Abstract: In this article, Barbara Applebaum examines “the inability to disagree claim” as it arises in objections made by those who want to ban “critical race theory” from being taught in schools and universities. Employing insights from the recent scholarship around willful hermeneutical ignorance, she discerns the important role that marginalized conceptual resources play in conditions of just and constructive dialogue. When such resources are misinterpreted and denied uptake, the resulting harm impedes the epistemic agency of marginally situated knowers. Applebaum claims that many high-profile anti–“critical race theory” arguments put forth by politicians, scholars, and others are a form of willful hermeneutical ignorance, and she concludes by showing how more just communications, in which disagreement is distinguishable from dismissal, can be achieved.
Abstract: The call for intellectual diversity on college campuses reemerges every few years, fueled by objections to the political imbalance or the liberal slant that conservative commentators claim is characteristic of higher education today. In this article, Barbara Applebaum sets out to add to the debate around intellectual diversity in higher education by addressing it through the lens of epistemic injustice, in general, and, more specifically, willful ignorance. She begins by summarizing the scholarship around epistemic injustice and then provides conceptual resources that are popular on social media to help explain the experience of marginalized knowers. Next, Applebaum demonstrates that unless willful ignorance is taken seriously, these conceptual resources remain unintelligible to dominantly situated knowers. She follows this with a review of some of the scholarship on epistemic injustice and the remedies for this problem proposed in it. Through applying insights gleaned from this scholarship to the call for intellectual diversity, Applebaum concludes that if the call for intellectual diversity is to lead to greater understanding among those who disagree on issues of injustice, it is necessary to confront the problem of willful ignorance in a serious and sustained way.
Abstract: A common remedial response to a culture of racism, sexism, homophobia and other forms of oppression on college campuses has been to institute mandatory implicit bias training for faculty, staff and students. A critical component of such training is the identification of unconscious prejudices in the minds of individuals that impact behavior. In this paper, I critically examine the rush to rely on implicit bias training as a panacea for institutional culture change. Implicit bias training and the notion of implicit bias it is grounded in is examined and the advantages and limitations of this approach is elaborated. An exclusive focus on implicit bias, it is argued, can protect ignorance rather than correct it. Similar to implicit bias, microaggressions is a concept that has played a role in campus diversity interventions. An examination of microaggression education demonstrates how it corrects for some of the pitfalls of relying on the concept of implicit bias to improve campus climate. The ambiguity that is characteristic of microaggressions, however, hints at the need to explore the type of “unknowing” that both implicit bias education and microaggression education attempt to remedy. Building on the recent scholarship around the idea of epistemic injustice, crucial insights can be gleaned about the significance of shifting the focus from lack of knowledge to a willful resistance to know. In the final section, some implications for improving campus climate are drawn out.
Abstract: In this article, I trouble the pedagogical practice of comforting discomfort in the social-justice classroom. Is it possible to support white students, for instance, and not comfort them? Is it possible to support white students without recentering the emotional crisis of white students, without disregarding the needs and interests of students of color, and without reproducing the violence that students of color endure? First I address the dangers of comforting discomfort and discuss Robin DiAngelo's notion of white fragility, which has been used to explain the tendency of white people to flee discomfort rather than tarry with it (DiAngelo 2011). Employing Erinn Gilson's work on vulnerability, I argue that white fragility is not a weakness but an active performance of invulnerability (Gilson 2011; 2014). I conclude by arguing that developing vulnerability is a counter to white fragility, and that one way such vulnerability can be encouraged is through offering critical hope, which I maintain is a type of support that does not comfort.
Abstract: This article examines a question that white students often ask when they learn about their role in systemic racial oppression: 'Why am I responsible?' I argue that the conception of responsibility that grounds this question is focused on causality and individual action and makes it difficult for white students to understand how within the context of structural injustice they are complicit in systemic racial injustice. Building on the work of feminist philosophers such as Iris Marion Young and Judith Butler, I propose a rearticulated notion of responsibility that is not focused on blame or fault and that understands that critique is at the heart of ethics. Implications for social justice education are discussed.
Abstract: This paper argues that the ‘traditional conception of moral responsibility’ authorizes and supports denials of white complicity. First, what is meant by the ‘traditional conception of moral responsibility’ is delineated and the enabling and disenabling characteristics of this view are highlighted. Then, three seemingly good, antiracist discourses that white students often engage in are discussed – the discourse of colour‐blindness, the discourse of meritocracy and the discourse of individual choice – and analysed to show how they are all grounded in the ‘traditional conception of moral responsibility’. The limitations of these discourses are drawn and how these discourses work to conceal white complicity is established. Finally, implications for social justice education are discussed.
Abstract: This paper explores the concept of white complicity and provides illustrations of how traditional conceptions of moral agency support the denial of such complicity. Judith Butler's conception of subjectivity is then examined with the aim of assessing its usefulness as a foundation for social justice pedagogy. Butler's conception of subjectivity is of interest because it offers insights into how dominant group identities are unintentionally complicit in the perpetuation of hegemonic social norms. While Butler's conception of subjectivity is shown to be useful in understanding white complicity, questions around the notion of agency that follow from such a conception of subjectivity are raised and briefly discussed. Finally, I show the implications of Butler's conception of self and agency for social justice pedagogy.
Abstract: Explores the relationship of intention to moral responsibility in contemporary notions of racism, arguing that, although the moral import of efforts to reveal & recognize dominance in Western society is to be lauded, the peripheral role attributed to intentions in ascriptions of racism can be counterproductive to the aid of helping dominant group members acknowledge their embeddedness in a culture that oppresses others.