All articles are accessible chronologically or by topic.
Note that many of my papers fall under more than one heading:
[117] The active nature of creative insight. Unpublished (and apparently unpublishable!).
[116] The motoric theory of curiosity. Mind & Language, (2026). (Online first 2025.)
[115] A content-general adaptation for tribal value-acquisition. Evolution and Human Behavior, 46 (2025), 106791.
[114] The contents and causes of curiosity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 75 (2024), 871-895. [online first in 2021]
[113] On valence: imperative or representation of value? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 74 (2023), 533-553. [online first in 2020]
[112] Pretend play: more imitative than imaginative. (With Heather Adair.) Mind & Language 38 (2023), 464-479.
[111] Model-free metacognition. (With David Williams.) Cognition, 225 (2022), 105117.
[110] Responsibility and consciousness. (With Matt King.) In D. Nelkin & D. Pereboom (eds.), Handbook of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press (2022), 448-467.
[109] Explicit nonconceptual metacognition. Philosophical Studies, 178 (2021), 2337-2356.
[108] Linking metacognition and mindreading: Evidence from autism and dual-task investigations. (With David Williams, Toby Nicholson, Catherine Grainger, and Sophie Lind.) Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 150 (2021), 206-220.
[107] Tracking science: an alternative for those excluded by citizen science. (Louis Liebenberg first author; multiple others.) Citizen Science: Theory and Practice, 6:1 (2021), 1-16.
[106] Stop caring about consciousness. Philosophical Topics, 48 (2020), 1-20.
[105] Representing the mind as such in infancy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 11 (2020), 765-780.
[104] Explaining the empiricist bias: Reply to Berent. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 27, 7-8 (2020), 230-235. A reply to Iris Berent’s critique of my paper #103.
[103] How mindreading might mislead cognitive science. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 27, 7-8 (2020), 195-219.
[102] Questions in development. In L. Butler, S. Ronfard, & K. Corriveau (eds.), The Questioning Child: Insights from psychology and education. CUP (2020), 6-28.
[101] Mechanisms for constrained stochasticity. Synthese, 197 (2020), 4455-4473.
[100] Comparative metacognition. (With David Williams.) Animal Behavior and Cognition, 6 (2019), 278-288.
[99] Relationships between implicit and explicit uncertainty monitoring and mindreading: Evidence from autism spectrum disorder. (With Toby Nicholson, David Williams, Catherine Grainger, and Sophie Lind.) Consciousness and Cognition, 70 (2019), 11-24.
[98] Cognitive instincts versus cognitive gadgets: A fallacy. (With Aida Roige.) Mind & Language (2019). Commentary on Cecilia Heyes, Cognitive Gadgets, Harvard University Press.
[97] Young children flexibly attribute mental states to others. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2018), 115, 11351-11353. Commentary on Kiraly et al., Retrospective attribution of false beliefs in 3-year-old children. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2018).
[96] The problem of animal consciousness. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 92 (2018), 179-205.
[95] Comparative psychology without consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 63 (2018), 47-60.
[94] The causes and contents of inner speech. In P. Langland-Hassan & A.Vicente (eds.), Inner Speech: new voices. Oxford University Press (2018), 31-52.
[93] Can you spot a liar? Deception, mindreading, and the case of autism spectrum disorder. (With David Williams, Toby Nicholson, Catherine Grainger, and Sophie Lind.) Autism Research, (2018), 11, 1129-1137.
[92] Basic questions. Mind & Language, 33 (2018), 130-147.
[91] Valence and Value. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97 (2018), 658-80.
[90] Implicit versus explicit attitudes: Differing manifestations of the same representational structures? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2018), 51-72.
[89] Consciousness operationalized, a debate realigned. (With Benedicte Veillet.) Consciousness and Cognition, 55 (2017), 79-90.
[88] The illusion of conscious thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24, 9-10 (2017), 228-252.
[87] Are epistemic emotions metacognitive? Philosophical Psychology, 30 (2017), 58-78.
[86] In defense of first-order representationalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24, 5-6 (2017), 74-87.
[85] Pragmatic development explains the Theory-of-Mind Scale. (With Evan Westra.) Cognition, 158 (2017), 165-176.
[84] Block’s overflow argument. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97 (2017).
[83] Mindreading in adults: evaluating two-systems views. Synthese, 194 (2017), 673-688.
[82] Opening up vision: The case against encapsulation. (With Ryan Ogilvie.) Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7 (2016), 721-742.
[81] Imagination and pretense. (With Elizabeth Picciuto.) In A. Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge, 2016.
[80] Two systems for mindreading? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7 (2016), 141-162.
[79] Perceiving mental states. Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015), 498-507.
[78] On central cognition. Philosophical Studies, 170 (2014), 143-162.
[77] The fragmentation of reasoning. In P. Quintanilla, C. Mantilla, and P. Capeda (eds.), Cognicion Social y Lenguaje, Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Catalica del Peru, 2014.
[76] Two concepts of metacognition. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 128 (2014), 138-139. (Commentary on Smith, Couchman, & Beran, “Animal metacognition: A tale of two comparative psychologies.”)
[75] The evolution of self-knowledge. (With Logan Fletcher and Brendan Ritchie.) Philosophical Topics, 40 (2012), 13-37. (Published in 2014.)
[74] The evolution of working memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (2013), 10371-10378.
[73] Animal minds are real, (distinctively) human minds are not. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2013), 233-247.
[72] Mindreading in infancy. Mind & Language, 28 (2013), 141-172.
[71] Mindreading the self. In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, and M. Lombardo (eds.), Understanding Other Minds, Third Edition. OUP, 2013.
[70] Behavior-reading versus mentalizing in animals. (With Logan Fletcher.) In J. Metcalfe and H. Terrace (eds.), Agency and Joint Attention. OUP, 2013.
[69] On knowing your own beliefs. In N. Nottelmann (ed.), New Essays on Belief: Structure, Constitution and Content. Palgrave MacMillan, 2013.
[68] The bodily senses. (With Brendan Ritchie.) In M. Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press, 2013.
[67] Inner sense. (With Vincent Picciuto.) In M. Matthen, M. Biggs, and J. Stokes (eds.), Perception and its Modalities. Oxford University Press, 2013.
[66] The distinctively-human mind: the many pillars of cumulative culture. In G.Hatfield and H.Pittman (eds.), The Evolution of Mind, Brain, and Culture. Penn Museum Press, 2013. [written in 2007]
[65] The emergence of metacognition: affect and uncertainty in animals. (With Brendan Ritchie.) In M.Beran, J.Brandl, J.Perner, and J.Proust (eds.), Foundations of Metacognition. OUP, 2012.
[64] Metacognition and reasoning. (With Logan Fletcher.) Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 367 (2012), 1366-1378.
[63] The origins of creativity. (With Elizabeth Picciuto.) In E. Paul and S. Kaufman, The Philosophy of Creativity. Oxford University Press, 2012.
[62] Creative action in mind. Philosophical Psychology, 24 (2011), 347-361.
[61] Language in cognition. In E.Margolis, R.Samuels, and S.Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. OUP, 2011.
[60] Moral responsibility and consciousness. (With Matt King.) Journal of Moral Philosophy, 9 (2012), 200-228.
[59] Descriptive Experience Sampling: What is it Good For? (With Mark Engelbert.) Journal of Consciousness Studies 18:1 (2011), 130-149. (Commentary on Describing Inner Experience? by Russell Hurlburt and Eric Schwitzgebel.)
[58] Animal mentality: its character, extent, and moral significance. In R. Frey and T. Beauchamp (eds.), Handbook on Ethics and Animals. OUP, 2011.
[57] Against the moral standing of animals. In C. Morris (ed.), Practical Ethics: questions of life and death. OUP, 2011.
[56] The case against cognitive phenomenology. (With Benedicte Veillet.) In T.Bayne and M.Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. OUP, 2011.
[55] Consciousness, higher-order theories of. In Edward Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2001 / 2007 / 2011).
[54] Introspection: divided and partly eliminated. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2010), 76-111.
[53] Introspection. (With Mark Engelbert.) Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 1 (2010), 245-253.
[52] Mindreading underlies metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2009), 164-176. (A reply to 28 peer commentaries on [51] below.)
[51] How we know our own minds: the relationship between mindreading and metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2009), 121-138.
[50] Action-awareness and the active mind. Philosophical Papers 38 (2009), 133-156.
[49] An architecture for dual reasoning. In J.Evans and K.Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: dual processes and beyond. OUP, 2009.
[48] Invertebrate concepts confront the Generality Constraint (and win). In R. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. CUP, 2009.
[47] Meta-cognition in animals: a skeptical look. Mind and Language, 23 (2008), 58-89.
[46] Precis of The Architecture of the Mind & Replies: On Fodor-fixation, flexibility, and human uniqueness. Mind and Language, 23 (2008), 257-262 & 293-303.
[45] Simulation and the first person. Philosophical Studies 144 (2008), 467-475. (Commentary on Simulating Minds by Alvin Goldman.)
[44] Evolution and the possibility of moral realism. (With Scott James.) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77 (2008), 237-244. (Commentary on The Evolution of Morality, by Richard Joyce.)
[43] Cartesian epistemology: is the theory of the self-transparent mind innate? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4) (2008), 28-53.
[42] The Phenomenal Concept Strategy. (With Benedice Veillet.) Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (2007), 212-236.
[41] The illusion of conscious will. Synthese, 159 (2007), 197-213.
[40] Invertebrate minds: a challenge for ethical theory. Journal of Ethics, 11 (2007), 275-297.
[39] The creative-action theory of creativity. In Carruthers, Laurence, and Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind 3: foundations and the future. OUP, 2007.
[38] Why pretend? In S. Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination. OUP, 2006.
[37] Simple heuristics meet massive modularity. In Carruthers, Laurence, and Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind 2: culture and cognition. OUP, 2006.
[36] The case for massively modular models of mind. In R.Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell, 2006.
[35] Can panpsychism bridge the explanatory gap? (With Elizabeth Schechter.) Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13: 10-11 (2006), 32-39. (Commentary on “Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism” by Galen Strawson.)
[34] Conscious experience versus conscious thought. In U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT, 2006.
[33] Distinctively human thinking: modular precursors and components. In P.Carruthers, S.Laurence, and S.Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: structure and content. OUP, 2005.
[32] Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap". Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 34 (2004), 153-173.
[31] HOP over FOR, HOT theory. In R.Gennaro (ed.), Higher Order Theories of Consciousness. John Benjamins, 2004.
[30] Practical reasoning in a modular mind. Mind and Language, 19 (2004), 259-278.
[29] Suffering without subjectivity. Philosophical Studies, 121 (2004), 99-125.
[28] On being simple minded. American Philosophical Quarterly, 41 (2004), 205-220.
[27] Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much. Philosophical Psychology, 17 (2004), 83-102.
[26] Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68 (2004), 316-336.
[25] On Fodor's Problem. Mind and Language, 18 (2003), 502-523.
[24] Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection? In C. Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science. Blackwell, 2003.
[23] Moderately massive modularity. In A. O’Hear (ed.), Mind and Persons. CUP, 2003.
[22] Modularity, language, and the flexibility of thought. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25:6 (2002), 705-719. (Published in 2003.) (Replies to commentators on [21].)
[21] The cognitive functions of language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25:6, (2002), 657-674. (Published in 2003.)
[20] Human creativity: its evolution, its cognitive basis, and its connections with childhood pretence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 53 (2002), 225-249.
[19] The roots of scientific reasoning: infancy, modularity, and the art of tracking. In P.Carruthers, S.Stich and M.Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. CUP, 2002.
[18] Consciousness: explaining the phenomena. In D.Walsh (ed.), Naturalism, Evolution and Mind. CUP, 2001.
[17] Replies to critics: explaining subjectivity. Psyche, 6 (2000). (Replying to ten refereed articles in the same journal targeted on [13].)
[16] The evolution of consciousness. In P.Carruthers and A.Chamberlain (eds.), Evolution and the Human Mind. CUP, 2000.
[15] Sympathy and subjectivity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77 (1999), 465-482.
[14] Thinking in language?: evolution and a modularist possibility. In P.Carruthers and J.Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought. CUP, 1998.
[13] Animal subjectivity. Psyche 4 (1998). (Long abstract and reworking of article #[12], to provide a target paper for a special issue of the journal devoted to animal consciousness.)
[12] Natural theories of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy, 6 (1998), 203-222.
[11] Conscious thinking: language or elimination? Mind & Language 13 (1998), 323-342.
[10] Autism as mind-blindness: an elaboration and partial defense. In P.Carruthers and P.K.Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. CUP, 1996.
[9] Simulation and self-knowledge: a defense of theory-theory. In P.Carruthers and P.K.Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. CUP, 1996.
[8] Pretend play: is it meta-representational? (With Chris Jarrold, Jill Boucher, and Peter K Smith.) Mind and Language 9 (1994), 445-468.
[7] Consciousness and concepts. Aristotelian Society Proceedings, supplementary volume 66 (1992), 41-59.
[6] What is Empiricism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 64 (1990), 258-269.
[5] Brute experience. The Journal of Philosophy, 86 (1989), 63-79.
[4] Conceptual pragmatism. Synthese 73 (1987), 205-224.
[3] Russellian thoughts. Mind 96 (1987), 18-35.
[2] Eternal thoughts. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1984), 186-204.
[1] Fragmentary sense. Mind 93 (1984), 351-369.
[116] The motoric theory of curiosity. Mind & Language, (2026). (Online first 2025.)
[115] A content-general adaptation for tribal value-acquisition. Evolution and Human Behavior, 46 (2025), 106791.
[114] The contents and causes of curiosity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 75 (2024), 871-895. [online first in 2021]
[113] On valence: imperative or representation of value? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 74 (2023), 533-553. [online first in 2020]
[102] Questions in development. In L. Butler, S. Ronfard, & K. Corriveau (eds.), The Questioning Child: Insights from psychology and education. CUP (2020), 6-28.
[92] Basic questions. Mind & Language, 33 (2018), 130-147.
[91] Valence and Value. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97 (2018), 658-80.
[87] Are epistemic emotions metacognitive? Philosophical Psychology, 30 (2017), 58-78.
[65] The emergence of metacognition: affect and uncertainty in animals. (With Brendan Ritchie.) In M.Beran, J.Brandl, J.Perner, and J.Proust (eds.), Foundations of Metacognition. OUP, 2012.
[58] Animal mentality: its character, extent, and moral significance. In R. Frey and T. Beauchamp (eds.), Handbook on Ethics and Animals. OUP, 2011.
[57] Against the moral standing of animals. In C. Morris (ed.), Practical Ethics: questions of life and death. OUP, 2011.
[44] Evolution and the possibility of moral realism. (With Scott James.) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77 (2008), 237-244. (Commentary on The Evolution of Morality, by Richard Joyce.)
[40] Invertebrate minds: a challenge for ethical theory. Journal of Ethics, 11 (2007), 275-297.
[29] Suffering without subjectivity. Philosophical Studies, 121 (2004), 99-125.
[15] Sympathy and subjectivity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77 (1999), 465-482.
[100] Comparative metacognition. (With David Williams.) Animal Behavior and Cognition, 6 (2019), 278-288.
[96] The problem of animal consciousness. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 92 (2018), 179-205.
[95] Comparative psychology without consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 63 (2018), 47-60.
[76] Two concepts of metacognition. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 128 (2014), 138-139. (Commentary on Smith, Couchman, & Beran, “Animal metacognition: A tale of two comparative psychologies.”)
[74] The evolution of working memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (2013), 10371-10378.
[73] Animal minds are real, (distinctively) human minds are not. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2013), 233-247.
[70] Behavior-reading versus mentalizing in animals. (With Logan Fletcher.) In J. Metcalfe and H. Terrace (eds.), Agency and Joint Attention. OUP, 2013.
[65] The emergence of metacognition: affect and uncertainty in animals. (With Brendan Ritchie.) In M.Beran, J.Brandl, J.Perner, and J.Proust (eds.), Foundations of Metacognition. OUP, 2012.
[58] Animal mentality: its character, extent, and moral significance. In R. Frey and T. Beauchamp (eds.), Handbook on Ethics and Animals. OUP, 2011.
[57] Against the moral standing of animals. In C. Morris (ed.), Practical Ethics: questions of life and death. OUP, 2011.
[48] Invertebrate concepts confront the Generality Constraint (and win). In R. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. CUP, 2009.
[47] Meta-cognition in animals: a skeptical look. Mind and Language, 23 (2008), 58-89.
[40] Invertebrate minds: a challenge for ethical theory. Journal of Ethics, 11 (2007), 275-297.
[28] On being simple minded. American Philosophical Quarterly, 41 (2004), 205-220.
[27] Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much. Philosophical Psychology, 17 (2004), 83-102.
[13] Animal subjectivity. Psyche 4 (1998). (Long abstract and reworking of article #[12], to provide a target paper for a special issue of the journal devoted to animal consciousness.)
[5] Brute experience. The Journal of Philosophy, 86 (1989), 63-79.
[94] The causes and contents of inner speech. In P. Langland-Hassan & A.Vicente (eds.), Inner Speech: new voices. Oxford University Press (2018), 31-52.
[90] Implicit versus explicit attitudes: Differing manifestations of the same representational structures? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2018), 51-72.
[88] The illusion of conscious thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24, 9-10 (2017), 228-252.
[82] Opening up vision: The case against encapsulation. (With Ryan Ogilvie.) Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7 (2016), 721-742.
[79] Perceiving mental states. Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015), 498-507.
[78] On central cognition. Philosophical Studies, 170 (2014), 143-162.
[77] The fragmentation of reasoning. In P. Quintanilla, C. Mantilla, and P. Capeda (eds.), Cognicion Social y Lenguaje, Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Catalica del Peru, 2014.
[74] The evolution of working memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (2013), 10371-10378.
[73] Animal minds are real, (distinctively) human minds are not. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2013), 233-247.
[66] The distinctively-human mind: the many pillars of cumulative culture. In G.Hatfield and H.Pittman (eds.), The Evolution of Mind, Brain, and Culture. Penn Museum Press, 2013. [written in 2007]
[61] Language in cognition. In E.Margolis, R.Samuels, and S.Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. OUP, 2011.
[50] Action-awareness and the active mind. Philosophical Papers 38 (2009), 133-156.
[49] An architecture for dual reasoning. In J.Evans and K.Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: dual processes and beyond. OUP, 2009.
[46] Precis of The Architecture of the Mind & Replies: On Fodor-fixation, flexibility, and human uniqueness. Mind and Language, 23 (2008), 257-262 & 293-303.
[37] Simple heuristics meet massive modularity. In Carruthers, Laurence, and Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind 2: culture and cognition. OUP, 2006.
[36] The case for massively modular models of mind. In R.Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell, 2006.
[33] Distinctively human thinking: modular precursors and components. In P.Carruthers, S.Laurence, and S.Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: structure and content. OUP, 2005.
[30] Practical reasoning in a modular mind. Mind and Language, 19 (2004), 259-278.
[25] On Fodor's Problem. Mind and Language, 18 (2003), 502-523.
[24] Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection? In C. Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science. Blackwell, 2003.
[23] Moderately massive modularity. In A. O’Hear (ed.), Mind and Persons. CUP, 2003.
[22] Modularity, language, and the flexibility of thought. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25:6 (2002), 705-719. (Published in 2003.) (Replies to commentators on [21].)
[21] The cognitive functions of language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25:6, (2002), 657-674. (Published in 2003.)
[19] The roots of scientific reasoning: infancy, modularity, and the art of tracking. In P.Carruthers, S.Stich and M.Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. CUP, 2002.
[14] Thinking in language?: evolution and a modularist possibility. In P.Carruthers and J.Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought. CUP, 1998.
[11] Conscious thinking: language or elimination? Mind & Language 13 (1998), 323-342.
[110] Responsibility and consciousness. (With Matt King.) In D. Nelkin & D. Pereboom (eds.), Handbook of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press (2022), 448-467.
[106] Stop caring about consciousness. Philosophical Topics, 48 (2020), 1-20.
[96] The problem of animal consciousness. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 92 (2018), 179-205.
[95] Comparative psychology without consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 63 (2018), 47-60.
[89] Consciousness operationalized, a debate realigned. (With Benedicte Veillet.) Consciousness and Cognition, 55 (2017), 79-90.
[88] The illusion of conscious thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24, 9-10 (2017), 228-252.
[86] In defense of first-order representationalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24, 5-6 (2017), 74-87.
[84] Block’s overflow argument. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97 (2017).
[60] Moral responsibility and consciousness. (With Matt King.) Journal of Moral Philosophy, 9 (2012), 200-228.
[59] Descriptive Experience Sampling: What is it Good For? (With Mark Engelbert.) Journal of Consciousness Studies 18:1 (2011), 130-149. (Commentary on Describing Inner Experience? by Russell Hurlburt and Eric Schwitzgebel.)
[56] The case against cognitive phenomenology. (With Benedicte Veillet.) In T.Bayne and M.Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. OUP, 2011.
[55] Consciousness, higher-order theories of. In Edward Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2001 / 2007 / 2011).
[54] Introspection: divided and partly eliminated. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2010), 76-111.
[42] The Phenomenal Concept Strategy. (With Benedice Veillet.) Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (2007), 212-236.
[35] Can panpsychism bridge the explanatory gap? (With Elizabeth Schechter.) Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13: 10-11 (2006), 32-39. (Commentary on “Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism” by Galen Strawson.)
[34] Conscious experience versus conscious thought. In U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT, 2006.
[32] Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap". Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 34 (2004), 153-173.
[31] HOP over FOR, HOT theory. In R.Gennaro (ed.), Higher Order Theories of Consciousness. John Benjamins, 2004.
[29] Suffering without subjectivity. Philosophical Studies, 121 (2004), 99-125.
[27] Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much. Philosophical Psychology, 17 (2004), 83-102.
[26] Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68 (2004), 316-336.
[18] Consciousness: explaining the phenomena. In D.Walsh (ed.), Naturalism, Evolution and Mind. CUP, 2001.
[17] Replies to critics: explaining subjectivity. Psyche, 6 (2000). (Replying to ten refereed articles in the same journal targeted on [13].)
[16] The evolution of consciousness. In P.Carruthers and A.Chamberlain (eds.), Evolution and the Human Mind. CUP, 2000.
[15] Sympathy and subjectivity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77 (1999), 465-482.
[13] Animal subjectivity. Psyche 4 (1998). (Long abstract and reworking of article #[12], to provide a target paper for a special issue of the journal devoted to animal consciousness.)
[12] Natural theories of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy, 6 (1998), 203-222.
[11] Conscious thinking: language or elimination? Mind & Language 13 (1998), 323-342.
[7] Consciousness and concepts. Aristotelian Society Proceedings, supplementary volume 66 (1992), 41-59.
[5] Brute experience. The Journal of Philosophy, 86 (1989), 63-79.
[117] The active nature of creative insight. Unpublished (and seemingly unpublishable!)
[112] Pretend play: more imitative than imaginative. (With Heather Adair.) Mind & Language 38 (2023), 464-479.
[101] Mechanisms for constrained stochasticity. Synthese, 197 (2020), 4455-4473.
[81] Imagination and pretense. (With Elizabeth Picciuto.) In A. Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge, 2016.
[63] The origins of creativity. (With Elizabeth Picciuto.) In E. Paul and S. Kaufman, The Philosophy of Creativity. Oxford University Press, 2012.
[62] Creative action in mind. Philosophical Psychology, 24 (2011), 347-361.
[39] The creative-action theory of creativity. In Carruthers, Laurence, and Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind 3: foundations and the future. OUP, 2007.
[38] Why pretend? In S. Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination. OUP, 2006.
[20] Human creativity: its evolution, its cognitive basis, and its connections with childhood pretence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 53 (2002), 225-249.
[8] Pretend play: is it meta-representational? (With Chris Jarrold, Jill Boucher, and Peter K Smith.) Mind and Language 9 (1994), 445-468.
[111] Model-free metacognition. (With David Williams.) Cognition, 225 (2022), 105117.
[109] Explicit nonconceptual metacognition. Philosophical Studies, 178 (2021), 2337-2356.
[108] Linking metacognition and mindreading: Evidence from autism and dual-task investigations. (With David Williams, Toby Nicholson, Catherine Grainger, and Sophie Lind.) Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 150 (2021), 206-220.
[105] Representing the mind as such in infancy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 11 (2020), 765-780.
[103] How mindreading might mislead cognitive science. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 27, 7-8 (2020), 195-219.
[100] Comparative metacognition. (With David Williams.) Animal Behavior and Cognition, 6 (2019), 278-288.
[99] Relationships between implicit and explicit uncertainty monitoring and mindreading: Evidence from autism spectrum disorder. (With Toby Nicholson, David Williams, Catherine Grainger, and Sophie Lind.) Consciousness and Cognition, 70 (2019), 11-24.
[97] Young children flexibly attribute mental states to others. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2018), 115, 11351-11353. Commentary on Kiraly et al., Retrospective attribution of false beliefs in 3-year-old children. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2018).
[93] Can you spot a liar? Deception, mindreading, and the case of autism spectrum disorder. (With David Williams, Toby Nicholson, Catherine Grainger, and Sophie Lind.) Autism Research, (2018), 11, 1129-1137.
[87] Are epistemic emotions metacognitive? Philosophical Psychology, 30 (2017), 58-78.
[85] Pragmatic development explains the Theory-of-Mind Scale. (With Evan Westra.) Cognition, 158 (2017), 165-176.
[83] Mindreading in adults: evaluating two-systems views. Synthese, 194 (2017), 673-688.
[80] Two systems for mindreading? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7 (2016), 141-162.
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