Postdoctoral Researcher 2025 - Present
Interdisciplinary Centre for Ethics, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
Outline of work: I work on an OPUS project titled “Ignorance of Law” in Piotr Bystranowski’s lab. My contribution to this project is guided by an expectation-based account of rule-cognition. In particular, I conceptualize the interaction between the state (or rule-maker) and agents (or rule-subjects) as a dyadic system of mutual expectations regarding rule awareness and compliance. My central hypothesis simply put is that rule-breaking is excusable* when we don't expect that rule was easy to know (see for a more academic account here). I use different methodologies to test this hypothesis, including games!
Some of this research is published and can be found here and here.
*ToC apply!
–
Doctorate, Cognitive Science 2019 - 2024
Department of Cognitive Science, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur
Short abstract: When we reason, we often find ourselves vacillating between options. We consider and reconsider options in the process of making up one's mind. These pre-decisional vacillations serve as valuable indicators of internal conflict. To measure these dynamics in reasoning and decision-making tasks, we developed a novel paradigm that tracks the real-time process of conflict. This approach offers a significant advantage over traditional summary-level measures like reaction times and explicitly stated preferences by dynamically revealing the ongoing tug-of-war between preferences as decisions evolve in real-time.
Link to the thesis and a representative publication.
–
MSc, Cognitive Science 2017 - 2019
Centre of Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences, University of Allahabad
Short abstract: This thesis investigated the role of perceived control in moral decision-making across two experiments. Findings revealed a tendency for participants to choose actions associated with higher perceived control, regardless of dilemma type or consequence maximization. These results suggest that perceived control plays a central role in moral choice and may, in some cases, outweigh distinctions proposed by dual-process theories of moral judgment.
Link to the publication from this thesis.