Abstracts

One of the key notions employed by early realist phenomenologists is that of states of affairs (Sachverhalte). This notion had been thematically discussed by (among others) Adolf Reinach, who developed what may be called an abundant ontology of states of affairs. In contemporary metaphysics, however, this Reinachian ontology of states of affairs has received relatively little attention, presumably because it is taken to be too generous or unparsimonious as compared to the sparser type of state of affairs ontologies defended by Armstrong and Meinertsen. In this talk, I would argue that the Reinachian view deserves more serious attention than has been given to it to date. First, I shall undertake a more systematic comparison of the two types of state of affairs ontology, taking not merely ontological but also ideological aspects (in Quine's sense) of the theories into account. Second, I shall put forward a (to my knowledge) new argument in favor of the Reinachian view, an argument structurally smilar to the argument from illusion in philosophy of perception.

One oft-used shorthand in accounts of early phenomenology is the distinction between the “realist” phenomenologists and those who followed Husserl through his “idealist” turn in 1913. But what exactly did “realism” mean in the period? In this talk, I argue that the most readily available resources for thinking about realism at the time came from Catholic philosophy, especially as it was represented at the University of Munich, where so many early phenomenologists studied. There “realism” was promoted both by the neo-scholastic philosopher Georg von Hertling and by the Catholic leaning psychologist Oswald Külpe. Initially in the period before World War I, Catholics configured their argument about realism to distinguish themselves from what they saw as the “subjectivism” of positivist philosophy and neo-Kantianism. They thus concentrated on proving the “mind-independence” of the laws governing our thinking. But by the end of the War, they had come to redefine “realism” in order to emphasize our ability to make claims about existing reality, especially in empirical judgments. Tracking the development of those sitting at the crossroads between phenomenology and Catholic philosophy, Joseph Geyser and Martin Heidegger, I then show that we can track a similar reorientation in the work of other phenomenologists, not least Hedwig Conrad Martius. I finish by reflecting on the way in which these connections help us think through the religious leanings of many of Husserl’s early students.

To some extent, the divergence within the Munich-Göttingen circle not only prompted Husserl to revise and expand upon his early positions, but also led to the development of a distinct phenomenological method. In particular, the discussions between Geiger and Husserl gradually drew attention to the rediscovery of tension within phenomenology. In Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins, Husserl explicitly responded to Geiger’s contributions and challenges regarding the intentionality of feeling, offering claims that differed from Geiger’s. Regarding their debate—particularly the consistency of the intentionality of feeling—three main positions have emerged in current scholarship: the first position holds that Geiger was more radical than Husserl, as noted by Crespo (2015); the second position asserts that Husserl effectively refuted Geiger, as emphasized by Averchi (2015); the third, a moderate neutral stance, suggests that differences in their respective ontologies of the mind led to divergent views, as proposed by scholars such as Vendrell Ferran (2024).

In this paper, I will analyze the core positions of Geiger and Husserl in order to provide a stronger defense of the first position, offering substantial reasons for this: First, different objects indeed require different directness. Drawing on early phenomenology’s critique of the theory of intentionality in Logical Investigations, I argue that intentional content itself necessitates the development of varying attitudes—therefore, I claim that intentionality does not exhibit continuity in Husserl. Second, Geiger's classification of emotions is more nuanced than Husserl's; adopting different attitudes helps to facilitate a more accurate experience of the essence of different feelings. Third, Geiger implicitly developed the temporal structure of emotional consciousness, which supports his analysis of diverse emotional experiences. Before presenting these supporting arguments, I will first reconstruct the background and current status of the debated issues in the opening section. I will then proceed with a critical reconstruction of Husserl’s position, before returning to defend Geiger in the three areas outlined above.

Moritz Geiger (1880–1937), a prominent figure among the phenomenologists of the Munich circle, characterized their ontological position as “a realism of the ‘immediate attitude (unmittelbare Einstellung)’” (Geiger 1933, 15) in his “Alexander Pfänder’s Methodical Position” (1933). This ontological position that he took can be regarded as a contributing factor to E. Husserl’s characterization of Geiger as a one-quarter phenomenologist in correspondence with R. Ingarden. Nevertheless, the fact that the founder of phenomenology criticized him does not guarantee the validity of the criticism, and in fact, Geiger himself criticized Husserl’s idealism. The purpose of this presentation is to elucidate the rationale and implications of the realism of the immediate attitude.

First, it is necessary to specify how Geiger understood phenomenology. In the aforementioned article, he insisted that the principle of phenomenology was “the recognition of a maximum of givenness” (Geiger 1933, 3), contrasting Husserl’s phenomenology with E. Mach’s positivism, both of which took self-givenness as their starting point. While Mach recognized only sensations as self-given, phenomenologists recognize not only sensations, but a more variety of self-givenness, as Husserl recognized that of the ideal in his Logical Investigations (1900/1). According to Geiger, if phenomenologists adopt the principle, the recognition of a maximum of givenness, they must also adopt “the ‘naïve attitude’ of natural life” (Geiger 1933, 14), namely the immediate attitude. In his Reality of Sciences and Metaphysics (1930), Geiger characterized the immediate attitude by contrasting it with the naturalistic attitude (naturalistische Einstellung) as follows. In the naturalistic attitude, everything must be explained physically, and anything that cannot be explained physically must be explained psychically. According to this perspective, the physical is identified as the objective, as the psychic is identified as the subjective. In contrast, the immediate attitude does not accept the identification made in the naturalistic attitude, and with it, opens more various object-spheres. To illustrate this, consider the notion of numbers. Within the naturalistic or psychologistic framework, numbers are accounted to be psychic since they are not physical. However, within the immediate attitude, numbers are recognized as ideal objects. According to Geiger, even Husserl himself adopted the immediate attitude in his Logical Investigations. 

Why does adopting the immediate attitude lead phenomenologists to the realism? The immediate attitude is what is taken in our daily life. In daily life, we find, for example, the smartphone in front of us to be something real that exists independently of our own consciousness, not something constituted through our own consciousness. Geiger argued that phenomenologists should recognize what is given to be as it is, therefore, what is given as real to be real, not to be “merely” given as real, if they adopt “the principle of all principles” presented in Husserl’s Ideas I: “that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originarily (...) offered to us in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there” (Hua III/1, 51, English translation by F. Kersten). According to Geiger, the phenomenologists of the Munich circle demonstrated a greater adherence to this principle in comparison to Husserl himself.

What is the significance of the realism of the immediate attitude? In his “Fragment on the Concept of the Unconscious and the Psychical Reality” (1921), Geiger asserted the importance of recognizing the psychic reality on the immediate attitude. He criticized the psychology that attempted to reduce everything psychic such as ego and will to a series of conscious experiences, namely “experience-psychology (Erlebnispsychologie)”. According to him, it metaphysically devalues the psychic into “mere” experience, in favor of the naturalistic attitude and the materialism or parallelism based on this attitude. Contrarily, Geiger argues for the reality of the psychic, taking our will as an example. In daily life, in other words, in the immediate attitude, we experience our will as what continues to exist even while it is not experienced, that is, as the reality that exists independently of our own conscious experiences. Besides, we experience it not as something powerless, but as something powerful to motivate other psychic and physical actions. Geiger called the psychology adopting this perspective “real-psychology (Realpsychologie)”, and according to him, by adopting this perspective, we can address the ethical and juristical issues of the freedom of will or responsibility.

Geiger, Moritz. 1921. „Fragment über den Begriff des Unbewußten und die psychische Realität. Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung des immanenten psychischen Realismus“, in: Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Bd. 4, hrsg. von Edmund Husserl, Halle a. d. S.: Max Niemeyer, S. 1–137.

Geiger, Moritz. 1933. „Alexander Pfänders methodische Stellung“, in: Neue Münchener philosophische Abhandlungen. Alexander Pfänder zu seinem sechzigsten Geburtstag gewindet von Freunden und Schülern, hrsg. von Ernst Heller/Friedrich Löw, Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth, S. 1–16.

Geiger, Moritz. 1966[1930]. Die Wirklichkeit der Wissenschaften und die Metaphysik, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Edmund Husserl, 1976[1913]. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, 1. Halbband, hrsg. von Karl Schuhmann, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.

Does Husserl’s phenomenology originate from possibility or reality? As the concepts that philosophy treats generally correspond to possibility, there is no doubt that the eide (εἴδη) that phenomenology depicts describes a possibility that can be detached from reality. However, one may ask: does this possibility originate from reality? Answering this question involves responding to the question of whether possibility precedes actuality or whether actuality is anterior to possibility. This question, raised by Aristotle in his Metaphysics Λ, initiated polemics against his teacher, Plato, that continue to this day.

In World and Infinity (Welt und Unendlichkeit, 2014), Lázló Tengelyi argues that Husserl’s phenomenology implies both aspects. It depicts possibility while originating from reality. The four moments, called archi-facts (Urtatsachen), that are the proto-realities distinct from the ‘first causes’ are the I as subject (Ichsubjekt), world possession (Welthabe), intentional mutual implication (intentionales Ineinander) and historicity (Geschichtlichkeit). As this question of reality revives Aristotle’s question in a radically new way, Tengelyi positions the question against the background of the history of metaphysics – metaphysics that traverses the transformation from antiquity via the medieval to the modern. 

Taking as a guide Tengelyi’s scenario, the aim of this presentation is to clarify how phenomenology can be located in the history of the debate surrounding possibility and actuality. To this end, the first part of the presentation will be dedicated to examining Aristotle’s argument answering the above-mentioned question in his proof of the existence of pure actuality: “a principle of this kind whose essence is actuality” (ἀρχ[ή] τοιαύτ[η] ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια), that is “actuality anterior [to possibility]” (ἐνέργεια πρότερον [δύναμιν]).

By adopting this pure actuality as the first moving cause in the proof of the existence of a creator in a monotheistic tradition and incorporating simultaneously Ibn-sina’s and Maimonides’s readings of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas argues in his Summa Theologiae that actuality must precede possibility. A radical turn of metaphysics occurs, however, around Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus according to Olivier Boulnois, a medievalist who is the principal reference of Tengelyi. In the conception of Thomas Aquinas, as the first cause is not included in the sphere of the beings as creatures, the science of the beings inevitably contains an unfillable void that cannot be treated: the first cause. Moreover, the equivocity of Being in Thomas Aquinas in the wake of Aristotle prevents the establishment of the science of Being as a univocal concept. To overcome this problem, Scotus, in his Ordinatio, introduces the univocity of Being, which opens the possibility that the first cause can be included in the sphere of beings, along with the creatures. This radical turn of metaphysics instigates in posterior time the revival of the metaphysics proceeding from possibility to reality. In the same way that all beings can be investigated regarding their origins, the ground of the prime cause can also be investigated, which up to the time was considered an absurdity. This investigation will be developed in the Cartesian and Leibnizian types of ontological argument for the existence of God, starting from the mere concept of God and requiring the passage from possibility (concept) to actuality (existence). It culminates in the Leibnizian view that, based on the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of complete determination, the combination of compossibles determine the actual world among the infinite possible worlds. This view prevails until it becomes the object of the criticism levelled by Kant. The second part of my presentation will be dedicated to the description of this radical turn: that possibility is supposed to be prior to reality.

Against the background of this radical transition of metaphysics, the third part of the presentation will depict how Husserl’s phenomenology answers the question of reality and possibility. First, it will confirm that Husserl’s phenomenology inherits from Leibniz its fundamental view on the passage from possibility to reality. As clearly declared in Ideas I (Ideen I) (1913), Husserl highly estimates the Leibnizian vision according to which the knowledge of the possibilities must precede that of the realities (Wirklichkeiten). 

However, in the manuscripts dedicated to the phenomenology of intersubjectivity (Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texte aus dem Nachlass), published in Husserliana XIII to XV, Husserl elaborates a completely new view that might reverse his previous insight. For instance, in a text that dates from around 1922 (in Husserliana XIV), Husserl starts from an archi-fact of the apodictical inevitability of the reality (Wirklichkeit) of ego. While describing how the possibility of something in nature precedes its reality, Husserl states, with regard to the monad or the cogito, that all monadic possibilities are existence-relative to the monadic realities. Husserl hence claims the necessity of starting with the actual and real (wirkliche) I. 

On the other hand, an opposite view is introduced with Husserl’s conception of ‘empathy (Einfühlung)’. In a text written around 1931 and published in Husserliana XV, Husserl assumes that there is an absolute abyss that separates the I and the other: one can never truly live the reality of experience of the other and can only imagine it as possible through empathy. This requires one to pass from the possibility to the reality of the other.

However, Husserl’s manuscript is never unilateral but rather fluctuates, as he shows that, at the same time, the other and the I form an intentional mutual implication and thus coexist as reality in a common world: the other transcendental ego lies in the I as the not-I, which also is an I. This mutual implication of the other and the I is, according to Husserl, ‘metaphysical’ primary fact.

Hence, the precedence of the reality to possibility is described not only with regard to the I as subject, but also with regard to the mutual implication between the I and the other. In his description of intersubjectivity, Husserl not only attempts to move from the possibility to the reality of the other, but also presents the reality of the other as an undeducible primary fact.  

Thus, following the subtle and non-unilateral arguments of Husserl and positioning them against the background of the historical transition of metaphysics, this presentation will demonstrate that phenomenology gives a possible answer to the metaphysical debate that goes back to Aristotle and is transformed through medieval and modern philosophy. Husserl rejoins the grand tradition of conceiving reality as preceding possibility, reforming it radically in the sense that, unlike primal causes, the arch-facts that he describes are far from being deducible.

In her 1922 work of Realontologie, the early phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius seeks to establish an ontology based on phenomenological insights. The basic idea is that phenomenology makes available the mind-independent features of experienced objects, which can subsequently be used in order to systematically elaborate an ontology spanning the formal and material specifications of objects. Conrad-Martius therefore rejects the idea that experienced objects only provide us with a relative view of reality. Her aim is to show instead that we do not only directly encounter real objects as such, but that this encounter can be fruitfully and systematically exploited to establish an ontology. In this context, the modifier “real” in realontology refers to the contention that this ontology is informed by the impression of the existence of objects.

One of the most controversial theses offered by Conrad-Martius is our having direct access to mind-independent features, essences, or intrinsic natures, of the things we encounter in experience. My proposal will therefore concentrate on expounding and discussing how Conrad-Martius aims to make this idea plausible. On a formal-ontological level, this is done via the introduction of “real-ontological” categories, i.e.., categories that pertain to things insofar asthey exist. Thus, by contrast to familiar categories which formally or materially designate things in themselves, the categories in question here involve a relation to the observer for whom their existence makes a difference. They are relational categories. One of these is corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit). For a thing to exist is for it to exhibit corporeality. This category does not apply to all existing things in the same manner. Phenomenological investigation has to determine how the essence of the thing (formally containing, qua existing, corporeality) is embodied in the case of different kinds of existing objects. While the formal ontological notion of an object in Husserl refers to a subject of possible predication, the formal real-ontological notion of an object in Conrad-Martius refers, in terms of corporeality, to a bodily self-presence, realized differently by different kinds of beings (i.e., it is not a material-ontological notion). The aim of realontology here is to determine what a thing is in itself, such that it can affect us in the way it does. For this, we need a phenomenological account of the relation in which stand to the object, and an ontological account of what it is, in categorial terms, we thereby stand in relation to.

I will proceed in three steps. Firstly, I will sketch the basic phenomenological presuppositions at play in Conrad-Martius’ philosophy, specifically her emphasis on a form of direct realism and on the reciprocal relationship expressed in the idea that we can cognize intrinsic features of existing objects based on our experience of them. Secondly, I present some central concepts of her ontology, including the distinction between substance and essence and her real-ontological category of corporeality which is subdivided further into touchability (Tangierbarkeit) and auto-position (Eigenposition) etc., in order to show how the experience of mind-independent features is addressed and captured using these categories. Thirdly, I will raise and some critical questions regarding her basic suppositions along the following lines: what exactly constitutes phenomenological evidence for the proposed kind of essence intuition, considering that the perception of external objects is principally fallible? More generally, in how far do epistemological and ontological concerns collapse in the phenomenology of Conrad-Martius?

Many phenomenologists and Husserl scholars believe (i) that Husserl was an anti-realist, and (ii) that he was right to maintain anti-realism. In my talk, however, I will argue that realism about material objects is true and anti-realism about such objects, consequently, is false. I will also suggest that it is possible to read many of Husserl’s seemingly anti-realist statements as being in fact compatible with realism.

The reception of early phenomenology (EP) has suffered from Husserl’s retrospective interpretation of this tradition as deriving from his own Logical Investigations. The aim of this talk is to dismiss this interpretation by showing that EP rejected the theory of intentionality defended in that œuvre, which is arguably a pillar of Husserl’s early and later reflection. The paper is organised in two parts.

In the first part, I reconstruct Husserl’s theory of doxastic verification in terms of fulfilment. According to this theory, in its simplest form, a belief is verified by a perception if the subject lives through a third experience called cognisance (Erkennen, or “the act of coming to know something”), which brings the truth-assessable contents (matters) of belief and perception into coincidence. It follows from this that cognisance is not factive: cognisance reaches out to the entity targeted by belief and perception if, and only if, their matters are true.

In the second part, I canvass EP’s understanding of verification. I argue that EP rejects the theory of fulfilment because it presupposes that perception carries a truth-assessable matter. However, perception does not carry truth-assessable matter, as this experience is relational: it is grounded in the essence of perception to be related to entities in the world. Verification, on this view, is the experience that relates to the state of affairs in which the object meant by the belief is the object given in perception. One consequence of this alternative understanding of verification is that, contrary to Husserl, cognisance is factive: to know something presupposes the existence of the states of affairs to which one is directed.

If my reconstruction is correct, then, pace Husserl and his followers, EP’s alternative understanding of verification and Erkennen sets it radically apart from Husserl’s phenomenology.

Despite rapid acceleration over the past years, research on early phenomenology remains underdeveloped in many respects. While this is partly due to the incipient and germinal stage in which this research still operates, a more fundamental factor is the lack of a comprehensive view that accounts for the entire scope of the early phenomenological movement. This study aims to address these gaps by illuminating an arguably marginal, but highly significant episode in the phenomenological movement: Gilbert Ryle’s critical reception of phenomenology.

The young Ryle was deeply engaged with what nowadays is sometimes referred to as "Austro-German philosophy." This interest is visible most notably in a series of essays and reviews on phenomenology he produced in Oxford around 1930, but traces of it can still be found in his later work, even after he became known as the author of The Concept of Mind.

The talk is organised in two parts. In a first step, we survey the various assessments of phenomenology that Ryle consistently held from his early career and focus on one of his negative evaluations: Ryle's rejection of Husserl's idealistic tendencies. According to Ryle, Husserl’s phenomenological idealism stems from understanding intentionality as "consciousness of" something and can be avoided by conceiving of intentionality as "knowledge-of" something. We will reconstruct Ryle's diagnosis and prescription, with reference to the relevant discussions of the Oxford realist Cook Wilson, who was a source of inspiration for Ryle.

In a second step, we contextualize Ryle's arguments within the broader landscape of critiques of Husserl developed by other early phenomenologists. This will allow us to position Gilbert Ryle on the periphery of, if not within, the phenomenological movement, broadly construed. These findings will offer significant insights for re-examining the nature of the early phenomenological movement and its commitment to realism.

A few different ‘realisms’ of speech acts are in play today: anthropological (Rosato, Duranti); bio-systematic (Green, cf. Artiga); psychological (Hare, Grice; cf. Récanati). These attempt to capture different aspects of the reality of the phenomena that the phenomenology of Adolf Reinach addresses under the title of ‘social acts’. (Mulligan, 1987) Yet Reinach too was committed to a ‘robust’ metaphysical realism (Massin, 2016; Salice, 2020). On these grounds, there is a question to be answered; how does Reinach’s realist standpoint relate to contemporary realisms of speech acts, if at all. After a brief survey of the current scene, I show that Reinach occupies quite a particular realist position; he goes beyond the idea that things like promises, consents, and warnings have a mind-independent reality, because he also seems to think that their structural composition is inflexible, i.e. not historically, culturally, or psychologically relative. This discussion of Reinach’s approach leads to some questions about how the relationship between ‘speech acts’ and ‘social acts’ may need to be revised.