The Philosophy of Religion
David Christopher Lane, Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy
David Christopher Lane, Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy
Office Hours: Mondays and Fridays via Zoom. 8 to 9 p.m.
Email: dlane@mtsac.edu
CRN 23483 / PHIL 16H
GENERAL AUDIOBOOK INTRODUCTION, 15 GATES OF THE SACRED MIND
Key Guideline: Everything you need for this course is listed on this page. Read it carefully and systematically. Each week you are provided with reading materials and films and essay questions. Your professor is here to help and available 24/7 via email at dlane@mtsac.edu.
General website: http://www.neuralsurfer.com
General library of free materials: https://sites.google.com/view/themasterlist/home
Neural Surfer's Youtube channel for original films: http://www.youtube.com/user/neuralsurfer
Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/neuralsurfer
Email: dlane@mtsac.edu
Audio Books: https://sites.google.com/site/msacaudiobooks/
Office location: ONLINE until further notice
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
TEACHER-STUDENT INTERACTION:
I have spent the last twenty years creating over 3000 audiobooks and films on philosophy, science, and religion, to provide a more personal (and visual) glimpse into philosophy. In this way, they serve as a visual and auditory lecture from your Professor.
Furthermore, we have created over 600 original books and pamphlets dealing with philosophy that are available for free as PDFs and as interactive texts. This is an ongoing project and during the semester we will be adding to the large database that can be accessed anytime and anywhere via the Internet.
Finally, I am available 24/7 via email for any questions or issues you may have. Contact: dlane@mtsac.edu
IMPORTANT NOTE: Plagiarism will not be tolerated. Your work must be your own.
A.I. and ChatGPT NOTICE: All essays and all writings must be self-generated. I know it is tempting to use A.I., but we have detectors and it is too easy to spot. Don't do it and don't be tempted to do it. Such writings will not be allowed, unless specifically specified.
I am available via email at dlane@mtsac.edu 24/7 if you have any questions or difficulties. I am here to help.
STUDENT TO STUDENT INTERACTION:
Often we learn more from sharing with other students than from formal lectures. Be sure to use the canvas forum to post your essay responses and to exchange ideas with other students. Also, be sure to keep a copy of your posts (and selected interactions) on your website for my review at midterm and finals time.
GUIDING MODULES PER WEEK
I have created unique websites for each of the readings, audiobook versions and the films in this course. They are rich study guides and will help contextualize the materials in this course. Follow each week per the week assigned.
1) What is “Religion”?
Study Guide and Required Review and Questions
2) Arguments for the Existence of God
2. VISUAL GUIDE
3. STUDY GUIDE WITH QUESTIONS TO REVIEW
3) Arguments Against the Existence of God, 4) Religious Experience 5) Miracles and Natural Law
6) The Problem of Evil, 7) Free Will, Determinism, and Divine Providence
8) Science and Religion
9) The Nature of Ultimate Reality (Brahman, Śūnyatā, Dao)
10) Self and No‑Self (Ātman vs. Anātman)
11) Time, Rebirth, and the Cyclic Universe
12) Karma, Causality, and Moral Order
13) Liberation and Enlightenment (Mokṣa and Nirvāṇa)
14) Ethics Without a Lawgiver
15) Artificial Intelligence and the Sacred
1. Course Website
Each student must create a free website (Google Sites is recommended) to host all course work, including posts and extra credit.
Google offers an updated tutorial video on how to set up your site.
Keep a copy of everything you produce for this class on your website.
Make sure your site is publicly accessible so your professor can view it.
If you use Google Docs, adjust the sharing settings so they are also public.
2. Assigned Readings
Complete all assigned readings to the best of your ability.
You may skim some sections, as long as you understand the key ideas and main concepts.
3. Films
Watch all required films shown in class.
4. Weekly Essays
Each week, write answers to two required essay questions.
Post these essays both on your website and on the Canvas discussion board.
5. Communication with the Professor
Email your professor twice during the semester at dlane@mtsac.edu, including a link to your website each time.
Your work will be graded within 48 hours, and you will receive a direct reply.
6. Responsibility and Self-Motivation
This is an accelerated course, so staying organized and motivated is essential.
If you encounter any difficulties or have questions, email your professor directly at dlane@mtsac.edu.
7. Course Completion Requirements
To successfully complete the course, you must:
Do all required readings
Watch all assigned films
Complete every assignment
Take both the midterm and final exam
8. Flash Extra Credit and Updates
Your professor will occasionally post extra credit opportunities (such as magazine articles, movies, or books) on the Canvas class forum.
Check regularly for updates so you don’t miss these chances.
GRADING
A= Securing a CREDIT on each of the assigned essays each week, passing the midterm and final with a B+ or higher, and doing all the required readings and watching all of the required films. Also completing each of the student responses and receiving a CREDIT.
B= Securing a CREDIT on each of the assigned essays each week, passing the midterm and final with a B- or higher, and doing all the required readings and watching all of the required films. Also completing each of the student responses and receiving a CREDIT.
C= Securing a CREDIT on each of the assigned essays each week, passing the midterm and final with a C or higher, and doing all the required readings and watching all of the required films. Also completing each of the student responses and receiving a CREDIT.
D= Securing a CREDIT on each of the assigned essays each week, passing the midterm and final with a D or higher, and doing all the required readings and watching all of the required films. Also completing each of the student responses and receiving a CREDIT..
F= Not doing the required work for this course.
FROM THE MSAC GUIDELINE SHEET
Cheating and Plagiarism
The term “Cheating” includes but is not limited to:
• Plagiarism
• Receiving or knowingly supplying unauthorized information
• Using unauthorized material or sources
• Changing an answer after work has been graded and presenting it as improperly
graded
• Illegally accessing confidential information through a computer
• Taking an examination for another student or having another person take an
examination for you
• Presenting another person’s work as your own
• Forging or altering registration or grade documents
• Submitting collectively developed work as your own, unless specifically allowed by
the professor
A professor who determines that a student has cheated may give the student a failing grade
for the assignment and should report the alleged academic dishonesty to the Student Life
Office, which will maintain a record of the report and appropriate action under the
provisions of the Administrative Procedures on Student Discipline (AP 5520).
Students are advised that allegations of dishonesty are serious, and can lead to disciplinary
sanctions including suspension and expulsion. (AP 4290).
For webpage: http://www.mtsac.edu/distancelearning/_resources/2013-
14_Catalog_StudentHonestyPolicy_1.pdf
Disability Accommodations
Students with disabilities, whether physical, learning, or psychological, who believe that they
may need accommodations in this class, are encouraged to contact Disabled Students
Programs & Services (DSPS) as soon as possible to ensure that such accommodations are
implemented in a timely manner. Their phone number is (909) 274-4290 and they are located
in the Student Services Building, Room 9B. Webpage: http://www.mtsac.edu/dsps/
GENERAL COURSE OUTLINE | 15 EPISODES
Each episode will be augmented weekly, with readings, assignments, and more.
What is “religion”?
No single definition commands universal assent, partly because religious traditions vary widely in doctrine, practice, and self‑understanding. Still, many scholars converge on a family resemblance: religions typically involve (i) symbols, narratives, and rituals; (ii) communities and institutions; (iii) beliefs and practices oriented toward an ultimate reality (God, gods, Brahman, śūnyatā/emptiness, the Dao) or an ultimate concern (salvation, nirvāṇa, liberation); and (iv) moral and ascetical disciplines shaping life toward that end. Crucially, not all religions are theistic. Classical Theravāda Buddhism and much of Daoism lack a creator‑God yet are uncontroversially “religions.”
Philosophy of religion vs. theology vs. religious studies.
Philosophy of religion uses the methods of philosophy—conceptual analysis, argument, phenomenology, logic, and ethics—to evaluate religious claims and practices. It asks, for example, whether belief in God is justified, whether miracles are possible, how divine omniscience relates to human freedom, what “emptiness” means in Madhyamaka Buddhism, or whether mystical experience can confer knowledge. The discipline is not committed to any tradition; it is a second‑order, critical inquiry that can be practiced by believers, agnostics, and atheists alike.
Theology (from theos + logos) is reasoning from within a tradition (“faith seeking understanding” in Anselm’s phrase). It presupposes certain revelations, scriptures, or authorities and elaborates them systematically. Christian trinitarian theology, Islamic kalām, or Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics in Hinduism are paradigms. Theology can be philosophically sophisticated, but its evidential standards include sources the philosopher qua philosopher may not grant (e.g., Scripture’s authority).
Religious studies is an academic, typically empirical, field that investigates religion descriptively and comparatively: history of religions, anthropology, sociology, and psychology of religion. It asks how rituals bind communities (Durkheim), how conversion happens (James), or how religions spread and change, without adjudicating truth claims as such.
Epistemic postures.
Philosophy of religion ranges from apologetic (defending a view), to critical (testing coherence), to comparative (mapping concepts across traditions). It also spans analytic and continental styles, virtue and feminist approaches, and increasingly, cross‑cultural philosophy that engages Sanskrit, Pāli, Chinese, Arabic, and classical Greek sources directly.
The nature of religious belief.
Religious belief is often propositional (“God exists,” “all conditioned things are impermanent”) but is also fiduciary (trust), practical (commitment to live under a norm), and affective (a stance of reverence, gratitude, or awe). In Christian thought, a classic distinction is between fides quae creditur (what is believed) and fides qua creditur (the act/virtue of believing). In Buddhism, śraddhā/saddhā is confidence that catalyzes practice; its rationality is tested by the transformation it yields (e.g., reduction of greed, hatred, and delusion), not only by argument. Confucianism treats belief less as assent to metaphysics and more as ritualized habituation (li) cultivating ren (humaneness).
Functions and social roles.
Cognitive: Religious worldviews interpret ultimate questions—origin, destiny, meaning, evil, death.
Moral: They ground and sustain norms (e.g., ahimsa in Jainism; charity and zakat in Islam).
Formative: Practices shape character, attention, and desire (prayer, meditation, asceticism).
Communal: Rituals mark belonging and transmit memory.
Aesthetic/affective: Liturgy, architecture, and art form sensibilities of awe and gratitude.
Political: Religions can underwrite regimes or galvanize reform (liberation theology; Gandhian nonviolence). Philosophy of religion scrutinizes these functions and asks whether they support or distort the truth‑aim of religious life.
Rationality and pluralism.
The field wrestles with whether rationality in religion is “evidentialist” (belief needs propositional evidence), “reformed epistemology” (some beliefs are properly basic), “pragmatist” (truth is what best resolves lived problems), or “phenomenological” (begin from the way the sacred is given). In a plural world, philosophers also ask how mutually incompatible claims can be responsibly negotiated—via exclusivism, inclusivism, or pluralism—and whether different traditions aim at the same ultimate reality under different conceptual schemes or at genuinely different ultimates.
Further reading
Ninian Smart, The World’s Religions and Dimensions of the Sacred.
Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith.
William Alston, Perceiving God (on religious belief as a doxastic practice).
John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion.
J.L. Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion.
Robert Audi, Rationality and Religious Commitment.
S.N. Balagangadhara, “The Heathen in His Blindness…” (on the concept of religion cross‑culturally).
S. Radhakrishnan & C.A. Moore, A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy.
2) Arguments for the Existence of God
Classical arguments: ontological, cosmological, and teleological.
Modern reformulations and critiques.
Ontological arguments.
Anselm’s Proslogion reasoned: by definition, God is “that than which nothing greater can be conceived.” If God existed only in the understanding, a greater being—one existing in reality—could be conceived; hence God exists. Kant famously objected that existence is not a predicate that adds greatness. Modern modal versions (Plantinga) define God as a “maximally great being” (omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect across all possible worlds). If it’s possible such a being exists, then there is a possible world in which God exists; but a necessarily existent being, if possible, exists in every world, hence in ours. Critics press whether the key premise—possibility of a maximally great being—is any less contentious than the conclusion, and whether modal ontological arguments risk “modal collapse” (erasing contingency) or support parodies (“necessarily existing perfect island” is incoherent, but debates continue about whether the parodies really parallel the divine case).
Cosmological arguments.
Aquinas’s “ways” (from motion, causation, contingency) and Leibniz’s version from the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) argue from the existence of contingent beings to a necessary being that explains why anything exists. A currently discussed variant is the kalām cosmological argument: (1) whatever begins to exist has a cause; (2) the universe began to exist; therefore (3) the universe has a cause beyond itself—often identified as a timeless, spaceless, immaterial, immensely powerful personal agent. Defenders argue that an “actual infinite” of past events is impossible and cite cosmology suggesting a temporal beginning. Critics question (i) whether the PSR is self‑evident; (ii) whether an infinite regress is absurd; (iii) whether beginningless cosmologies or quantum models evade the premises; and (iv) whether the cause must be a personal God rather than a non‑personal necessary reality.
Teleological/design arguments.
Traditional versions (Paley) infer a designer from the adaptation of organisms. Darwinian evolution eroded this form by explaining complexity through natural selection. Contemporary design arguments pivot to cosmic fine‑tuning: many physical constants appear to fall in a very narrow life‑permitting range; this is striking if unguided but less surprising if a cosmic mind aims at life. Some frame it as an inference to the best explanation; others use Bayesian confirmation. Objections include the multiverse hypothesis (many universes make a life‑friendly one unsurprising), selection effects (observers will of course find themselves in a universe that permits them), and the worry that “fine‑tuning” assumes life like ours is the aim. Proponents reply that multiverse theories face their own evidential burdens and that life’s generality (not carbon chauvinism) is what calls for explanation.
Cumulative case and pragmatic reasons.
Many philosophers (Swinburne; Collins) argue for a cumulative case in which cosmological, axiological (objective moral values), experiential (mystical experience), and historical (putative miracles) strands together raise theism’s probability. Others (Pascal, James) emphasize the permissibility or prudence of faith where strict proof is unavailable, given the existential stakes.
Further reading
Anselm, Proslogion; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Paralogisms/Antinomies).
Gottfried Leibniz, Monadology; Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God.
William Lane Craig & J.P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology.
Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (axiological arguments).
Robin Collins, “The Teleological Argument” (various essays).
Graham Oppy, Arguing about Gods.
Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God.
John Leslie & Robert Lawrence Kuhn (eds.), The Mystery of Existence (fine‑tuning debates).
3) Arguments Against the Existence of God
Logical and evidential problem of evil.
Divine hiddenness and the argument from unbelief.
Logical problem of evil.
J.L. Mackie argued that the propositions “God is omnipotent,” “God is wholly good,” and “Evil exists” are logically inconsistent. Alvin Plantinga’s free‑will defense replies: if God creates significantly free creatures, it may be impossible (not even God can do the logically impossible) to ensure they never do wrong. Plantinga showed a logical possibility under which God and evil co‑exist without contradiction. Most philosophers accept that the “strict logical” problem is defused; the harder question is evidential.
Evidential/inductive problem of evil.
William Rowe’s famous fawn case: a fawn dies horribly in a forest fire with no apparent compensating good. He argues such seemingly gratuitous evils make God’s existence unlikely. Responses include (i) theodicies (see §6) that specify goods served by evil; (ii) skeptical theism, which claims human cognitive limits prevent us from inferring “gratuitousness” from “appears gratuitous”; and (iii) appeals to afterlife or cosmic eschatology (Hick’s soul‑making).
Divine hiddenness.
J.L. Schellenberg formulates: If a perfectly loving God exists, then for any finite person capable of relationship, God would make His existence evident enough to permit relationship, absent resistance. Yet there are “non‑resistant nonbelievers.” Therefore, such a God likely does not exist. Replies: (a) free and non‑coercive relationship might require a space for seeking, not overwhelming manifestation; (b) hiddenness may protect human moral autonomy or communal goods (no theocracy of spectacle); (c) some argue there are no truly non‑resistant unbelievers; (d) others propose that God reveals differently across cultures and life stages; or (e) that God’s love may wait until the right conditions (including post‑mortem opportunities) to reveal.
Other critiques.
Incoherence arguments: omnipotence paradoxes (“a stone too heavy to lift?”) are usually handled by clarifying omnipotence as power to do all that is logically possible.
Divine command and morality: some contend objective moral facts are either independent of God (making God redundant) or dependent (risking arbitrariness). Theists respond with modified divine command theories or natural law accounts where God’s nature grounds value.
Naturalism’s parsimony: if the world is explainable by impersonal laws and chance, adding God violates Occam’s Razor. Theists reply that explanation of why there are laws at all, or why consciousness and value exist, may not be captured by naturalism.
Further reading
J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism.
William Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.”
J.L. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason.
Michael Bergmann, Skeptical Theism.
Paul Draper, “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists.”
Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil.
Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics (morality without God).
Stephen Law, “The Evil‑God Challenge.”
4) Religious Experience
Mysticism, revelation, and altered states of consciousness.
William James, Rudolf Otto, and contemporary critiques.
Phenomenology.
Mystical experience displays recurring features across cultures. William James’ classic four marks—ineffability, noetic quality (a sense of insight), transiency, and passivity—map well onto reports from Christian contemplatives, Sufi dhikr, Kashmiri Shaiva samādhi, and Zen kenshō. Rudolf Otto analyzed the numinous: the “mysterium tremendum et fascinans”—a felt encounter with the Holy as simultaneously overwhelming and attractive. Contemporary studies distinguish introvertive mysticism (undifferentiated unity; Advaita’s nirvikalpa samādhi) from extrovertive (unity through multiplicity; nature mysticism). Pilgrims report “thick” experiences of presence in liturgy or sacrament; many traditions hold canonical revelations (Torah, Qurʾān, Vedas) believed to be divinely authored or mediated.
Epistemic status.
Can such experiences justify belief? Richard Swinburne proposes a principle of credulity (“it seems to S that X is present” is prima facie evidence unless defeaters are shown) and testimony (others’ sincere reports carry weight). William Alston describes “doxastic practices”: if sense perception and memory are rational absent specific defeaters, perhaps disciplined mystical perception is similarly innocent until proven guilty. Critics offer (i) naturalistic explanations (neural correlates, suggestion, psychosocial need); (ii) constructivism (Steven Katz): experiences are shaped by the conceptual/theological lenses of their traditions, so no “pure” experience speaks for all; (iii) cross‑cultural conflict (Christian Trinitarian visions vs. Advaita nondual insight); and (iv) safety/reliability concerns given the ease of self‑deception.
Altered states and neuroscience.
Meditation research, neurotheology, and careful psychedelic trials suggest that certain practices and substances can occasion experiences of unity, timelessness, and profound meaning with long‑term prosocial effects. Religious communities debate whether induced states are spiritually authentic, but their phenomenology overlaps with classical accounts. None of this settles metaphysics: neural correlates do not by themselves explain whether the object of experience (God, Brahman, emptiness) is real.
Social fruit and discernment.
Traditions deploy criteria to distinguish authentic from spurious experiences: stability of humility and compassion (across Christian, Sufi, and Buddhist manuals), alignment with scripture or doctrine (Abrahamic faiths), and the counsel of mature practitioners. The pragmatic transformation of agents—courage in suffering, love of enemies, release from greed—has evidential weight for many.
Further reading
William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience.
Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy.
William P. Alston, Perceiving God.
Steven T. Katz (ed.), Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis.
Walter T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy.
Ann Taves, Religious Experience Reconsidered.
John Hick, Faith and Knowledge.
Andrew Newberg & Mark Waldman, How God Changes Your Brain.
5) Miracles and Natural Law
Hume’s critique and modern defenses.
Miracles as violations vs. signs of meaning.
Hume’s challenge.
In Of Miracles (Section X of the Enquiry), Hume defines a miracle as a violation of the laws of nature and argues that the evidence from uniform experience always outweighs testimony to violations. Since laws are established by firm uniform experience, and testimony is often unreliable (credulity, zeal, ignorance), it is never rational to credit a miracle claim.
Responses.
Bayesian approaches contest Hume’s “always defeated” stance. If the prior probability of a miracle is low but not zero, and the likelihood of the testimony given a genuine miracle is much higher than the likelihood of such testimony if no miracle occurred, repeated independent, highly reliable testimonies can raise the posterior probability above rational acceptance thresholds (Swinburne; Earman’s sharp critique of Hume’s probabilistic reasoning).
What is a “law”? Many philosophers treat laws as idealized descriptions under ceteris paribus conditions, not exceptionless edicts. If God is part of the total causal story, “special divine action” need not be a violation but an additional causal factor at a higher explanatory level.
Non‑interventionist causation. Some theologians propose that God acts through indeterminacies (quantum events, chaotic systems) or by sustaining and constraining the whole, not by jamming the gears.
Miracles as signs. In biblical contexts, semeia (“signs”) are not magic tricks but symbolic events within a revelatory pattern—e.g., healings as foretaste of eschatological wholeness. Viewed thus, evidential force is intertwined with narrative meaning and the credibility of witnesses and communities.
Cross‑cultural claims.
Hagiographies across Buddhism, Jainism, Hinduism, and Christianity record wonders—from bilocation to levitation to prophetic knowledge. Philosophically, the duplication of wonder claims across rival traditions can undercut apologetic deployment, or it can suggest that the sacred is not tradition‑monopolized and that extraordinary events, where credible, support a general supernaturalism rather than a particular creed.
Practical rationality.
Given background beliefs, the same evidence can rationally lead different agents to different conclusions. Hume rightly warns against credulity; but a blanket a priori bar against miracles overreaches. Case‑by‑case assessment—considering independence of witnesses, medical records, disconfirmation efforts, and coherence with wider theistic commitments—better fits intellectual virtue.
Further reading
David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section X.
John Earman, Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argument against Miracles.
Richard Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle.
C.S. Lewis, Miracles.
Craig Keener, Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Accounts.
Robert Larmer, The Legitimacy of Miracle.
N.T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (historical method and signs).
Carol Zaleski & Philip Zaleski, The Book of Heaven (visions across traditions).
6) The Problem of Evil
Theodicies (Augustinian, Irenaean, process).
Suffering and meaning in different traditions.
Defense vs. theodicy.
A defense shows it’s logically possible that God and evil co‑exist; a theodicy tries to identify God’s actual reasons. This section surveys major strategies without claiming any single one fully resolves all cases.
Augustinian (privation and free will).
Evil is a privation of good, not a co‑eternal force. God creates free creatures whose misuse of freedom yields moral evil; natural evils are tied to a fallen order. Strengths: preserves divine goodness; diagnoses moral agency. Weaknesses: natural evil seems disproportionate to creaturely sin; evolutionary history predates human moral agents; inherited guilt is contested.
Irenaean/Hick (soul‑making).
We are created immature and are perfected through trials in a world “fit for soul‑making.” Goods like courage, forgiveness, and compassion require difficult conditions. This shifts the focus from blame to formation. Strengths: matches experiential growth narratives; allows eschatological fulfillment. Weaknesses: the extremity of some horrors (genocide, child suffering) seems excessive for any soul‑making; using others as instruments for my virtues raises justice worries.
Process and open theism.
Influenced by Whitehead and Hartshorne, process theists revise omnipotence: God lures creation toward value but cannot unilaterally override creaturely processes. Open theists maintain that some future free acts are not knowable as truths yet. Strength: aligns with a dynamic, law‑governed world; avoids the implication that God permits horrors he could deterministically stop. Weakness: departs from classical theism; some ask whether a non‑omnipotent deity is worthy of worship.
Comparative perspectives.
Buddhism frames suffering (dukkha) as structurally built into craving and ignorance; the solution is not theodicy but liberation through the Noble Eightfold Path.
Hindu traditions often link suffering to karma—past actions’ moral fruits—even across lives. This can underwrite moral seriousness but risks victim‑blaming; many teachers stress compassion over judgment.
Judaism after the Shoah wrestles with protest theologies (e.g., Elie Wiesel’s Night) and covenantal fidelity without tidy answers.
Islamic thought affirms divine wisdom (ḥikma) beyond human ken and emphasizes patience (ṣabr) and trust (tawakkul), coupled with a strong duty to relieve suffering.
Pastoral note.
Philosophical answers and existential care are different tasks. In lament traditions (Psalms, Job), questioning God is part of faith. Any adequate account must preserve both the demand for justice and the injunction to mercy.
Further reading
Augustine, Confessions and City of God (evil as privation).
John Hick, Evil and the God of Love.
Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God.
David Bentley Hart, The Doors of the Sea.
Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness (narrative theodicy).
Whitehead, Process and Reality; Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes.
Damien Keown, Buddhism: A Very Short Introduction (dukkha).
Elie Wiesel, Night (witness literature).
7) Free Will, Determinism, and Divine Providence
Human freedom vs. divine omniscience.
Compatibilist and libertarian perspectives.
The dilemma.
If God infallibly knows tomorrow that you will do X, can you do otherwise? If the physical world is deterministic, are we responsible? In Abrahamic traditions, God’s providence orders history; in South Asian traditions, karma orders consequences. How any such ordering coexists with meaningful freedom is central.
Compatibilism.
Compatibilists hold that freedom is acting according to one’s reasons and desires without external coercion, even if those desires are determined. Frankfurt cases challenge the “principle of alternate possibilities” (PAP): moral responsibility may not require the ability to do otherwise if the agent acts from her own will. Consequence arguments (van Inwagen) push back: if determinism is true, our acts follow from laws and past states we don’t control; hence we are not free. Semi‑compatibilists (Fischer) argue responsibility can survive even if alternative possibilities don’t.
Libertarianism.
Libertarians insist on genuine indeterminacy at the point of choice. Some posit agent causation: agents, not just events, originate actions. Critics ask how such causation is intelligible and how randomness avoids undermining control. Proponents reply that controlled, reasons‑responsive indeterminism is coherent and matches moral intuition.
Divine foreknowledge.
Boethian timelessness: God is outside time; he knows our actions in an eternal “now” without causing them, so necessity of the past is not imposed.
Ockhamism: God’s past beliefs are “soft facts” dependent on future contingents; changing the future would have changed the past belief counterfactually.
Molinism: God has “middle knowledge” of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (what any agent would freely do in any circumstance). By choosing to actualize a world with certain circumstances, God can providentially order free history. Critics question the grounding of such counterfactuals.
Open theism: future free acts are not yet truths to be known; God knows all that can be known and is supremely resourceful. Critics see this as limiting omniscience; advocates argue it elevates relational mutuality.
Karma and freedom.
Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain frameworks treat karmic causation as strong but not fatalistic. The Buddha compares karma to seeds whose fruition depends on conditions; practice can alter trajectories. Jainism emphasizes radical responsibility yet allows for ascetic practices that burn off karmic matter.
Further reading
Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will; Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy (Bk V).
Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will.
John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will.
Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will.
Alfred J. Freddoso (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate.
William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (open theism).
Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy (karma and agency).
Jonardon Ganeri, The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance (Indian debates).
8) Science and Religion
Conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration models.
Cosmology, evolution, and intelligent design debates.
Four relations.
Ian Barbour proposed: (1) Conflict (scientific naturalism vs. biblical literalism); (2) Independence (separate magisteria—Gould’s NOMA—science handles facts, religion values/meaning); (3) Dialogue (mutual clarification about method, language, and limits); (4) Integration (systematic syntheses—natural theology or theologies of nature). Most historians note that “conflict” as a master narrative is misleading: medieval Islam and Christianity incubated science; major scientists were religious; yet conflict has flared where ecclesial authorities or fundamentalists made empirical claims contravened by evidence.
Cosmology.
Big‑bang cosmology surprised many by positing a temporal origin; some theists saw confirmation of creation ex nihilo, others caution against “God‑of‑the‑gaps.” Fine‑tuning (see §2) motivates renewed natural theology; multiverse proposals parse it differently. The key is epistemic humility: cosmology is data‑constrained and theory‑laden.
Evolution.
Common descent with natural selection is a bedrock of modern biology. Religious responses range from young‑earth creationism (rejecting mainstream science) to intelligent design (accepting some evolution but inferring design in irreducible complexity or information) to theistic evolution/evolutionary creation (God creates through evolutionary processes). Many theologians read Genesis as theological cosmology rather than modern science. Jewish and Islamic scholarship historically integrated Aristotelian/Neoplatonic cosmologies with scriptural exegesis; contemporary scholars do similar work with evolution.
Methodological vs. metaphysical naturalism.
Science operates with methodological naturalism (seek natural causes). Some move from that to metaphysical naturalism (only nature exists). Critics argue the move is not compelled by scientific method itself. Conversely, religious appeals must avoid premature supernatural insertions into scientific explanation.
Human uniqueness.
Debates on consciousness, rationality, morality, and religious sense explore whether these phenomena fit within evolutionary accounts. Some theists see the imago Dei realized through emergent capacities; Buddhists treat mind as dependently arisen and trainable; Confucians emphasize moral cultivation rather than radical ontological discontinuity.
Further reading
Ian Barbour, Religion and Science.
Stephen Jay Gould, “Nonoverlapping Magisteria.”
John Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science.
Francis Collins, The Language of God.
Michael Behe, Darwin’s Black Box; critics in
Robert Pennock (ed.), Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics.
Philip Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit (integration).
Ted Peters & Martinez Hewlett, Evolution from Creation to New Creation.
Peter Harrison, The Territories of Science and Religion (history).
9) The Nature of Ultimate Reality (Brahman, Śūnyatā, Dao)
Comparative inquiry into Being and Emptiness.
Ontological monism vs. non‑essentialist metaphysics.
Brahman (Advaita and alternatives).
The Upaniṣads speak of Brahman as the ground of being and consciousness: “That thou art” (tat tvam asi). Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta reads this as nondualism: Atman (self) is Brahman; the world of plurality is māyā (not sheer illusion but dependent appearance). Realization (jñāna) dissolves ignorance and reveals pure consciousness. Alternatives include Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita (qualified non‑dualism: Brahman with real attributes; souls and world are modes of Brahman) and Madhva’s Dvaita (dualism: eternal difference between God and souls). All hold Brahman as ontologically ultimate, but they disagree about the status of multiplicity.
Śūnyatā (Madhyamaka).
Nāgārjuna’s analysis of dependent origination yields emptiness: all phenomena lack svabhāva (inherent nature). Emptiness is not a new substance but a way of seeing things as relational and conditioned. The “two truths” (conventional and ultimate) protect against nihilism: ultimately there’s no fixed essence; conventionally there are persons, causes, and moral responsibilities. Realizing emptiness undercuts clinging and enables compassion, because identities are porous and interdependent.
The Dao.
The Dao De Jing opens: “The Dao that can be spoken is not the constant Dao.” Dao is the unnameable source and pattern of the ten thousand things. To live well is to align with its flow through wu‑wei (effortless action) and ziran (spontaneity). The Dao is neither a personal creator nor a mere abstraction; it is the generative process that precedes being/non‑being distinctions.
Comparison.
Brahmanic monism affirms an ultimate Being or consciousness—often personal in devotional Vedānta. Madhyamaka denies any ultimate substance, offering instead an ultimate lack of essence that reveals the world’s interdependence. Daoism gives an apophatic, processual source that is not a being among beings, closer to a way than a substance. Yet convergences appear: all three critique reification, emphasize contemplative transformation, and deploy apophatic language to avoid idolatry of concepts. Where Advaita prioritizes identity with the Absolute, Madhyamaka cautions that any such posit risks reification; the “ultimate” is precisely the collapse of ultimizing.
Further reading
The Upaniṣads (various translations); Śaṅkara, Brahma‑Sūtra‑Bhāṣya.
Rāmānuja, Śrī‑Bhāṣya; Madhva, Anuvyākhyāna.
Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (trans. Jay Garfield).
T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.
Dao De Jing (trans. D.C. Lau; Ames & Hall); Zhuangzi.
Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction.
Graham Priest, The Fifth Corner of Four (logic and emptiness).
Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought.
10) Self and No‑Self (Ātman vs. Anātman)
Upaniṣadic self‑realization vs. Buddhist denial of enduring self.
Implications for consciousness and personal identity.
Ātman.
Upaniṣadic seers proclaim a deep self beyond body and mind—the witness consciousness that persists through waking, dream, and deep sleep. Knowing Ātman as Brahman is liberation. Later Vedāntic debates refine whether the phenomenal ego (ahaṃkāra) is illusory, whether the “witness” is identical to pure awareness, and how ignorance superimposes individuality on the nondual Self.
Anātman.
The Buddha rejects any permanent, independent core. Persons are aggregates (skandhas)—form, feeling, perception, formations, consciousness—arising and ceasing in dependence. Clinging to a self breeds suffering; insight into impermanence and non‑self frees. Yet Buddhism maintains continuity through causal streams; karma carries patterns without a persisting owner (like a flame passed from candle to candle).
Debates and bridges.
Classical Hindu‑Buddhist controversies (e.g., Nyāya vs. Buddhist logicians) turn on memory, responsibility, and liberation. If no self, who is reborn? Buddhism answers: a conventionally designated person constituted by relations—not nothing, not a substance. Some Yogācāra texts speak of ālaya‑vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) that conserves karmic seeds; critics worry this reifies a self in all but name. In modern analytic terms, Derek Parfit’s “reductionism” about persons echoes anātman: identity is not a further fact beyond psychological/physical continuity.
Consciousness studies.
Advaita sees consciousness as fundamental; materialism cannot, on this view, explain the “hard problem.” Buddhist thinkers like the Abhidharma and contemporary mindfulness theorists analyze consciousness as momentary and conditioned, dissolving the hard problem by denying a unitary subject. Both traditions offer rigorous phenomenologies that can complement or critique neuroscience.
Ethical upshot.
If the self is ultimate, compassion arises from recognizing the same Self in all. If the self is empty, compassion arises from recognizing interdependence and the arbitrariness of privileging “me.” Either way, the self is decentered, and ethics becomes other‑regarding.
Further reading
Chāndogya and Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads.
S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy.
Peter Harvey, The Selfless Mind.
Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.), Self, No Self?
Jonardon Ganeri, The Concealed Art of the Soul.
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons.
B.K. Matilal, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge.
Evan Thompson, Waking, Dreaming, Being.
11) Time, Rebirth, and the Cyclic Universe
Cyclical cosmology vs. linear temporality.
Philosophical implications of rebirth and karmic continuity.
Temporal imaginaries.
Abrahamic traditions tend to imagine time as linear: creation → history → judgment/new creation. South and East Asian traditions often imagine cycles: yugas, kalpas, universes expanding and contracting, beings coursing through samsāra until liberation. Greek Stoics also entertained eternal recurrence. Nietzsche’s existential thought experiment (“would you will your life eternally repeated?”) tests life‑affirmation rather than cosmology.
Physics and metaphysics.
Modern cosmology’s standard model has a beginning in a hot dense state; alternative models propose bounces or cycles (ekpyrotic scenarios, conformal cyclic cosmology). Philosophy of time distinguishes presentism (only the present exists) from eternalism (all times are equally real—the “block universe”). If eternalism is true, divine foreknowledge becomes easier; presentism fits better with becoming and freedom. None of these positions is settled by physics alone; philosophical commitments about causation and modality shape interpretations.
Rebirth and identity.
Rebirth raises the identity question: what makes a future person you? Hindu and Jain accounts posit a persisting self/subtle body; Buddhism denies this but retains karmic continuity. If memory is absent, is survival meaningful? Some argue moral continuity is enough; others see eschatological justice (balancing of karma) as incoherent without a subject. Empirical investigations of putative past‑life memories are controversial; philosophy of religion treats them, at most, as defeasible data points.
Karmic order and responsibility.
Rebirth stretches ethical horizons beyond one life, but can tempt fatalism or victim‑blaming. Buddhist teachers stress the complexity of causes: karma is only one condition among many; compassion remains primary. Jainism emphasizes austere practices to purify karmic matter; Hindu texts balance karma with divine grace.
Further reading
Wendy Doniger (ed.), Hindu Myths; Gavin Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism.
Bhikkhu Bodhi (trans.), The Connected Discourses of the Buddha (on dependent origination).
Paul Dundas, The Jains.
Sean Carroll, From Eternity to Here (time’s arrow).
Roger Penrose, Cycles of Time (conformal cyclic cosmology).
William Lane Craig & Quentin Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology.
Stephen Phillips, Classical Indian Metaphysics.
Mark Johnston, Surviving Death.
12) Karma, Causality, and Moral Order
Karma as moral law vs. mechanistic determinism.
Buddhist dependent origination (pratītya‑samutpāda) and its ethical significance.
Karma as moral causation.
“Karma” (action) and its fruits (phala) express that intentional actions shape character and consequences, within and across lives. Hindu and Jain thought often construes karma as a quasi‑law; Jainism is striking in treating karma as subtle material particles adhering to the soul. Buddhism emphasizes intention (cetanā) as the heart of karma: mere outcomes don’t fix moral valence; motives do.
Determinism?
Karmic law is not strict determinism. Many causes and conditions interact; stored potentials (saṃskāras, bīja seeds) ripen when conditions conspire. Practice (ethical discipline, meditation, wisdom) can interrupt and transform patterns. This dynamism parallels contemporary accounts of habit formation and neuroplasticity, though the metaphysical frame is broader.
Dependent origination.
The Buddha’s signature teaching links ignorance → formations → consciousness → name‑and‑form … → aging and death. This is not a linear chain but a web of mutual conditioning showing how suffering arises and can cease. Because nothing has fixed essence, change is possible; because phenomena are conditioned, responsibility is real. Emptiness (see §9) deepens this: to see beings as relational engenders compassion and undermines egoic reactivity.
Ethical implications.
Karma motivates long‑range accountability; it also encourages patience with oneself and others—no one is fixed by present states. Compassion (karuṇā) and loving‑kindness (mettā) are not mere sentiments but causal strategies: cultivating them changes the karmic field. Socially, karmic thinking can support nonviolent reform (Gandhi drew on ahimsa and karma) but needs guarding against quietism in the face of injustice; many modern teachers unite karma with structural analysis and activism.
Further reading
Bhikkhu Bodhi, In the Buddha’s Words (anthology).
Damien Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics.
Johannes Bronkhorst, Karma.
Paul Williams, Mahayana Buddhism.
Padmanabh Jaini, The Jaina Path of Purification.
Jonardon Ganeri, Attention, Not Self.
Charles Goodman, Consequences of Compassion.
Maria Heim, The Forerunner of All Things (Buddhist ethics).
13) Liberation and Enlightenment (Mokṣa and Nirvāṇa)
Philosophical accounts of liberation in Vedānta, Jainism, and Buddhism.
Is liberation a metaphysical state, psychological transformation, or both?
Vedānta.
For Advaita, liberation (mokṣa) is knowledge (jñāna) that the individual self is the nondual Brahman. Bondage is avidyā (ignorance) superimposing limitation on pure consciousness. Practices (ethical discipline, meditation, scriptural inquiry) prepare the mind; realization is instantaneous and, classically, irreversible. In Viśiṣṭādvaita, liberation involves everlasting loving union with the personal God Viṣṇu; divine grace cooperates with devotion and virtue. In Dvaita, the soul remains eternally distinct; liberation is beatific vision and service. These nuances turn on how metaphysics (monism, qualified non‑dualism, dualism) frames the self‑God‑world relation.
Jainism.
The soul (jīva) is intrinsically omniscient and blissful but is weighed down by karmic matter. Through strict ethical vows (nonviolence, truth, non‑stealing, chastity, non‑attachment) and asceticism, one burns off karmic accretions until achieving kevala‑jñāna (omniscience) and release from rebirth. Liberation is metaphysically precise: an unembodied soul rises to the apex of the universe.
Buddhism.
Nirvāṇa is the extinguishing of greed, hatred, and delusion—the fires that sustain samsāra. Early texts contrast nirvāṇa “with remainder” (while living) and “without remainder” (at death). Mahāyāna elaborates bodhisattva ideals that postpone final nirvāṇa out of compassion, and some traditions (e.g., Zen, Dzogchen) emphasize recognizing the already present Buddha‑nature. Metaphysically, debates rage: is nirvāṇa a positive reality or simply the cessation of defilements? The mainstream insists it’s unconditioned yet describable only negatively; later schools treat it as inseparable from emptiness.
Transformation: metaphysical or psychological?
The choices are not exclusive. Liberation entails metaphysical insight (about self, reality, or God) and psychological transformation (stable virtues and attentional clarity). Contemporary philosophy of mind and psychology illuminate mechanisms of transformation (habits, attention, affect regulation), while metaphysics guards against reducing soteriology to therapy. In all three traditions, liberation yields unselfish love.
Further reading
Śaṅkara, Vivekacūḍāmaṇi; Rāmānuja, Śrī‑Bhāṣya.
Paul Hacker & Wilhelm Halbfass, essays on Vedānta.
Padmanabh S. Jaini, Gender and Salvation (Jainism).
Rupert Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism.
Steven Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities.
Sallie B. King, Buddha Nature.
Andrew Olendzki, Untangling Self.
John Powers, A Bull of a Man (Bodhisattva ideal).
14) Ethics Without a Lawgiver
Buddhist compassion (karuṇā), Jain ahimsa, and Confucian virtue ethics.
Can moral order exist without divine command?
Non‑theistic moral frameworks.
Buddhism grounds ethics in the causal structure of suffering and its cessation. Actions are good insofar as they conduce to the flourishing of self and others by reducing greed, hatred, and delusion. Compassion and wisdom are mutually reinforcing; the precepts function as skillful means, not edicts from a commander.
Jainism elevates ahimsa (non‑violence) to the summit of virtue, motivated by the conviction that all living beings possess souls and that violence binds karmic matter.
Confucianism is a virtue ethics centered on ren (humaneness) cultivated through li (ritual propriety) within hierarchical relationships. Heaven (Tian) is sometimes personified, but often functions as an impersonal moral order discerned through the exemplary junzi (gentleman). Moral knowledge arises from tradition‑guided cultivation, not divine fiat.
Philosophical grounding.
Moral normativity can be grounded in (i) human nature and flourishing (Aristotle; Confucians); (ii) the structure of suffering and interdependence (Buddhists); (iii) rational requirements (Kant); (iv) social contracts; or (v) objective moral facts independent of God (robust moral realism). The Euthyphro dilemma pushes theists to clarify: are actions good because God commands them (risking arbitrariness) or does God command them because they are good (implying an independent moral order)? Modified divine command theories identify goodness with God’s loving nature to avoid arbitrariness, while natural law theorists align morality with human flourishing designed by God. Non‑theists argue that moral truths, if objective, can be brute or platonic; if not objective, a constructivist or contractualist account can still yield binding norms.
Practical convergence.
Despite metaphysical differences, many traditions converge on prohibitions (killing, lying) and virtues (compassion, honesty). Dialogue can thus focus on reasons and practices that sustain common goods—fostering civic friendship without metaphysical uniformity.
Objections and replies.
Without God, no ultimate accountability. Reply: karmic and social orders can generate accountability; secular legal orders and human conscience suffice for many.
Without God, no motivation to be good. Reply: love of the good, compassion for suffering, and the intrinsic worth of persons/creatures are potent motives; indeed, Buddhist and Confucian ethics mobilize them effectively.
Moral progress. Religious and secular traditions both drive reform; critique and self‑correction are built into virtue traditions.
Further reading
Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics.
Charles Goodman, Consequences of Compassion.
Paul Dundas, The Jains.
Confucius, Analects (trans. Ames & Rosemont).
Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics.
Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics.
Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (modified DCT).
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue.
15) Artificial Intelligence and the Sacred
Framing the question.
As machine learning systems permeate daily life, religions ask new and very old questions: What is a person? Can mind emerge from matter? What makes something worthy of moral concern? What happens to authority when algorithms generate or curate scripture‑like texts? Does creativity or agency in artifacts invite sacralization—or idolatry?
Personhood and moral status.
Most traditions tie personhood to capacities (rationality, self‑consciousness, moral agency), relations (membership in covenant or li-guided community), or metaphysical status (ensoulment, ātman). Current AI lacks consciousness and autonomous goals; it is a tool running statistical pattern recognition. If a system appeared to be conscious (passing advanced tests), we would still need criteria distinguishing simulation from sentience.
Abrahamic views often link personhood to the imago Dei (image of God). Some theologians argue that image‑bearing is relational and vocational (called to wise stewardship), not a substance; if so, AI cannot be in the image. Others allow that if genuinely self‑aware artifacts ever arose, their moral status would be an open theological question.
Buddhist views decenter substantial self; the criterion becomes capacity to suffer and to awaken. A machine that truly suffers would warrant compassion. But current systems do not have phenomenal consciousness; attributing suffering is a category mistake.
Confucian views stress ritual relations and virtue cultivation; machines might be “rites‑assistants” that scaffold human flourishing but are not ritual subjects.
Authority and idolatry.
Language models can generate sermons or sutra‑style passages. Religious communities should ask: Who is responsible for content? What biases are embedded? Authority arises from lineage, community recognition, and lived wisdom—not from predictive text. The risk is algorithmic oracleism: treating outputs as oracular because they are fluent. A healthy stance is instrumental and transparent: AI is a tool for study, translation, and administration, not a prophet.
Sacred design and alignment.
Traditions offer virtues for builders: humility, truthfulness, non‑maleficence, justice, and compassion. Confucian zhong (loyalty) and shu (empathic reciprocity) translate into human‑centered design; Buddhist sati (mindfulness) counsels attention to downstream harm; Christian caritas grounds dignity‑preserving systems. Ahimsa (Jain non‑violence) pushes toward minimizing harm to sentient beings and the biosphere affected by compute‑intensive training.
Ritual and presence.
Robots already perform limited ritual assistance (chanting, guiding prayer). Philosophically, symbols need not be conscious to mediate meaning; a cross is wood yet sacramental. But when a robot simulates pastoral care, authenticity is at stake: consolation without understanding risks cheapening grief. Communities can use AI to augment access (translations, scheduling, accessibility), while keeping human presence central.
Eschatology and hubris.
Apocalyptic anxieties about superintelligence mirror earlier fears of human overreach (Babel, Prometheus). Traditions counsel prudent hope: technological gifts are ambivalent, demanding wisdom and limits. The sacred calls for reverence toward reality’s givenness, not domination for its own sake.
Speculative frontiers.
If artificial consciousness ever emerged (still hypothetical), the moral landscape would shift. Hindu Vedānta could ask whether such minds manifest Brahman; Buddhists could treat them as sentient streams in need of compassion; Abrahamic faiths would debate whether God can bestow grace on non‑biological persons. Until then, best practice is to avoid anthropomorphizing and to focus on present harms (bias, surveillance, labor exploitation, environmental cost) and goods (medical discovery, accessibility, education).
Further reading
Alan Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.”
John Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs” (Chinese Room).
Luciano Floridi, The Ethics of Information; The Fourth Revolution.
Shannon Vallor, Technology and the Virtues.
David J. Gunkel, Robot Rights.
Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence; Stuart Russell, Human Compatible.
Noreen Herzfeld, In Our Image: Artificial Intelligence and the Human Spirit.
Brent Waters, From Human to Posthuman.