My research centers on the notion “system of systems” – a generalized system of interconnected systems that not only span engineering systems but may also account for those with human in the loop, economic systems in particular. This research is predicated on cross-discipline knowledge of diverse systems, and further motivated by the emerging couplings between systems that lead to unfathomable interplay. Combining tools from control, optimization, learning and game theory, I highlight human behavior as a key coupling that breaks system boundaries, and characterize the fundamental impact of such an interconnection on system behavior. A critical procedure is to identify individual incentive structures across systems and use these insights to develop incentive compatible system operation schemes to fulfill engineering specifications and economic efficiency.
My goal of studying systems of systems is to reliably address the challenging global problem of resource, energy and economic efficiency, in pursuit of inter-system synergy. The interconnection of separately designed systems inevitably leads to tear and wear, or even disruptive outcomes, if no concerted effort is made. Understanding how these systems behave and interact would not only allow us to locate and analyze the underlying discord, but may also inspire solutions to synergizing the joint flexibility for improved efficiency and reliability. Key questions to be addressed for each system of systems include
What is the fundamental coupling between systems?
How does interconnection impact the joint system behavior?
What is the system-level solution to efficiency and reliability?
The electricity and transportation sectors consume the most energy and emit the most greenhouse gases. For instance, they combine for approximately two thirds of energy consumption and over a half of greenhouse gas emission in the US. Power networks and transportation networks are therefore the most important engineering systems to manage towards energy efficiency and zero emission. The emergence of electric vehicles on the road and their tremendous demand to charge batteries on power networks further couple the two systems, adding to the complexity of operating them efficiently and reliably. However, scheduling of EVs also offers a unique opportunity to fully exploit the flexibility of both systems and coordinate with renewable integration to potentially eliminate emission.
Related publications
[J12] P. You, J. Z.F. Pang, and S. H. Low. "Online Station Assignment for Electric Vehicle Battery Swapping". IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, accepted (access)(PDF)[J8] P. You, S. H. Low, L. Zhang, R. Deng, G. B. Giannakis, Y. Sun, and Z. Yang. "Scheduling of EV Battery Swapping, II: Distributed Solutions". IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 1920-1930, Dec. 2018(access) (PDF)[J7] P. You, S. H. Low, W. Tushar, G. Geng, C. Yuen, Z. Yang, and Y. Sun. "Scheduling of EV Battery Swapping, I: Centralized Solution". IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 1887-1897, Dec. 2018 (access) (PDF)[J4] P. You, Z. Yang, Y. Zhang, S. H. Low, and Y. Sun. "Optimal Charging Schedule for a Battery Switching Station Serving Electric Buses". IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 31, no. 5, pp. 3473-3483, Sep. 2016(access) (PDF)[J3] P. You, Z. Yang, M.-Y. Chow, and Y. Sun. "Optimal Cooperative Charging Strategy for a Smart Charging Station of Electric Vehicles". IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 2946-2956, Jul. 2016 (access) (PDF)Deregulated markets are aimed at driving efficient trading with maximum surplus from a social standpoint, such that the economy appeals to investment and can prosper. In addition to spot markets where commodities are traded for immediate delivery, forward contracting is another crucial platform for transactions that target future delivery. It is co-designed to increase the efficiency of a marketplace by allowing participants to hedge risks and promoting trade, and has its application in a wide spectrum of markets, spanning finance, cloud computing, natural gas and electricity. My research on such a system of two-stage sequential markets is motivated by electricity markets where as much as 95% of energy is traded through forward contracts. Therefore, any potential source of inefficiency in these market designs is likely to incur enormous social economic loss in the long run.
Related publications
[4] P. You, M. Fernandez, D. F. Gayme, and E. Mallada. "The Role of Strategic Participants in Two-Stage Settlement Electricity Markets"[1] R. K. Bansal, P. You, D. F. Gayme, and E. Mallada. "Storage Degradation Aware Economic Dispatch" (access)[C19] P. You, D. F. Gayme, and E. Mallada. "The Role of Strategic Load Participants in Two-Stage Settlement Electricity Markets". IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), Nice, France, 2019 (access) (technical report) (PDF)[C11] J. Z.F. Pang, P. You, and M. Chen. "The Role of Information in Temporally Networked Cournot Markets: Second Chance in Power Markets". Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), Hawaii, US, 2018(access) (PDF)Electricity grids and markets cooperate to reliably trade and deliver power. The cooperation is a demanding task: a physical grid is bounded to Newton’s and Kirchhoff’s Laws and operates within specified operating regions, while a market pursues underlying efficiency but has to accommodate incentives of individual participants that are free to change their preferences. To prioritize reliability, the norm has been adopting an operational hierarchy across timescales: market economic dispatch spanning five-minute intervals or longer; and frequency regulation required to function within one minute or so. Such a paradigm is a compromise at best – a higher-frequency market approaches finer-granularity efficiency and better handles system variability, but might destabilize the grid. This tradeoff motivates my research on the system of grid and market that aims to explore the fundamental limit of how fast a market can be operated without jeopardizing grid reliability.
Related publications
[3] P. You, Y. Jiang, E. Yeung, D. F. Gayme, and E. Mallada. "On Stability and Economic Efficiency of Electricity Market Dynamics"[C16] P. You*, J. Z.F. Pang*, and E. Yeung*. "Deep Koopman Controller Synthesis for Cyber-Resilient Market-Based Frequency Regulation" (*all authors contributed equally). IFAC Symposium on Control of Power and Energy Systems (CPES), Tokyo, Japan, 2018(access) (PDF)[C15] P. You, J. Z.F. Pang, and E. Yeung. "Stabilization of Power Networks via Market Dynamics". ACM e-Energy, Karlsruhe, Germany, 2018(access) (PDF)