After the 2008 Great Financial Crisis, Bank Regulators increased capital requirements to make the banking sector more resilient to economic shocks and reduce their impact on the real economy. A key Basel requirement was Bank Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) to build in the buffers. In Climate Shocks and Liquidity Smoothing Mechanisms: Evidence from Indian Firms, I find credit institutions exposed to an unexpected climate shock increase their lending to the real economy. In this paper, I evaluate if more capitalized Banks, i.e. those with better buffers, are better able to supply credit after a climate shock crisis. I find bank branches with higher capitalization increase lending overall, particularly to firms in the real sector. Decomposing the CAR into its components, Tier 1 capital i.e. the bank's core capital and its primary safeguard against losses, is driving these results. Tier 2 capital i.e. the supplementary capital, has no effect. Exposed branches with lower core capital (Tier 1) and higher supplementary capital (Tier 2) increase lending to Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs) to maximize their risk-adjusted returns while responding to market liquidity needs. Thus, credit flowing from stronger capitalized banks to the real sector during a crisis aligns with macro-financial risk mitigating policies: banks with greater loss absorption capacity are providing liquidity after a shock. However, this capital play by banks that is catalyzing the intermediation channel via NBFIs can potentially augment risk in the system. NBFIs have been documented to reach for yield in their lending practices, which is supported by the relatively less stringent regulatory framework they are subjected to.