NEW:

• Les liens complexes et renouvelés entre commerce international et conflits militaires au regard de la guerre en Ukraine avec Thierry Mayer et Mathias Thoenig. Tribune Le Monde 7 février 2023.

• Trade imbalances, fiscal policies  and the rise of protectionism: evidence from G20 countries, revised version (January 2023), with Samuel Delpeuch and Etienne Fize, CEPR Discussion Paper DP15742.  We investigate the role of trade imbalances in the rise of protectionism on the period 2009-2019 among G20 countries. Bilateral as well as multilateral trade imbalances are robust (with various sets of fixed effects) predictors of protectionist attacks. The role of trade imbalances in the rise of protectionism is confirmed when we instrument trade imbalances by unanticipated government spending shocks. Countries with more expansionary fiscal policies react to the ensuing trade imbalance by a more protectionist trade policy. The role of trade imbalances and fiscal policies in the rise of protectionism is economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in the bilateral and multilateral trade deficits of a country leads respectively to a 6% and 8% rise of protectionist attacks by this country.

• The effect of COVID certificates on vaccine uptake, health outcomes, and the economy, Nature Communications volume 13, Article number: 3942 (2022) with Oliu-Barton, Miquel and Pradelski, Bary S. R. and Woloszko, Nicolas (main authors) and Guetta-Jeanrenaud, Lionel and Aghion, Philippe and Artus, Patrick and Fontanet, Arnaud and Wolff, Guntram B. 

• Repenser les sanctions contre la Russie, Tribune dans le Le Monde avec Béatrice Weber di Mauro, 17 juin 2022

• Revisiting the EU framework: Economic necessities and legal options, CEPR Policy Insight No 114 with Miguel Maduro, Jean-Claude Piris, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Lucrezia Reichlin, Armin Steinbach, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, see also VOXEU column and Tribune Le Monde, December 2021.

• Pour une refonte du cadre budgétaire européen // Reforming the European fiscal framework, April 2021, with Jean Pisani Ferry and Xavier Ragot, Note du Conseil d'Analyse Economique, VOXEU column

• Will Schumpeter catch COVID-19? February 2021, with Mathieu Cros and Anne Epaulard. CEPR DP 15834. VOXEU column. We estimate the factors predicting firm failures in the COVID crisis based on French data in 2020. Although the number of firms filling for bankruptcy was much below its normal level (- 36% compared to 2019) the same factors that predicted firm failures (primarily productivity and debt) in 2019 are at work in a similar way as in 2020. Hence, the selection process, although much reduced, has not been distorted in 2020. At this stage, partial hibernation rather than zombification characterises the selection into firm survival or failure. We also find that the sectoral heterogeneity of the turnover COVID shock (proxied by the change in credit card transactions) has been largely (but not fully) absorbed by public policy support because it predicts little of the probability of bankruptcy at the firm level. Finally, we sketch some potential scenarios for 2021-2022 for different sectors based on our empirical estimates of predictors of firm failures.

• The Economics of Sovereign Debt, Bailouts and the Eurozone, 2020, with Pierre Olivier Gourinchas and Todd Messer, CEPR DP 14891 and NBER No. 27421:  Despite a formal ‘no-bailout clause’, we estimate significant transfers from the European Union to Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, ranging from roughly 0% (Ireland) to 43% (Greece) of output during the recent sovereign debt crisis. We propose a model to analyze and understand bailouts in a monetary union, and the large observed differences across countries. Because of collateral damage to the union in case of default, these bailouts are ex-post efficient. Our model embeds a ‘Southern view’ of the crisis (assistance was insufficient) and a ‘Northern view’ (assistance weakens fiscal discipline). Ex-post, bailouts do not improve the welfare of the recipient country, since creditor countries get the entire surplus from avoiding default. Ex-ante, bailouts generate risk shifting with an incentive to over-borrow by fiscally fragile countries.