Elgar Encyclopedia of Public choice

Hi there!

Great that you found your way to the page about the Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Christian Bjornskov and I (Richard Jong-A-Pin) are the editors of this big project. So far, we have found over 70 world class Public Choice / Political Economy scholars, who will contribute one or more entries to the Encyclopedia including people like:

James Alt, Peter Boettke, Geoffrey Brennan, Roger Congleton, Christopher Coyne, Axel Dreher, Jakob de Haan, Roberta Herzberg, Arye Hillman, Toshihiro Ihori, Marek Kaminski, Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Kai Konrad, John Matsusaka, Michael Munger, Nicholas Miller, Martin Paldam, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Friedrich Schneider, Thomas Strattman, William F. Shughart II, Jan-Egbert Sturm, Donald Wittman, and more!

If you are also willing to contribute, then you can propose any topic that is relevant to Public Choice that is currently not covered in the list of topics. If you can't think of any topic, but wish to contribute, then you find also a list below with suggested topics. And if that doesn't work either, then you can always contact us. We are looking forward to your topic proposal!

Best wishes

Christian and Richard

List of topics that are already included in the Encyclopedia:

topic

Algorithmic Fairness

Anarchy

Anti-trust policy

Apartheid

Are voters uninformed and if so how are they manipulated

Arrow's theorem and voting rules

Attitudes towards Globalisation

Autocratic succession

Beauty

Behavioral Symmetry

Buchanan and the Virginia School

Campaign contributions (and legislative voting)

Central Bank Independence

Checks and Balances in Socialist Countries

Civil Conflict

Classical Greek and Modern Democracy.

Coercion

Constituional Political Economy

Constitutional Political Economy and Ordoliberalism

Cooperation Games

Corruption

Corruption in Healthcare

Covering and the uncovered set

Decentralization (tax competition)

Deforestization

democracy and the quality of institutions

Democratization and the threat of revolution

direct democracy

Economic Freedom

Economic Reforms under uncertainty

election outcomes and norms behavior

Electoral engineering in new democracies

Electoral Systems

Elinor Ostrom

Emergency constitutions

Emerging Donor Aid

Empirical social choice (voting paradoxes)

Entrepreneurship

European Integration

Expressive Choice

Female Policymakers

Fiscal equalization

Fiscal Federalism

Fiscal institutions

Fiscal Transparency

Foreign Influence

Globalisation

Grease the Wheels hypothesis of corruption

Immigration Policy

Inequality and financial development

Informal or shadow economy,

Institutional Constraints on Public Debt

Institutions and economic growth

Internation Trade Policy

International Currency

Local PBC's

Logrolling

Lotteries and Public Goods

Meausring Democracy

Median Voter model

Meta-analysis

Methodological Individualism

Military-Industrial Complex

Mixed-member electoral systems

Monarchy

Non-violent action

Olson's by-product theory

Olson's group size paradox

PBC (technical)

Pocketbook voting

Political Budget Cycles (national level)

Political Dynasties

Political economy of attention

Political economy of international sanctions

Political Favoritism

Political ideology

Political Instability

Political Leaders

Political Polarization

Political reform

politico economic models,

Politics as Exchange

Polycentricity

Primacy effects

Procyclical Fiscal Policy

Propaganda

Property Rights

Prospect Theory in Public Choice

Public Choice and Good Governance

Public choice of secession

Public Debt

Public Goods

Public Health

Public Sector Efficiency

Public Spending

Relatively Absolute Absolutes

Rent-seeking: theory

Robert Putnam

Samaritan’s Dilemma

Short-sightedness effect

Slavery

Status Quo and "Start From Where We Are"

strategic corporate environmentalism

t.b.a.

Political legislation cycles

Term limits

The consequences of democracy

The Decline of Liberal Democracy

The public choice of development policy

The Ratchet effect

The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism

Transitional Gains Trap

Trust in Financial Institutions and Central Banks

Turnout

U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787

Vote Buying

What motivates voters?

Even though entry proposals are unrestricted, there are a number of topics that we like to see addressed, but that are not taken yet. If you feel like contributing to one of the entries below, then let us know!

List of topics that need to be addressed but are not addressed yet.

Bargaining

Dictator games

dictatorships

Fake news

gerrymandering

Gordon Tullock

Knut Wicksell

Leviathan government

Mancur Olson

pork barrel spending

probabilistic voting

Rational ignorance

Selectorate theory

status quo bias

Trust games

Tyranny of the majority

Tyranny of the minority

Veil of ignorance

winning coaltion - Rikers theorem