Research

Women Appointed to Corporate Boards: Network Centrality and the Gender Quota Reform - Latest draft

This paper investigates the interplay between professional network centrality and gender quotas in shaping board appointments, focusing on the Cope-Zimmerman law implemented in France in 2010. Using a comprehensive dataset from the BoardEx database covering publicly listed French firms from 2001 to 2019, I analyze how professional networks influence the likelihood of first-time board appointments and whether the quota reform altered these dynamics. Network centrality, measured through degree and betweenness metrics, is found to be a significant determinant of board appointments. Employing an instrumental variable approach, I address potential endogeneity in network formation by using the centrality of second-degree connections as an instrument. The results indicate that the gender quota substantially increased female representation on boards, with first-time appointees becoming better qualified post-reform. However, the benefits of the quota were not evenly distributed, as women with higher network centrality were better positioned to capitalize on the opportunities created. The findings underscore the effectiveness of quotas in reducing gender disparities but highlight the persistent role of network-driven barriers in shaping access to board positions.

Presentations:

• 2025: South West Economics PhD Conference at the University of Exeter, UK

• 2025: Irish Economic Association Annual Conference, Queen’s University Belfast

• 2024: Lightning talks by GW4 Universities ECRs at 2nd Diversity and Human Capital Workshop at the University of Exeter, UK

• 2024: PGR conference at University of Exeter, UK

The Withholding Edge: Strategic Sharing of Labour-Market Information. AEA Registry 

This paper studies how labour-market information diffuses through social networks when it improves relative performance in competitive hiring. I distinguish vacancy information, which signals that a job exists, from process information, which improves performance in selection. I study both in a lab-in-the-field experiment with university students in Pakistan, who learn about a real paid job opportunity and decide whether, and with whom, to share it. The design cross-randomises process information, observability, and competition salience. Process information does not change application behaviour, yet it is withheld far more tightly than the vacancy. Holding it also leads participants to share the vacancy 7 to 9 percentage points less widely, from a 60 percent baseline. Observability raises sharing only without an advantage, while competition salience suppresses advantaged sharing, especially of process information. Dyadic evidence shows that the vacancy travels along friendship ties, whereas process information is guarded even from friends and flows toward central peers. The findings show that networks transmit valuable information selectively, reproducing unequal access and favouring the well-connected over the most able.

Presentations:

• 2026: 2nd South West Economics PhD Conference at the University of Exeter, UK

• 2026: Sheffield Workshop on Behavioural Economics

• 2026: SEEDEC - Symposium on Economic Experiments in Developing Countries, Durham.

• 2026: PGR conference at University of Exeter, UK

Stereotypes and Effort Provision in Teams (with Ashley McCrea and Joel Lamb)