Claudio de Almeida

Professor of Philosophy

Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul [PUCRS, Brazil]

E-mail: socratically@gmail.com

Some Representative Publications

Papers and Dictionary Entries

Testimony, Epistemic Cooptation, and Paradox. In Dos Santos, Bettina S., Pontel, Evandro & Tauchen, Jair (eds.) Aurora do cinquentenário filosófico do PPG Filosofia—PUCRS. Porto Alegre, Brazil: Editora Fundação Fênix, 2024, pp. 159-166. Open access. Available from: https://doi.org/10.36592/9786554601085 (Click on the blue button 'Acesse aqui' to download the volume, a 6MB load.) Chapter only (147 KB): https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HuwoJfm6XLcpMB30O0UjoirvQasNwAxA/view?usp=sharing

The Benign/Malignant Distinction for False Premises. In Borges, R. and Schnee, I. (eds.) Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge. New York: Routledge, 2023. Available from: https://www.routledge.com/Illuminating-Errors-New-Essays-on-Knowledge-from-Non-Knowledge/Borges-Schnee/p/book/9780367630423

Moore's Paradox Generalized, Theoria, 88(6), 1111-1127, 2022. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12427.

Epistemic Closure and Epistemological Optimism, Philosophia, 49 (1), 113-131, 2021, DOI: 10.1007/s11406-020-00206-5. Available from: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-020-00206-5

Co-authored with J.R. Fett, Review of Federico Luzzi, Knowledge from Non-Knowledge: Inference, Testimony and Memory, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2019, Open access: ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/knowledge-from-non-knowledge-inference-testimony-and-memory/.

Klein, Skepticism, Epistemic Closure, and Evidential Underdetermination. In Fitelson, B., Borges, R., and Braden, C. (eds.), Themes from Klein: Knowledge, Scepticism, and Justification, Synthese Library, Springer, 2019. Available from: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-04522-7

Epistemic Closure and Post-Gettier Epistemology of Reasoning. In Hetherington, S. (ed.), The Gettier Problem, Cambridge University Press, 2019. Available from: https://www.cambridge.org/br/universitypress/subjects/philosophy/epistemology-and-metaphysics/gettier-problem?format=PB

On Our Epistemological Debt to Moore and Russell. In Hetherington, S. and Valaris, M. (eds.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy, Bloomsbury, 2018. Volume 4 of The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History. Available from: https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/knowledge-in-contemporary-philosophy-9781474258784/

Knowledge, Benign Falsehoods, and the Gettier Problem. In Borges, R., De Almeida, C., and Klein, P. D. (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Available from: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/explaining-knowledge-9780198724568?lang=en&cc=gb#

Stroud, Skepticism, and Knowledge-Claims, Sképsis, no. 14, 2016, pp. 40-56. Open access: http://philosophicalskepticism.org/skepsis/numero-14/

Co-authored with J. R. Fett, Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder,  Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94:1, 152-169, 2016, online 10 Feb. 2015, DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2015.1009127. Available from: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048402.2015.1009127?journalCode=rajp20

Contextualism. In Audi, R. (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, third edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Pragmatic Encroachment. In Audi, R. (ed.), The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy, third edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

G. E. Moore Shift. In Audi, R. (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, third edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Moore’s Paradox. In Audi, R. (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, third edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. (This is an extensively revised and enlarged version of my 1999 entry for the second edition of the dictionary.)

Epistemic closure, Skepticism and Defeasibility, Synthese (2012) 188: 197-215. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-9923-7.

Closure, Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons, Acta Analytica 22.4, 2007.

Moorean Absurdity: an Epistemological Analysis. In Williams, J. N. and Green, M. (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

What Moore’s Paradox Is About, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62.1, 2001.

Edited Volumes

Co-edited with Rodrigo Borges and Peter D. Klein, Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Co-edited with Stephen Hetherington, Topics in Contemporary Epistemology, a special issue of the journal Synthese, vol. 188, no. 2, 2012. DOI for the guest-editorial: 10.1007/s11229-011-9929-1.

Perspectives in Contemporary Epistemology, a special issue of the journal Veritas (PUCRS, Brazil), 2005. Open access: http://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/ojs/index.php/veritas/issue/view/178. Contributors: Fred Adams, Jonathan Adler, Anthony Brueckner, Julio Cesar Burdzinski, Elvo Clemente, Earl Conee, Richard Feldman, Tito Alencar Flores, Stephen Hetherington, Peter Klein, Jonathan Kvanvig, Alexandre Meyer Luz, Felipe M. Müller, Roberto Hofmeister Pich, and Doris Olin.

Publishers and journals for which I have reviewed

Publishers

Bloomsbury Publishing (as Editorial Board member for the series Bloomsbury Critical Introductions to Contemporary Epistemology)

Broadview Press

Cambridge University Press

Continuum Books

Oxford University Press

Palgrave Macmillan

Routledge

Journals

Abstracta (Brazil, as Editorial Board member)

Acta Analytica

Analysis

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Erkenntnis

Journal of Philosophical Research

The Journal of Philosophy

Manuscrito (Brazil)

Philosophia (Springer)

Philosophical Studies

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Principia (Brazil)

Southern Journal of Philosophy

Synthese

Theoria (Wiley)

Education

I’ve been lucky to have had some great teachers. In my formal education, these included Peter D. Klein and Roy Sorensen, my post-doctoral hosts at Rutgers University and New York University respectively, Nicholas Griffin, my Ph.D. supervisor at McMaster University, Douglas Odegard, my epistemology teacher at the Guelph-McMaster Doctoral Programme, and Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos, my M.A. supervisor at the University of São Paulo (Brazil). 

Conferences organized (or co-organized) by me

Speakers at major conferences organized (or co-organized) by me: Fred Adams, Heather Battaly, Paul Boghossian, Anthony Brueckner, Otávio Bueno, Oswaldo Chateaubriand, David Christensen, Stewart Cohen, Juan Comesaña, Michael DePaul, Fred Dretske, Luiz Henrique Dutra, Mylan Engel, Paulo Faria, Richard Feldman, Tito Flores, Richard Foley, Gary Fuller, Richard Fumerton, Carl Ginet, Alvin Goldman, Nicholas Griffin, Stephen Hetherington (co-organizer of our 2010 conference), Risto Hilpinen, Paul Horwich, Thomas Kelly, Peter D. Klein, Jennifer Lackey, Keith Lehrer, Alexandre Meyer Luz, William Lycan, Brian McLaughlin, Adam Morton, Ram Neta, Erik Olsson, Roberto Pich, John Pollock, Ted Poston, Baron Reed, Sherrilyn Roush, Sarah Sawyer, Thomas Señor, Plinio Smith, David Sosa, Ernest Sosa (co-organizer of our 2004 conference), Matthias Steup, John N. Williams, and Michael Williams. 

Dissertation/Thesis Supervision

My work as a supervisor has yielded 24 MAs and 20 PhDs to date. With the exception of three MAs in the philosophy of language – on theories of vagueness, theories of metaphor, and Grice’s theory of implicature – supervised dissertations and theses have been in epistemology.