Research

My approach to research and a summary of current projects can be found in my research statement. 

Optimal Taxation and Enforcement with Market Power (Job Market Paper)

This paper explores the effect of market power on optimal tax and enforcement rates, finding that neither tax rates nor enforcement levels necessarily vary monotonically with market power. Higher effective taxation of an imperfectly competitive market compounds its distortions, but in some circumstances the associated welfare cost can be outweighed by the behavior of the tax base. The government's tradeoff between taxation and enforcement is strongly influenced by the degree of complementarity between firm size and the cost of tax avoidance. If greater firm size facilitates avoidance, then more competitive markets will feature lower tax avoidance rates, making higher tax rates rather than stiffer enforcement the lower-cost option for obtaining tax revenue.

Optimal Dual-Regime Business Tax Systems (with Rishi R. Sharma, Joel Slemrod, Michael Stimmelmayr, and John D. Wilson)

Optimal Progressivity of K-12 Public School Funding (with Jordy Berne)