The central focus of my PhD research is a kind of philosophical anxiety around where we stand as knowers. Forms of this anxiety have been repeatedly identified throughout the history of philosophy, including recent analyses concerned with the causal origins of our representations (i.e. their genealogies: where did the concepts we use come from, and how have they been shaped over time by different institutions and historical developments?). However, I want to shift from the epistemological framing of this concern (how do we know we know?) to a more ethical one: on what basis do we presume to know better than someone else, when the genealogy of our perspective reveals both the contingency of our beliefs and the ways in which they are entangled with power? How can we engage seriously with perspectives different to our own? And why, even as we are moved to insist on the primacy of the non-neutral perspective (one that doesn’t claim to see everything from its contingent position), do we nonetheless feel troubled by its inevitable blind spots (the ways in which this position might obscure other perspectives)?