Research and Publications
Research and Publications
I have been fortunate to collaborate with passionate people in mathematics, computer science, economics, philosophy and political science. The following publications and projects are a result of our collaborations, and present ample opportunity for future work.
Dong, C., Kraiczy, S., Vasishta, R., Brill, M., Holliday, W., & Boehmer, N. Where Should Society Draw the Line? A Social Choice Approach to Collective Consent. Submitted to NeurIPS 2026. To appear at the New Directions in Social Choice Workshop, EC 2026 (Rome, Italy).
In this paper, we study how society should determine which options deserve collective consent. We introduce a social-choice framework that balances majority support, minority protection, and the exclusion of clearly inferior alternatives. Our main contribution is a veto-based approach that gives minorities proportional power to block harmful outcomes while still ensuring broad societal agreement.
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Connor, F., Langevin, L.-R., Ndiaye, N., Totschnig, A., Vasishta, R., & Vetta, A. The Popular Dimension of Matchings. In Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2025), LNCS 16266, pp. 341–357, 2026. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-18660-7_18.
In this paper, we study popular matchings in house allocation, marriage, and roommate markets. Because popular matchings do not always exist, we introduce the notion of the popular dimension: the minimum number of matchings needed to collectively represent a popular outcome. We prove tight bounds on the popular dimension across several classical matching settings, establishing new connections between matching theory, voting, and collective decision-making.
Totschnig, A., Vasishta, R., & Vetta, A. Matrix Rationalization via Partial Orders. In Proceedings of the 17th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2024), LNCS 15156, pp. 461–479, 2024. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71033-9_26.
In this paper, we study how to measure the rationality of collective preferences. We introduce a new framework that models voters using partial orders rather than complete rankings, allowing us to quantify how much inconsistency or ambiguity is needed to explain observed voting outcomes. We characterize this notion through graph-theoretic parameters and establish bounds on the minimum level of rationality required to explain a preference matrix.