Active Projects:

• Informative Certification: Screening vs. Acquisition (with Gorkem Celik), R&R Review of Economic Studies

  • video presentation (March, 2025)

  • slides (updated to March, 2025)

  • working paper  (January, 2025)

  • This paper supercedes our earlier paper "Selling Certification of Private and Market Information"

• Private Monitoring and Collective Reputation (with Volker Nocke)

  • slides (April, 2024)

• Mediated Renegotiation (with Andrea Attar, Lorenzo Bozzoli)

  • working paper (February, 2025)

  • slides (Paris, 2025)

  • video presentation (June, 2024)

• Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence (with Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch)

  • working paper version (March, 2025)

  • slides (Toronto, 2022.03.22)

  • video presentation (90min; newer version)

  • video presentation (20min; older version)

  • presentations: Cambridge (UK), University of Toronto, Yale University, Paris School of Economics, Michigan University, Penn State

  • This work is based on and supersedes my working paper "Mechanism design with partially verifiable information" from 2016.