Generally speaking, the goal of equal opportunity becomes meaningless to the extent that some groups are handicapped, relative to others, in their ability to take advantage of social opportunities. Groups who carry with them the harmful consequences of being past victims of human or social injustice do not compete on equal ground with groups who are not victims of comparable injustice. Hence equal opportunity becomes meaningless when these consequences of past circumstances are not taken into account.
As a general rule (but not an absolute one), African-American children growing up in the midst of poverty and gang warfare do not have the same opportunities to advance in society as do the children of wealthy, white Americans.
Note that there is a difference between a call for equality of opportunity and a call for equality. Society's attempt to maximize equality of opportunity is a more realistic goal than striving for general equality—since differences in ability, motivation, and interest constitute a formidable hindrance to general equality. (This does not mean however that there should not be specific areas of equality--such as equality before the law or one person, one vote.)
Expecting persons to take responsibility for their own actions is a familiar principle of social policy commonly advocated in U.S. society. As an ideal, the principle accords well with our basic notions of what it means to function as a moral agent and it has fairly obvious beneficial consequences for society. So I would not want to eliminate the principle or downplay its desirability—although I think that we need to make clear two qualifications.
First, although we encourage taking responsibility for one's actions as an ideal and often do hold them responsible in practice, we also make frequent exceptions in practice by giving persons second and third "chances." For example, it is not unusual (a) to allow students to repeat courses, (b) to treat persons for injuries of their own doing (such as driving and skiing accidents), and (c ) to overlook or treat gently persons' mistakes because we recognize making mistakes as a normal result of human imperfection.
Secondly, taking responsibility for "one's own actions" is not as simple a notion as it may first seem--when our actions exhibit our group associations in addition to any independent self-directedness. My own actions depend heavily (some would say "wholly") upon the groups I belong to. For example, while my being a philosophy professor is central to many of "my own" actions, it is unlikely that I would have become a philosophy professor if I had grown up and lived under quite different social circumstances. Even the degree to which we accept the Taking Responsibility for One's Own Actions Principle often is dependent upon what we were taught or upon our social circumstances. (Thus, if parents stress the need for teaching their own children the principle, they also should recognize that children growing up with a different parental upbringing may well have less allegiance to the principle.)
Thirdly, there are three factors involved with personal responsibility that need to be taken into consideration:
Factor (1) The Common, Individualistic Meaning: Personal responsibility requires that you admit to and accept the consequences of your choices and actions, whether the consequences are fortunate or unfortunate, praiseworthy or blameworthy.
Factor (2) Knowledge: Personal responsibility requires that you be sufficiently well-informed to make good choices and perform good actions.
Factor (3) Added Conditions with Respect to Personal Responsibility: Numerous conditions seriously affect our lives without our having chosen them. These conditions have advantageous or harmful effects that are not equally distributed among everyone; so accomplishments and shortcomings are not simply matters of personal determination or shoddy effort. Aside from personal experience, there is an enormous amount of evidence in the biological, social, and behavioral sciences that supports this more expansive view of human beings.
Although taking responsibility for others' actions is counterintuitive at first, most persons quickly recognize the need to take this type of responsibility when people have a supervisory role or when they encourage or condone someone else's wrongful actions. Responsibility for others' actions based on benefits however seldom receives equally quick recognition.
I often hear a person say something like this: "I don't feel guilty about discrimination against persons or groups in the past when I had nothing to do with the actions." And the person may add that this situation is quite different from supervising, encouraging, or condoning the actions.
Suppose that we consider the following case: In good faith, you buy a used bike for $100. You proceed to improve it— refinishing the bike, adding a new set of gears, replacing the seat and wheels, repairing the chain for it, and tuning it up—so that the bike is now worth $450. Accordingly, you both benefited from the initial sale and put some money and effort of your own into improving the bike. It then turns out that the bike was stolen. There is no reason for you to feel guilty about possessing stolen goods—since you did not participate in, have a supervisory role in, encourage, condone, intend, or even know about the theft. Yet you have a responsibility to make restitution to the legal owner at least to the extent of compensating the person for the value of the bike when you first obtained it. (You also may try to recover your $100 from the thief.)
This case illustrates how, quite aside from guilt, you sometimes need to take responsibility for restitution simply because you benefited from someone else's wrongful action.
In a similar way, white males as a group who benefited from past discrimination against women and minorities consequently have a responsibility to provide compensation.
Avoidance of harm takes precedence before doing good, because harm is more easily decided upon and resources are limited. Once one can document the extensive harm done to minorities and women through discrimination or under-representation--harm greater than that experienced by white European males--avoiding this harm becomes more important than the social good in providing white European males with the opportunity to achieve self-realization in some specific field.
For example, lower proportions of minorities and women in professional schools (such as in law and medicine) does severe harm to these groups both with respect to past discrimination and under-representation. Avoiding this harm prevents some white males from achieving their specific aspirations for self-realization. Yet the measures taken to avoid harm through preferential treatment take precedence before the social good of allowing white males the opportunity to achieve their specific aspirations--so long as the general opportunities available to them in society are considerably greater than those available to the groups benefiting from preferential treatment. (This proviso eliminates the possibility that white males as a group will be suffering much greater harm than the groups getting preferential treatment.)
The requirement that social policy should serve the interests of types of individuals and groups rather than each individual in the society in the process of serving the greatest good for the greatest number amounts to a realistic recognition that the society cannot serve each individual's interest in every case. There are all sorts of injustices (or better perhaps, perceptions of unfairness) that citizens have to accept because eliminating them causes worse injustices. Here is a list of some examples:
(a) The criminal justice system leads to conviction of some innocent persons and acquittal of some guilty ones;
(b) Some persons who do not qualify for welfare assistance are more needy than some persons who do qualify;
(c) The voting age for Presidential elections is eighteen, even though some younger persons are more mature and better informed than some persons over eighteen years of age;
(d) In states where the drinking age is twenty-one, some younger persons are more capable of drinking alcohol responsibly than some persons over twenty-one years of age;
(e) The social security system restricts the freedom of some individuals by forcing them to contribute money to the system even though they have no need of, or do not want, the system to provide retirement or disability security;
(f) The tax system allows some to pay less than their fair share, whereas others pay more; and
(g) A driver may receive a traffic ticket for failing to come to a complete stop at a stop sign, even though the driver served the basic purpose of the sign by slowing down enough to have a clear view of traffic and is driving cautiously.
Similarly, some group may receive preferential treatment in keeping with Affirmative Action, even though the treatment is perceived as unfair to job candidates who consider themselves better qualified but are turned away.
Since all social programs are imperfect, some programs are put into effect because they do significantly less harm than other programs. So we do not throw out the whole criminal justice system because lawyers sometimes attain acquittals or light sentences for guilty clients or because some juveniles protected by the system go on to commit hideous crimes. Likewise, an Affirmative Action program does not need to be free of all harm before it can be implemented. Although candidates for a position have a right to fair consideration of their applications, this is not always equivalent to being judged simply on the basis of qualifications.
The claim that one cannot place a price on a human life; the claim that one person's injustice is everyone's injustice; and the claim that everyone has a right to become whatever one has the desire, ability, and motivation to become.
In recognition of these moral interests, society has an obligation to place considerable value on human life,to set up a system of justice that serves well as many individuals as possible, and to provide as wide an array of social opportunities as possible to allow individual persons to maximize self-realization. Yet it is unrealistic to elevate these important moral interests to the highest level of social obligation--that is, to basic principles of social policy.
Note that these are terms of moral disapproval, commonly understood as such in a discussion of social issues. Thus if affirmative action were reverse discrimination or a racist policy or a sexist policy, it would carry the burden of moral disapproval associated with the terms.
No one (except a white supremacist perhaps) wants to be called "a racist." And when persons say that affirmative action is a racist policy, we expect them to be opposed to affirmative action on moral grounds. It should be clear, from this, that the term "racism" (as well as the terms "sexism" or "discrimination") is not morally neutral and carries with it a meaning of moral disapproval.
1. Racism consists in setting a preference for one race over another.
Superficially, this meaning seems to be straightforward, simple, and accurate. On careful examination however, it proves to be inadequate because of the need to deal with historical, social, and moral context in dealing with the term "racism."
Situation: Blacks were brought to the U.S. against their will and were held as slaves for centuries. They were routinely denied educational opportunities. They were regarded as being inferior and as property rather than as persons possessing rights like other human beings. Their families were often broken up and women often were treated as concubines. Even after the end of slavery, they had to face intimidation from whites, judgments about their inferiority, segregation, measures designed to deny them the right to vote, as well as much fewer economic and educational opportunities than whites. Now suppose, to rectify these injustices, a judge orders a school district to spend a disproportionate amount of money on improving schools that blacks attend and on providing much expanded educational opportunities for blacks. Whites, using Meaning 1., then accuse the judge of being a racist--since preferences are being set that favor one race over another. Is this accusation straightforward, simple, and accurate?
I find the accusation to be morally outrageous and a denial of reality. Put differently, the accusation ignores the historical, social, and moral context that underlies the judge's action. Remember that "racism" is a term of moral disapproval. How does required rectification of injustice become an act demanding moral disapproval? Is there any way these injustices could be compensated for without giving some preference to blacks? That is, how can one establish "a level playing field" or equal opportunity without taking measures that favor blacks so as to overcome the advantages that whites enjoy? Moreover, accepting a meaning of racism that proceeds independently of the historical and social context is an inappropriate use of the term that amounts to a denial of reality.
The situation chosen is an extreme one; but the underlying analysis applies just as well to other situations that are less extreme: Compensation needed to rectify injustice always involves doing something to aid the injured party that one does not do for an advantaged party that cannot claim injury. If the racial preferences in affirmative action are just either by way of compensating for past injustices or of achieving a just diversity in society, they are not "racist." Hence this first meaning of racism is inadequate.
The term "racism" applies more appropriately when we can satisfy meanings 2., 3., and 4. below.
2. Racism consists in asserting the superiority of one race (almost always your own) over another.
3. Racism consists in exhibiting hatred or severe antagonism toward members of another race.
4. Racism consists in allowing or using power positions in society to repress the legitimate aspirations of a disadvantaged racial group (or, in far rarer cases, an advantaged racial group).
All these meanings are consistent with the historical, social, and moral context that surrounds our notions of racism.
Note that these adequate meanings have counterparts in cases of "institutionalized racism."
1. Sexism consists in setting a preference for one gender over another.
This meaning is inadequate for reasons similar to those that establish the inadequacy of the first meaning of racism, namely, it ignores the historical, social, and moral context surrounding the notion of "sexism." So we can construct a similar situation that shows how this meaning leads to an interpretation of sexism that is morally outrageous and a denial of reality.
2. Sexism consists in asserting the superiority of one gender (almost always your own) over another.
3. Sexism consists in exhibiting hatred or severe antagonism toward members of another gender.
4. Sexism consists in allowing or using power positions in society to repress the legitimate aspirations of a disadvantaged gender group (or, in far rarer cases, an advantaged gender group).
For reasons similar to those for racism, all these meanings are consistent with the historical, social, and moral context that surrounds our notions of sexism.
Note that these adequate meanings have counterparts in cases of "institutionalized sexism."
1. Discrimination consists in penalizing individuals simply because they happen to be members of a group.
This meaning is inadequate for reasons similar to those for the corresponding meanings of racism and sexism. Accordingly, the charge frequently derived from it, that affirmative action is reverse discrimination, does not survive the analysis here. Compensatory justice to establish "a level playing field" or equal opportunity, although it favors some individuals because they happen to be members of a group at the expense of others because they happen to be members of a group is not discrimination—provided that the historical, social, and moral context establishes the demand for compensatory justice.
My claim about the inadequacy of this meaning of discrimination may appear to be much weaker in situations where the goal is just diversity rather than compensatory justice. If we introduce the beneficial consequences of affirmative action in producing just diversity however, my claim becomes much stronger. (Note that the difference between compensating for past injustice and producing the good of just diversity parallels the distinction between avoiding harm and doing good that came up with respect to the avoidance of harm principle earlier. Accordingly, it is easier to make a case for compensating for past injustice than it is to make a case for achieving just diversity.)
2. Penalizing individuals based upon their membership in a group rather than their individual merit.
Heavily qualified, this meaning can be adequate. As it stands however, there are two problems associated with the notion of "individual merit": (a) Persons often make the mistake of equating "qualifications" with "individual merit"; and (b) More basically, individual merit can be misleading because we possess both an individual and a group identity.
Regarding (a), many people presume that qualifications are equivalent to individual merit. But this presumption that seems so obvious is much like so many people once believing that, obviously, the earth is flat
As a general claim, the equivalence presumption is false, unless there is a pre-existing social situation of equal opportunity. Without equal opportunity, natural/social advantages and disadvantages frequently affect a person's qualifications in ways quite independently of individual merit. This is just a matter of fact. For example, given two candidates for employment, a Harvard University graduate may present more impressive qualifications than a Mankato State University graduate without possessing a higher degree of individual merit—if the Harvard graduate has enjoyed social advantages such as better economic support and better educational opportunities than the MSU graduate. (It does not follow that there is a total separation of qualifications and individual merit. But we do need to recognize that there is no simple equivalence between the two.)
Accordingly, anyone wanting to claim that affirmative action is discrimination based upon its emphasis on group membership rather than individual merit (in accord with this second meaning of "discrimination") has to show first that there is a pre-existing level playing field of equal opportunity. But this is hard to do--because there is so much evidence to the contrary.
Regarding (b), the underlying metaphysics that allows the complete separation of individual and group identity needs reconstruction. People often will say, "We ought to judge people as individuals rather than as members of a group"—as if there is no relation between the two. Yet there is considerable evidence to show that what most persons are as individuals is closely related to their group memberships.
To take a simple example: The fact that I as an individual speak English rather than some other language is closely related to, and dependent upon, my group memberships throughout my life.
(An Aside: What about stereotyping? Answer: It is a superficial way of judging a person in terms of group membership.)
Now how does the individual-group relation affect discussions about affirmative action based upon this second proposed meaning of "discrimination"?
When persons submit their qualifications in applying for jobs or admission to programs, they do not simply present their accomplishments as self-subsisting, independent individuals—that is, they do not simply establish their individual merit. They also present the accomplishments they possess through their memberships in groups. And if a person happens to be a member of a dominant, advantaged group, one is likely to have advantages (in the form of greater or more desirable accomplishments) over less dominant, less advantaged groups. Accordingly, the second meaning of "discrimination" is inadequate.
3. Discrimination consists in penalizing individuals who are members of a disadvantaged group in a way that represses their legitimate aspirations (or, in far rarer cases, an advantaged group).
For reasons similar to those for racism and sexism, this meaning is consistent with the historical, social, and moral context that surrounds our notion of discrimination.
Note that this adequate meaning has a counterpart in cases of "institutionalized discrimination."