Welcome!
Welcome!
I am a research associate at the Heidelberg University.
My research interests lie in behavioral and experimental economics, game theory and more specifically in bargaining setups with private information.
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Education:
2020 - 2024:
PhD in Economics, Heidelberg University
2019 - 2020:
Visiting PhD Student at GESS, University of Mannheim
2013 - 2019:
BSc and MSc in Economics, University of Bonn
Research Projects
Don't put all your legs in one basket:
Theory and evidence on coopetition behavior in road cycling
(joint work with Julian Matthes, European Economic Review, Volume 170, 2024)
Abstract: We study competition between two groups of individuals with team affiliations, where each group solves a coopetition problem to outperform the other group. Our analysis suggests the presence of a strategic benefit of diversification that goes beyond merely reducing outcome uncertainty. We outline applications in industrial and workplace organization and provide a detailed model of road cycling races, which naturally feature this strategic setup. We find that asymmetric groups tend to cooperate better. Also, having team members in two competing groups is beneficial for a team, as it increases free-riding opportunities in both groups. By analyzing data from over 40 seasons of professional road cycling races, we find empirical evidence in favor of these results. In particular, having a teammate in a group behind positively impacts win probability.
Legislative bargaining with private information:
A comparison of majority and unanimity rule
(joint work with Christoph Vanberg, Games and Economic Behavior, 2025)
Abstract: We investigate the effects of alternative voting rules in a three-person, two-period bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to secure agreement to a proposal under either majority or unanimity rule. Two responders have privately known disagreement payoffs. We characterize Bayesian equilibria in stagewise undominated strategies. Our central result is that responders are ‘more expensive’ under unanimity rule because they like to be perceived as high types. Inefficient delay and disagreement are more likely under unanimity rule, except under very restrictive parameter conditions. Our analysis provides a theoretical foundation for intuitions that have been stated informally before. In addition, it yields deeper insights into the underlying incentives and what they imply for optimal behavior in bargaining with private information.
Legislative bargaining with private information:
Experimental results on the comparison of different voting rules
(joint work with Christoph Vanberg, Jorunal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2025)
Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates behavior in a legislative bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to pass a proposal. In each of two rounds, she attempts to buy the necessary votes by offering payments. Between rounds, the game ends in breakdown with a certain probability. The two responders hold privately known disagreement values. We compare behavior under majority (one vote needed) vs. unanimity (both votes needed) rule. The main theoretical prediction is that responders are more “expensive” in round 1 under unanimity rule because there exists a signaling incentive to vote “no”. Under majority rule, this incentive is absent and in fact, responders should fear being excluded after voting “no”. Our experimental findings confirm the presence of signaling incentives under unanimity rule, resulting in lower agreement probabilities than under majority rule. In contrast, the experimental evidence under majority rule is mixed and does not fully coincide with the theoretical predictions.
The “German Vote” and its consequences:
(Un)reliable parties in multilateral bargaining under private information
(European Journal of Political Economy, 2025)
Abstract: This paper theoretically investigates the strategic implications of varying reliability of bargaining partners under unanimous and non-unanimous voting. In a sequential two-period model, three players (one proposer, two responders) bargain over the distribution of a pie. One responder has private information about his valuation of finding an agreement, implying signaling values that differ substantially between voting rules and are affected by the other responder’s reliability. The other responder is of a non-strategic “robot” type, who is unreliable in the sense that in the first period, he may vote “no” after announcing a “yes”-vote. Under unanimity rule, the responder with private information benefits from voting “no” because this signals that he requires a larger compensation in a future period. In contrast, under majority rule, voting “no” is unattractive due to the fear of being excluded from a future coalition. Under both voting rules, one responder becoming less reliable negatively affects the other responder’s willingness to vote “yes”, making efficient agreements increasingly difficult to achieve. Under majority rule, the presence of unreliable parties can lead to more parties being included in the winning coalition, as demonstrated by an extension of the model. However, some of these insights are contingent on the specific assumptions of the model.
Contact
david.piazolo [at] awi.uni-heidelberg.de
Bergheimer Str. 58, Heidelberg, AWI, Room 01.003
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