Robinson, P. D. & Samuels, R. (2018). Reasoning, rules, and representation. In S. Bangu (ed.) Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge: Approaches from Psychology and Cognitive Science (Routledge Series in Philosophy of Mathematics and Physics), pp. 30-51.
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In recent years, philosophical theories of reasoning in general, and logical inference in particular, have been heavily influenced by a regress argument which purports to undermine a general conception of reasoning that has widespread acceptance among psychologists and cognitive scientists – what we call the "intentional rule-following account".
In this paper we highlight the virtues of the intentional rule-following account, provide a detailed reconstruction of the Regress argument, and show that it is unsound. Specifically, we argue that a range of received accounts of psychological processes in cognitive science have the resources to address the Regress.
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