Working Papers

The Impact of Auction Timing on Bidding Behaviors: Evidence from the Chinese Land Market[SSRN] , Revise and Resubmit at International Journal of Industrial Organization

Abstract: This study examines how changes in auction timing affect bidding behavior, using data from Chinese land market transactions. In 2021, a new policy mandated that 22 cities shift from sequential to simultaneous auctions for residential land. Using an event study approach, I find simultaneous auctions lead to higher prices and a greater auction failure rate. Additionally, I examine testable implications related to the mechanism behind the policy effect: auction prices rise more for higher-quality land and in cities with higher land quality variance; moreover, the auction failure rate increases more for lower-quality land. I then developed a model of bidding that rationalizes my main findings and offers some policy suggestions.

Presented at: CEA(2024)

Auctions vs Negotiations under Corruption: Evidence from Land Sales in China [SSRN] , with Hayri Alper Arslan and Robert Clark

Abstract: This paper studies how allocation mechanisms shape the pricing consequences of corruption. Using data on Chinese land transactions, we compare prices under negotiations and auctions, two allocation mechanisms that differ in transparency and competitive pressure. We find that corrupt firms receive similarly large price discounts under the two mechanisms on average, suggesting that replacing negotiations with more transparent auctions does not by itself improve allocation outcomes. This aggregate comparison, however, masks substantial heterogeneity. Auctions with limited competition resemble negotiations, while sufficiently competitive auctions substantially reduce corruption-related discounts. We argue that the effectiveness of transparency depends on whether the allocation mechanism sustains entry and competitive pressure. A simple model of bidding with corruption and endogenous entry rationalizes these patterns.

Presented at: Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative Conference (CIREQ) 2023, CEA (2023), Chinese Economists Society North America Conference (2024), II0C 2024,  the Conference on Auctions, Firm Behavior, and Policy in University of Oklahoma (2024) 

Position Auctions with Organic Search, with Mehtab Hanzroh

Abstract: Recent regulatory actions, such as the FTC v. Amazon antitrust case, have raised concerns about the impact of sponsored advertisements on consumer welfare in online search platforms. While theoretical models of position auctions typically predict that sellers are ranked by consumer-match/seller-quality in equilibrium, these models often abstract from the coexistence of sponsored and organic listings. We develop a model in which sellers can appear in both sponsored and organic positions and examine how this affects equilibrium outcomes and consumer welfare. Our model captures a key tradeoff: high-quality sellers value the visibility from sponsored placement but also expect to appear prominently in organic rankings. As a result, under certain conditions, lower-quality sellers may outbid them to obtain the sponsored position - lending some support to the FTC’s concern. However, we show that this outcome only arises when all sellers are relatively high-quality, which limits potential consumer harm.

Presented at: CEA(2026), The 12th  Hong Kong Economic Association Biennial Conference, IAAE(2026)