Meritocracy and Homophily in Collegial Organizations, with Jean Tirole. Revise & resubmit, Review of Economic Studies.
Social Responsibility, Consequentialism and Public Policy
Managing Diversity to Attract Talent, with Jean Tirole
The Cooperative and the For-Profits, with Pierre Dubois and Jean Tirole [NEW DRAFT COMING SOON]
The Economics of Transferable Patent Extensions, with Pierre Dubois and Jean Tirole [NEW DRAFT COMING SOON]
Merit Narratives
Local Status Concerns and a Theory of Unsociable Sociability
Platforms, Data and User Manipulation, with Doh-Shin Jeon.
Strategic Disclosure in R&D Contests, with Amirreza Ahmadzadeh.
Data Trades and Data Cooperatives
Fixation Results for the Two-Feature Axelrod Model with a Variable Number of Opinions, with Nicolas Lanchier, Journal of Theoretical Probability, December 2016
The Axelrod model is a spatial stochastic model for the dynamics of cultures that includes two key social mechanisms: homophily and social influence, respectively defined as the tendency of individuals to interact more frequently with individuals who are more similar and the tendency of individuals to become more similar when they interact. The original model assumes that individuals are located on the vertex set of an interaction network and are characterized by their culture, a vector of opinions about F cultural features, each of which offering the same number q of alternatives. Pairs of neighbors interact at a rate proportional to the number of cultural features for which they agree, which results in one more agreement between the two neighbors. In this article, we study a more general and more realistic version of the standard Axelrod model that allows for a variable number of opinions across cultural features, say 𝑞_𝑖 possible alternatives for the ith cultural feature. Our main result shows that the one-dimensional system with two cultural features fixates when 𝑞_1+𝑞_2 ≥ 6.