"Effects of Entering the Credit Market in a Recession," (with Judith Ricks). In Submission
This paper studies the relationship between economic conditions and entry into the credit market using unique tradeline-level data that precisely identify the timing, product type, and age of entry into the credit market. We show that economic conditions are related to both the timing of entry and the type of product consumers enter the credit system with. Instrumental variables analysis shows that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a 2.7 point average increase in credit score two years after entry. This effect persists for up to 10 years after entry and remains economically meaningful. Higher unemployment at the time of entry also increases the likelihood of having a student loan and decreases access to auto loans and revolving credit for at least 10 years after entry.
"Is Sharing Credit Caring? Piggybacking Accounts and Credit Outcomes," (with Zachary Blizard and Alyssa Brown)
U.S. financial regulations require creditors to consider accounts of consumers who are authorized users on a spouse’s credit accounts as if they were the primary user. Because credit record data does not allow easy identification of spouses, a practice of “piggybacking” has developed whereby individuals with no responsibility for paying an account are made authorized users for the purpose of boosting their apparent creditworthiness. This paper provides the first empirical analysis of the prevalence and impact of sharing credit in this manner. We identify and describe two types of piggybacking: first, the common practice of “family sharing,” in which parents add their young adult children to their credit cards; and second, a niche market for “renting” credit card tradelines to strangers. We use both event study and regression discontinuity methods to identify the effect of both types of piggybacking on access to credit, and on outcomes for new credit obtained. We find that piggybacking substantially increases access to credit, and find suggestive evidence that family sharing generally improves the terms of any credit obtained. We find broad evidence that consumers who obtain credit in their own names while piggybacking are more likely to default on the credit in their name, ceteris paribus. Finally, we discuss the implications of piggybacking for credit inequality in the United States.
“Estimating the Effect of Deception on Demand: Theory and an Application,” (with David Ovadia).
In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to analyze the effect of deceptive advertising on consumer behavior. Deceptive advertising has the effect of shifting the demand curve outward for purposes of consumer choices, while consumer welfare remains determined by the "true" demand function, leading to a loss of consumer surplus. We apply our framework to an empirical application in the market for performance athletic shoes. From 2008 to 2011, so-called "toning shoes" were fraudulently marketed as having special weight loss benefits until those claims were challenged by the Federal Trade Commission. We use a discrete choice demand model to estimate the substitution patterns between toning shoes and competing products. Our model suggest that absent the deceptive marketing by toning shoe manufacturers, more than 70% of purchasers would have switched to another product, generally at a significantly lower price. The welfare costs of the deceptive advertising exceeded $550 million between 2009 and 2011.