Ongoing Research Projects and Working Papers

Challenger states dissatisfied with existing international organizations (IOs) are increasingly engaging in contested multilateralism (CM)-creating and using competing IOs-to press to accommodate their interests. China's creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) out of dissatisfaction with the institutional status quo in the World Bank (WB) is just one prominent example of such non-cooperative behavior. Yet evidence shows that incumbent states that dominate legacy IOs rarely respond by accommodating challengers through significant adjustments to legacy IOs. At the same time, legacy IOs and their nascent counterparts surprisingly often refrain from open competition and instead engage in interorganizational cooperation, thereby accommodating challenger states "through the back door". How can this backdoor accommodation be explained? We argue that "front-door accommodation" through adjustments to legacy IOs is typically rejected because incumbent states are wary of the reputational costs of giving in to blackmail by challengers. In contrast, "backdoor accommodation" is possible because IO bureaucracies, which enjoy some autonomy from their state principals, are more concerned with fulfilling their mandate than with their reputation for being tough on challengers. Legacy IOs will therefore cooperate with challenger IOs if it helps their bureaucracies fulfill their mandates; in doing so, they inadvertently provide backdoor accommodation to challenger states as well. Incumbent states in legacy IOs tend to accept this backdoor accommodation not only because they often have difficulty reining in IO bureaucracies, but also because backdoor accommodation is less damaging to their reputation for being tough on uncooperative challengers than front-door accommodation would be. For incumbent states, backdoor accommodation thus provides a way to mitigate the accommodation dilemma in contested multilateralism. To test our theory, we first empirically map interorganizational cooperation in instances of CM. We then examine two cases of backdoor accommodation, drawing on quantitative and qualitative process evidence. We analyze how inter-organizational cooperation between the World Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) contributed to China's accommodation, and how cooperation between the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) contributed to Germany's accommodation.

It is generally assumed that the authority of international organizations (IOs) drives their member states to challenge them, even to the point of terminating their membership. We provide a systematic assessment of this authority thesis and suggest that the type of IO authority matters. IOs with pooled authority exert centrifugal effects on their membership, as minorities are more likely to face adversarial majority decisions (the pooling thesis). In contrast, IOs with delegated authority exert centripetal effects because they tend to be more accommodating to the broader membership and seek to prevent termination of membership by dissatisfied states (delegation thesis). A logistic regression analysis based on an original dataset of membership terminations in major IOs over the period 1950-2023 provides empirical support but also important nuances for these arguments: While withdrawal is significantly more likely the more authority is pooled, and significantly less likely the more authority is delegated on the aggregate level, our analysis of different dimensions of pooling and delegation also suggest that the effects of authority distribution vary across different areas of IO decision-making, likely reflecting their different sensitivities for state sovereignty. Our findings have important implications for the resilience of IOs in times of heightened contestation. Rather than driving withdrawal, delegation may help contain the escalation of contestation.

Upon their creation, new international organizations (IOs) are not isolated entities, but part of regime complexes teeming with established IOs. This paper examines how incipient IOs act to secure their position within pre-existing institutional structures. It argues that gaining a foothold requires the pursuit of two goals simultaneously: (1) enhancing legitimacy vis-à-vis other IOs and their member states, and (2) expanding political influence. To achieve these overarching goals, emerging IOs are inclined to pursue both, integrative and emancipatory strategies. The former are aimed at gaining legitimacy among current and future member states. The latter involve forms of strategic (non-)cooperation with legacy IOs to expand both the functional and political scope of their activities. The paper argues that the situational attractiveness of integrative or emancipatory strategies depends on pre-existing inter-institutional structures and geopolitical context. Contrary to prevailing expectations of either conflict or cooperation, I argue that new IOs, even when created for revisionist purposes, face a trade-off between emancipation and integration. Empirically, the paper draws on original network and quantitative project data from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) from its inception in 2016 until the end of 2023. The multi-method analysis shows that the AIIB's insertion into the development finance regime complex has so far consisted of a careful balance between building relationships (integration) with established institutions and acting independently (emancipation) to gain influence. Emancipation has been significantly more likely in less democratic countries outside the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), where the AIIB has used innovative non-sovereign financing methods.

The return of geopolitics to Europe has left its mark on current policy debates. Most policymakers once again see the possession of military capabilities as a sine qua non for global influence. A key implication is that the European Union (EU) needs to centralise military capabilities in order to emerge as a powerful actor in global politics. We seek to challenge this diagnosis on both counts and to propose a more viable policy alternative. Our policy paper argues that the new geopolitics does not prioritise military power at the top. Instead, the key strategy is to combine military and economic assets and exploit their complementarities. Rather than increasing its efforts to build an unviable European army, we therefore recommend that the EU invest its efforts in becoming a dual security manager. First, it should strengthen its activities to arm member states through regulatory and budgetary instruments. Second, the EU should broaden its definition of the political problem and focus more on the challenge of coercing its adversaries. To do this, it should abandon the illusion that European geopolitical coercion will ever be effective without close coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). If this succeeds, the EU will become a weaponising power, helping EU member states to strengthen their military muscles and coerce adversaries through smart cooperation with complementary partners such as NATO. This would be the real European Zeitenwende. We conclude with some caveats, but also with policy recommendations and new priorities.

Over the past decades, the European Union (EU) has confronted multiple crises, which have prompted swift political responses from the EU’s member states and institutions. While there is a broad literature about the EU’s internal responses to political crises, we know much less about the EU’s interactions with external actors to address crisis-related challenges. Since the EU is part of wider, issue-specific regime complexes, it has cultivated diverse relationships with international organizations (IOs) across a multitude of issues. We argue that during political crises the EU has heightened incentives to complement its internal crisis response by initiating interactions with other IOs that vary significantly in their qualities. We identify three different types of crisis-induced interactions amongst IOs: pooling, division of labor, and competition. We argue that under the condition of regime complexity – when mandate and membership overlap between the EU and other IOs – the choice of interorganizational interaction is shaped by the convergence of means and ends among the respective dyad of IOs. To illustrate the usefulness of our typology and the plausibility of our argument, we empirically map and analyze three instances of EU-IO relationships in crisis contexts: pooling among the EU and IMF to address the sovereign debt crisis; division of labor among EU and NATO in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; and competition among the EU and the ECtHR during the ‘migration crisis’.

The global internet governance (GIG) landscape is at a pivotal crossroads. The long-standing ideal of a free and open internet, championed by the US and its Western allies and underpinned by the International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), is facing mounting challenges. Countries such as Russia and China advocate for enhanced “digital sovereignty” and a state-centric governance model, disrupting the existing equilibrium. While much of the existing literature has concentrated on the most influential proponents of these divergent governance models, namely China and the US, this paper proposes a shift in focus towards what we call geopolitical swing states (GSS). As geopolitical hubs with substantial resources, these states like India and Brazil are not only willing but also capable of adopting a strategic ‘pick and choose’ approach to internet governance. Due to their unique position as “digital hubs”, GSS strategic choices can significantly influence the evolution of the GIG regime complex and potentially tip the balance towards either a multi-stakeholder or state-centric model. This paper addresses two key questions: (1) How are GSS influencing the trajectory of internet governance? and (2) What are the underlying motivations driving their strategic choices? To answer these questions, we first develop a conceptual framework that categorizes GSS approaches along two dimensions: the type of issue being governed (technical or security concerns) and the type of governance (multi-stakeholder or state-centric). We then develop a theoretical argument to account for the variation in GSS approaches to GIG. Drawing on geoeconomics literature, we argue that it is the strategic interplay between economic and geopolitical considerations that explains GSS approaches to GIG. Geopolitical swing states must navigate a complex interplay, leveraging their aspirations for their digital economies to bolster their geopolitical objectives, and vice versa. We provide empirical evidence for the usefulness of our conceptualization and plausibility of our argument by analyzing the strategic positioning of India and Brazil vis-à-vis ICANN and its intergovernmental alternative, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU).

Geopolitics has reached the governance of the internet. Distinct digital governance models compete worldwide over alternative standards and norms about how individuals, states, and markets interact. While the European Union (EU) has often-times successfully externalized its regulatory model to shape global markets, the market-driven model promoted by the United States and the state-centric model advanced by China constitute powerful competitors in the digital sphere. While scholarship has mainly focused on these three digital ruler-makers, this paper shifts its focus on potential, yet influential rule-takers, so-called geopolitical swing states (GSS). As geopolitical hubs in their respective region, GSS possess an outsized influence on the global diffusion of a digital governance norms. We chart the digital governance models of three GSS – South Africa, India, Turkey – and explain their adoption by drawing on theories of policy diffusion. We find that GSS tend to display hybrid digital governance models, which reflects their relative autonomy from the three digital rule makers.

International institutions are increasingly under attack from their member states; at the same time, member states’ “negative institutional power”, i.e. their opportunities to avoid undesired institutional outcomes, is declining. However, the modes of their institutional contestation vary widely. This paper examines the extent to which variation in negative institutional power endowments” shapes the choice of contestation modes by dissatisfied powers. We contend that the more extensive (limited) the negative institutional power of dissatisfied states in an institution, the more moderate (radical) modes of institutional contestation they will choose. More specifically, we argue that, all else equal, states’ inside options to prevent undesired outcomes within the institution and their outside options to evade undesired outcomes by leaving the institution jointly condition whether they choose a strategy of voice, subversion, exit, or rollback to contest the institution. We assess the plausibility of our Negative Institutional Power Theory (NIPT) by means of four detailed case studies of the Trump Administration’s contestation of the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Deal. We then demonstrate the generalizability of our arguments by assessing our claims across eight additional instances of other dissatisfied powers’ contesting different international institutions. The twelve case studies demonstrate that negative power matters for – modes of – institutional contestation but that dissatisfied powers can also actively manipulate their opportunities to avoid undesired institutional outcomes. As individual states’ negative power is likely to further erode in the future, international institutions will be increasingly challenged from within and outside.

The digital realm has become a contested battleground, mirroring the geopolitical tensions of the real world. Distinct digital governance models, championed by the European Union (EU), the United States, and China vie for dominance, shaping norms and standards for online interaction between individuals, states, and markets while also encouraging or constraining the development and use of digital surveillance, artificial intelligence, or censorship technologies. While much scholarly attention has focused on the three most powerful "ruler-makers", this paper sheds light on a critical, yet understudied, group of actors in the global governance of the digital: geopolitical swing states (GSS). We claim that these states, functioning as important regional hubs with no clear-cut geopolitical alignment with either the EU, the US, or China, exert significant influence on the global diffusion of digital governance norms. Despite their potential to adopt hybrid models, important GSS like Turkey, or India appear to gravitate towards the state-centric model championed by China in important dimensions. Why? Building on the literature on policy diffusion, we examine the factors that underpin the attractiveness of the Chinese digital governance model and associated digital technologies for GSS. We argue that the appeal of digital authoritarianism has political, economic, and normative sources, and that these sources are particularly prevalent in GSS. In political terms, GSS tend to transition between democratic and authoritarian rule and their non-alignment with great powers makes them more susceptible to domestic political instability. For GSS governments, the Chinese model and its associated digital surveillance and censorship technologies offer a means to consolidate state power and control over their information space, and to tighten their grip on domestic politics, especially in times of political crisis and turbulence. Economically, China's massive "Digital Silk Road" (DSR) initiative offers GSS a cheap and efficient way to expand their own digital infrastructure by providing access to critical financial resources and technological infrastructure without political strings attached. Finally, we argue that the attractiveness of the Chinese digital governance models for GSS also has normative sources. China's strategic framing of its state-centric digital governance model as an alternative to Western dominance finds fertile ground in parts of GSS societies wary of perceived Western hegemony in the digital sphere and in favor of digital sovereignty. Empirically, our paper analyzes the adoption of state-centric digital governance models and the political, economic, and ideological conditions that shaped these decisions in four GSS: Turkey, India, South Africa, and Brazil.