Matching with batches, with Stephen Cheung and Edward Wang. Revise and resubmit at the European Economic Review
We propose the use of batching to eliminate truncation and recover strategy-proofness in matching markets with large choice sets, thereby allowing the clearinghouse to provide simple advice. Batching is particularly useful when applied to algorithms that rely on cut-offs rather than quotas, such as the Universities Admissions Centre (UAC) in Australia. The current UAC mechanism uses a constrained list, giving applicants
incentives to strategise. We test the efficiency of batching in an individual decision-making experiment, comparing the batched mechanism to the status quo, with and without advice. We find a significant and sizeable increase in realised payoffs in the batched treatments, which is driven by participants submitting preference lists that are closer to truth-telling.
Fostering Cooperation by Threatening with Altruistic Punishment, with Archer Kirk and Lokendra Nedunuri. Working paper SSRN 4854793.
We use an online experiment to test the effect of an extreme kind of altruistic punishment, labelled Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), on cooperation. In particular, we study the outcomes of adding the possibility of MAD punishment to a standard Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. The strategies including MAD punishment are weakly dominated. However, the availability of MAD punishment changes the equilibrium structure of the PD game under the standard assumptions. Even if the game has now multiple equilibria, an out-of-equilibrium strategy profile (Cooperate, Cooperate) becomes the most likely outcome in the MAD treatment. Thus, the mere presence of a punishment threat works as a device to dramatically enhance cooperation, leading to net efficiency gains. Our results provide support to the idea that the threat of extreme forms of altruistic punishment might be likely at play as an effective deterrent in many real-life social dilemma situations.
ARTICLES
Butz, B., Guillen, P., Harbring, C. (2024). Incentives for cooperation in groups - sociality meets decision rights. Review of Managerial Science,
Guillen, P., Kesten, O., Kiefer, A., Melatos, M., 2022. A field evaluation of a matching mechanism: university applicant behaviour in Australia. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Nexus, 1(1).
Guillen, P., Veszteg, R., 2021. Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets. Experimental Economics, 24(2), 650-668
Guillen, P., Hakimov, R., 2018, The effectiveness of top-down advice in strategy-proof mechanisms: A field experiment. European Economic Review, 101, 505-511.
Guillen, P., Hakimov, R., 2017, Not quite the best response: truth-telling, strategy-proof matching, and the manipulation of others. Experimental Economics, 20(3), 670-686.
Bou, S., Brandts, J., Cayón, M., Guillen, P., 2016, The price of luck: paying for the hot hand of others. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2(1), 60-72.
Guillen, P., Merrett, D., Slonim, R., 2015, A New Solution for the Moral Hazard Problem in Team Production. Management Science, 61(7), 1514-1530.
Griffiths, R., Guillen, P., Martinez i Coma, F., 2015, Between the sword and the wall: Spain's limited options for Catalan secessionism. Nations and Nationalism, 21(1), 43-61.
Guillen, P., Hing, A., 2014, Lying through their teeth: Third party advice and truth telling in a strategy proof mechanism. European Economic Review, 70(October), 178-185.
Babones, S., Babcicky, P., and Guillen, P., 2013, Fairness in the social regulation of labor markets: Reasons for Hope? Comparative Sociology, 12(2), 139-159
Guillen, P., and Veszteg, R., 2012, On "Lab rats", Journal of Socio-Economics, vol 41:5, pp.714-720.
Guillen, P. and Kesten, O., 2012, Matching markets with mixed ownership: The case for a real-life assignment mechanism, International Economic Review, vol 53:3, 1027–1046.
Guillen, P. and Ji, D., 2011 Trust, discrimination and acculturation: Experimental evidence on Asian international and Australian domestic university students', Journal of Socio-Economics, vol. 40:5, pp. 594-608
Brañas-Garza, P., Fatas, E., Guillen, P., 2010, Inducing efficient cooperation patterns in public good games, an experimental investigation’, Journal of Economic Psychology , vol.31:6, pp. 872-883
Slonim, R., Guillen, P., 2010, Gender selection discrimination: Evidence from a trust game, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, vol.76:2, pp. 385-405
Englmaier, F., Guillen, P., Llorente, L., Onderstal, S., Sausgruber, R., 2009, The choptstick auction: A study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.27:2, pp. 286-91
Brañas-Garza, P., Guillen, P., Lopez del Paso, R., 2008, Math skills and risk attitudes, Economics Letters, vol.99:2, pp. 332-336
Brandts, J., Guillen, P., 2007, Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance, Journal of Industrial Economics, vol.55:3, pp. 453-473
Brañas-Garza, P., Georgantzís, N., Guillen, P, 2007, Direct and indirect effects of pathological gambling on risk attitudes, Judgement and Decision Making, vol.2:2, pp. 48-58
Guillen, P., Schwieren, C., Staffiero, G., 2006, Why feed the Leviathan?, Public Choice, vol.130:1-2, pp. 115-128
Guillen, P., 2004, Becoming famous and then richer: how status san bias perfect competition, Cuadernos de Economía, vol.75:3.