Telecommunications Policy
2026-04 | Journal article
DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2025.103141
Contributors: Renzo Clavijo
Permanence clauses are a widespread tool used by mobile operators to keep consumers subscribed to their network. This type of contract imposes switching costs on consumers, typically through a minimum contract duration before the subscriber can leave the network or a penalty to be paid by the user if leaving before the minimum permanence expires. A ban on permanence clauses was ruled by 2014-Q3 by the regulator in Colombia. This paper proposes a difference-in-differences approach to gather reduced-form evidence about the effect of the ban on the Colombian mobile voice market. Evidence shows that the average revenue per user significantly drops by 30.92% due to the ban.
2025-12 | Working paper
Contributors: Renzo Clavijo; Julian Hidalgo
This research investigates the equilibrium and welfare effects of Internet speed labels on market competition and the digital divide, utilizing a structural model of endogenous price and speed decisions applied to Colombian regulatory data. Empirical findings demonstrate that providers strategically bunch plans at the mandated "broadband" threshold, which intensifies price competition and shifts consumer demand away from both lower and higher-speed segments. The structural estimation reveals that consumers disproportionately value the regulatory label itself over the underlying speed, while speed provision remains costly for firms. Ongoing work leverages this framework to simulate counterfactual policies—such as multi-tiered categorizations and optimal label thresholds—to identify regulatory designs that maximize consumer welfare and drive technological adoption.
2025-12 | Working paper
Contributors: Jorge Florez-Acosta; Renzo Clavijo
This paper studies how vertical control affects retail price rigidity. Existing evidence suggests that resale price maintenance (RPM) increases cost pass-through by reducing markup distortions. We show that this conclusion changes once price adjustment costs are taken into account. We develop and estimate a structural model of demand and supply that allows vertical contracts and retail price adjustment costs to interact. Using scanner data on ready-to-eat breakfast cereal sales from two large supermarket chains in California, we recover markups, marginal costs, and bounds on retail price adjustment costs under alternative vertical conduct assumptions. We recover substan-tially higher upper bounds on retail price adjustment costs under RPM than under linear tariffs. As a result, retail prices adjust less frequently and become less responsive to cost shocks under RPM. These findings suggest that vertical control can increase retail price stability despite improving vertical coordination
Telecommunication; Regulation; Competitiveness; Investment; Science and Technology; Industry
IDB (Inter-American Development Bank)
2025-01 | Technical Notes
DOI: dx.doi.org/10.18235/0013354
Contributors: Renzo Clavijo
This study examines the regulatory landscape and competitive dynamics in the telecommunications industry of five key Latin American countries: Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile. Focusing on market concentration analysis and the identification of regulatory policies that may impact market competitiveness, the research aims to contribute insights to the discussion about telecommunications policy in the region. This article encompasses the analysis for both fixed and mobile services for each country in the sample. Using descriptive analysis, I explore potential relationships among the evolution of key variables, offering evidence on the intricate interplay between regulation, competition, and market power in the Latin American telecommunications industry. Preliminary findings reveal a remarkable market concentration in mobile services and a somewhat lower yet significant concentration in fixed services. Quantitative reduced-form evidence supports expected impact of certain regulations on key market indicators across the region.
Universidad Eafit
2025-12 | Working paper
Contributors: Renzo Clavijo
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