Lobbying and the U.S-China Trade War
(with Giovanni Facchini and Peri da Silva)
Abstract: Elected officials formally craft and implement trade policies, which implies that these decisions may be significantly affected by interest groups and lobbyists. In this paper, we examine the role of lobbying expenditures in shaping U.S. trade policy decisions toward China during the first Trump administration. Using detailed information from publicly available lobbying reports, we build a firm-level dataset on lobbying expenditures to examine how lobbying by U.S. firms related to Chinese trade policy impacted the inclusion of products on U.S. tariff lists under Section 301. We also create unique sentiment data both in favor of and against tariffs on China to develop relevant lobbying measures for each firm, enabling us to test their influence on tariff decisions. There is a natural concern that lobbying efforts by U.S. firms may not be exogenously determined but instead respond to expected policy outcomes. To address this issue, we developed instrumental variables, including instruments for firm sentiments, based on Chinese exports to high-income countries. Our findings show that lobbying by U.S. firms on Chinese trade issues, especially for the most comprehensive tariff lists (3 and 4), effectively shaped tariff decisions during the U.S.-China trade war. Specifically, the greater the lobbying expenditures by U.S. firms on these larger lists, the less likely these products are to be included in them. For firms importing critical inputs from abroad, lobbying efforts against tariffs on China reduce the likelihood of including products in the tariff list. Conversely, lobbying efforts in favor of tariffs increase the chances that firms’ products are included, helping them secure government protection.
Firm Size, Tariff Exposure, and Margins of Trade-Policy Lobbying
(with Giovanni Facchini and Peri da Silva)
Impact of Section 232 Lobbying on steel and aluminum tariff waivers
(with Giovanni Facchini and Peri da Silva)