"Barriers and Pathways: How Economic Conditions Shape Credit Market Entry," (with Judith Ricks). In Submission
This study shows how economic conditions affect first-time access to credit in terms of both when and how consumers enter the credit market. We estimate changes in the local demand and supply of credit using county-level unemployment rate and a constructed measure of credit tightness. When unemployment is high and credit is tight, consumers are less likely to enter the credit market, especially at young ages. Those that are able are more likely to enter with a student loan or credit card and may receive different credit terms than they otherwise would have. Our findings show that economic conditions play an important role in first-time access to credit. New entrants tend to be 18--24 years of age, so these findings have important implications for the ability of younger households to access credit.
"Is Sharing Credit Caring? Piggybacking Accounts and Credit Outcomes," (with Zachary Blizard and Alyssa Brown)
U.S. financial regulations require creditors to consider accounts of consumers who are authorized users on a spouse’s credit accounts as if they were the primary user. Because credit record data does not allow easy identification of spouses, a practice of “piggybacking” has developed whereby individuals with no responsibility for paying an account are made authorized users for the purpose of boosting their apparent creditworthiness. This paper provides the first empirical analysis of the prevalence and impact of sharing credit in this manner. We identify and describe two types of piggybacking: first, the common practice of “family sharing,” in which parents add their young adult children to their credit cards; and second, a niche market for “renting” credit card tradelines to strangers. We use both event study and regression discontinuity methods to identify the effect of both types of piggybacking on access to credit, and on outcomes for new credit obtained. We find that piggybacking substantially increases access to credit, and find suggestive evidence that family sharing generally improves the terms of any credit obtained. We find broad evidence that consumers who obtain credit in their own names while piggybacking are more likely to default on the credit in their name, ceteris paribus. Finally, we discuss the implications of piggybacking for credit inequality in the United States.
“Estimating the Effect of Deception on Demand: Theory and an Application,” (with David Ovadia).
In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to analyze the effect of deceptive advertising on consumer behavior. Deceptive advertising has the effect of shifting the demand curve outward for purposes of consumer choices, while consumer welfare remains determined by the "true" demand function, leading to a loss of consumer surplus. We apply our framework to an empirical application in the market for performance athletic shoes. From 2008 to 2011, so-called "toning shoes" were fraudulently marketed as having special weight loss benefits until those claims were challenged by the Federal Trade Commission. We use a discrete choice demand model to estimate the substitution patterns between toning shoes and competing products. Our model suggest that absent the deceptive marketing by toning shoe manufacturers, more than 70% of purchasers would have switched to another product, generally at a significantly lower price. The welfare costs of the deceptive advertising exceeded $550 million between 2009 and 2011.