Articles
"Aristotle on the Rule of Law and Particularism: Politics 3.15–16"
2026. Polis 43, no. 1: 189–209 (DOI/PhilArchive)
Argues that Aristotle favors the rule of law over the arbitrary rule of an absolute king because he (1) rejects Plato's crafts analogy and (2) deems equitable judgments in exceptional cases to be under, not above, the law. In his ethics, Aristotle is often thought to be a moral particularist. But favoring the rule of law over the rule of the virtuous king counts against particularism about political wisdom, the same state as practical wisdom.
"Virtue and Contemplation in Eudemian Ethics 8.3"
2025. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 64: 95–137 (DOI/PhilArchive)
Argues that in Eudemian Ethics 8.3, virtue’s mean between excess and deficiency is defined by the standard of promoting the most contemplation. Promotion is indirect and constrained by virtue’s other essential features. The chapter’s apparent restriction of the standard to actions concerning natural goods actually serves a dialectical, not a restrictive, purpose. Unifies the chapter’s argumentative arc.
"The Function Argument in the Eudemian Ethics"
2022. Ancient Philosophy 42, no. 1: 191–214 (DOI/PhilArchive)
Reconstructs the function argument of Eudemian Ethics 2.1 through the method of dichotomous division. Argues that the Eudemian argument defines the highest good without appealing to an antecedent conception of the human function, sidestepping a fallacious inference alleged of the Nicomachean argument.
Reviews
On G. Di Basilio (ed.), Investigating the Relationship Between Aristotle's Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics (Routledge, 2022)
2025. Classical Review 75, no. 2: 449–452. (DOI)
In Preparation
I am preparing the following for publication:
"Is the Eudemian Ethics Missing its Middle Books?"
Forthcoming in Aristotle's Other Ethics (under contract, draft available on request)
Presents the case that an eight-book Eudemian Ethics, with books 4, 5, and 6 as we have them (which are shared with the Nicomachean Ethics, where they are books 5, 6, and 7) is the most parsimonious account that fits the evidence we have. Rejects Oliver Primavesi's book-numbering argument which suggests that the middle books were added to a five-book Ethics, as well as Dorothea Frede's recent arguments that the middle books fit better with the Nicomachean Ethics.
In Progress
I am currently working on the following:
a paper about an account of practical wisdom (phronêsis) unique to the Eudemian Ethics, that is given in terms of ruling the parts of the soul and parallels Plato’s Republic
a paper about the best life of the best city of Politics 7 and the extent to which the method of Aristotle’s political inquiry depends on results from his ethical inquiry
a book-length study of the method of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics and its ability to explain differences with other practical inquiries, especially that of the Nicomachean Ethics.
Please don't hesitate to get in touch if you'd like to know more about any of these projects.
Dissertation Abstract
The Ethical Theory of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics
Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics has often been treated as an inferior, earlier version of the more famous Nicomachean Ethics. My dissertation reads the Eudemian Ethics as a systematic, self-contained, carefully constructed whole that contains distinctive answers to questions fundamental to ethical theory. I find that Aristotle’s answers to questions like “What is virtue?” and “Can virtue be taught?” in the Eudemian Ethics differ significantly from his answers to those questions in the Nicomachean Ethics. I focus as well on questions about moral motivation, Aristotle’s metaethics, and the relation between ethics and politics. Taken together, these interpretive claims complicate the conventional wisdom that Aristotle pushes us away from the dominant ethical theories (consequentialism, deontology) and toward alternative or anti-theoretical paths like virtue ethics or moral particularism. The method of the Eudemian Ethics supports the view that ethical reasoning proceeds from established first principles that the treatise seeks to identify and refine, rather than ethical coherentism. Additionally, these interpretive claims challenge the primacy scholars have given to the Nicomachean Ethics by showing that the Eudemian Ethics—often regarded as earlier, inferior, but otherwise much the same—in fact speaks with a distinct, philosophically sophisticated voice.