Active Projects:

• Private Monitoring and Collective Reputation (with Volker Nocke)

  • slides (April 2024)

• Unidirectional incentive compatibility (with Daniel Krähmer)

  • working paper (April 2024)

  • video presentation (May 2024)

  • slides (December 2023)

• Mediated Renegotiation (with Andrea Attar, Lorenzo Bozzoli)

  • working paper (March 2024)

• Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence (with Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch)

• working paper version (2024.01.18)

  • slides (Toronto, 2022.03.22)

  • video presentation (90min; newer version)

  • video presentation (20min; older version)

  • presentations: Cambridge (UK), University of Toronto, Yale University, Paris School of Economics

  • This work is based on and supersedes my working paper "Mechanism design with partially verifiable information" from 2016.

• Dynamic Screening with Verifiable Bankruptcy (with Daniel Krähmer)

  • working paper version (2024.03.22)

  • working paper version  (2022.11.10)