Saja Parvizian

I received my Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Illinois at Chicago (2018), where I was trained in historical scholarship on early modern and Islamic philosophical systems. My work lies at the intersections of ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. My writings examine philosophers such as Descartes, Leibniz, Princess Elisabeth, Ibn Rushd, and al-Ghazali. In addition to further projects on these philosophers, I am currently investigating the work of Spinoza, Ibn Sina, Ibn Arabi, Suhrawardi, Russell, and Wittgenstein.

Below, you can find abstracts of publications and links to pre-prints on PhilArchive (*please cite published versions*).

sparvizian@outlook.com

Cartesian Ontology of Thought: Distinguishing Intellect and Will

Journal of Spinoza Studies, forthcoming

.On the standard reading, Descartes maintains that there is a modal distinction between the two main faculties of the mind: intellect and will. Against the standard view, Alan Nelson has argued that a conceptual distinction holds between the intellect and will, which entails that the intellect and will are ontologically identical, but two different ways of conceiving of mental substance. While there are interpretive benefits to such a view, it is also a highly revisionary reading of Descartes’ ontology of thought. It makes Descartes out to be a Spinozist, which threatens canonical features of his philosophical system. I raise three objections to Nelson’s reading that must be addressed in order for the conceptual reading to be viable

(Contact me if you would like to see the final draft)

Princess Elisabeth on Seeking Death

Journal of Modern Philosophy, forthcoming

In his correspondence with Princess Elisabeth, Descartes claims that knowing truths about the immortality, nobility and pleasures of the mind prevents a person from fearing death, a benefit for the practice of virtue. Employing Descartes’ commitments, Princess Elisabeth argues that said knowledge should lead a person to seek death. This paper reconstructs Princess Elisabeth’s seeking death objection, and tracks Descartes and Princess Elisabeth’s objections and replies across a series of letters in 1645. Princess Elisabeth pinpoints Descartes’ austere internalism and where it goes array—despite Descartes’ insistence to the contrary. In contrast to a recent medical reading of the objection, it is argued that the primary implication is that this epistemic condition is faulty, raising problems for Descartes’ views on the relation between virtue and happiness.

PhilArchive

Leibniz on Meliorism

Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, forthcoming

Leibniz claims that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds. However, this raises the question of whether there can be improvements in the world from moment to moment. This paper examines Leibniz’s view on meliorism, or progress in the best of all possible worlds. Against static, developmental, and inconsistency readings of meliorism, it is argued that a systematic progress reading should be preferred, in order to preserve Leibniz’s ethical commitments. On this view, the world increases in metaphysical, physical, and moral perfection, and this can be rendered consistent with Leibniz’s fundamental metaphysical commitments (e.g. his views on activity and passivity).

PhilArchive

Leibniz's Ethics [w/ Andrew Youpa]

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2025

SEP (2025 Update)

Al-Ghazali

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2024

Al-Ghazālī did not regard himself as a philosopher, given that during his period in Islamic intellectual history, philosophy was associated with the Aristotelian tradition promulgated primarily by Avicenna (Ibn Sina), and, for al-Ghazālī, Avicenna was undoubtedly considered to be an unbeliever whose philosophical views (such as his commitment to the eternity of the world) fell outside the scope of orthodox Sunni Islam. There would be a serious stigma attached, from the perspective of Islamic orthodoxy, with al-Ghazālī identifying with the philosophers. Instead, al-Ghazālī regarded himself primarily as a Sufi (mystic), theologian, and jurist.

Yet despite his aversion to particular philosophical theses, it is clear that Al-Ghazālī is not only sympathetic to particular disciplines and methodologies of philosophy (for example, logic and ethics), but produces work that would certainly qualify as philosophical both in his day and ours. Indeed, he contributed immensely to the history of Islamic philosophy and the history of philosophy more generally, and he is considered to be one of the greatest and most influential thinkers in Islamic intellectual history. Al-Ghazālī’s philosophical work spans epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, natural philosophy, and ethics. His philosophical work had a wide-reaching influence within the Islamic world, and his Incoherence of the Philosophers, in particular, was well-received by other medieval philosophers and the Latin philosophical tradition.

IEP

Descartes' God is a Deceiver and That's OK [w/ Joseph Gottlieb]

Synthese, 2023

That Descartes’ God is not a deceiver is amongst the canonical claims of early modern philosophy. The significance of this (purported) fact to the coherence of Descartes’ system is likewise canonical, infused in how we teach and think about the Meditations. Though prevalent, both ends of this narrative are suspect. We argue that Descartes’ color eliminativism, when coupled with his analysis of the cognitive structure of our sensory systems, entails that God is a deceiver. It’s doubtful that Descartes recognized this, given his insistence that God is not a deceiver, and the role this plays in his system. But this is a concession Descartes can grant if we are careful about the kind of deception at play—a kind Descartes does recognize, albeit not without some ambiguity. On our story, Descartes’ metaphysics and epistemology are not driven by concerns about deception per se, but by concerns about God’s benevolence.

PhilArchive

Al-Ghazali, Nativism, and Divine Interventionism

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2023

Al-Ghazali's engagement with skepticism in the Deliverance from Error has received much attention in recent literature, often in the context of comparing him with Descartes. However, there is one curious text that has gone largely unnoticed by commentators. In his account of how he overcame skepticism vis-à-vis a divine light cast unto his heart, al-Ghazali makes a cryptic claim that suggests that primary truths are inherent to the mind, and that said cognitive status of primary truths is related to his overcoming of skepticism. Although this one text does not straightforwardly prove that al-Ghazali is a nativist, I argue that there are other texts that plausibly reveal his nativism. As such, I argue that al-Ghazali can be read as a nativist, and I reconstruct a way in which his nativism helps explain how he overcomes skepticism. In doing so, I defend the (standard) strong divine interventionist reading of al-Ghazali's response to skepticism, against Hadisi’s recent weak divine interventionist reading.

PhilArchive I NWP Blog Post

Against Passionate Epistemology: Defending Pure Thought in the Meditations

History of Philosophy Quarterly, 2023

A revisionary reading of Descartes's epistemology has emerged in the literature. Some commentators have argued that Descartes subscribes to passionate epistemology, which claims that epistemic progress in the Meditations requires contributions from the meditator's passions. This paper argues that the passions cannot perform any epistemic work in the Meditations. As such, the meditator's passions do not require us to revise our canonical understanding of the Meditations as an exercise of pure thought. Furthermore, we need not abandon the standard claim that ethical practice emerges in the tree of philosophy only after metaphysics and epistemology have been established.

PhilArchive

Descartes on the Unity of the Virtues

Journal of Philosophical Research, 2022

Commentators have neglected a tension in Descartes’s virtue theory. In some texts, Descartes seems to argue that there are distinct virtues. In other texts, Descartes seems to argue that there is only a single virtue—the firm and constant resolution to use the will well. In this paper, I reconcile this tension. I argue that Descartes endorses a specific version of the unity of the virtues thesis, namely, the identity of the virtues. Nonetheless, Descartes has the resources to draw conceptual distinctions between various virtues. Distinct virtues are conceptually generated when we regard the firm and constant resolution to use the will well in different ways, that is, based on the different ways this resolution manifests in moral situations.

PhilArchive

Descartes on What "Truly Belongs" to Us

The Annals of the University of Bucharest - Philosophy Series, 2021

In recent literature commentators have challenged the standard interpretation that the Cartesian Self is a res cogitans. Various modifications have been proposed: the will should be regarded as an essential feature of thought as well (not just the intellect), and even the body – in some sense – belongs to the Cartesian Self. While these modifications are important, commentators have neglected Descartes’ wholly different conception of the Self in the Passions of the Soul. In his definition of generosity, Descartes claims that the Cartesian Self is a res volans: the only thing that truly belongs to the generous person is her free will. I aim to unpack what Descartes means in the “truly belongs” locution (TBL), ultimately arguing for what I call the weak essentialist reading. Descartes’ grounds for claiming that free will truly belongs to the Cartesian Self is that free will constitutes the activity – not passivity – of the mind. And that is the most important property in the essence of a mental substance.

PhilArchive

Averroes' Takfir of al-Ghazali: Ta'wil and Causal Kufr

American Journal of Islam and Society, 2021

Al-Ghazālı̄ famously claims in the Incoherence of the Philosophers that al-Farabi and Avicenna are unbelievers because they hold philosophical positions that conflict with Islam. What is less well-known, however, is that Averroës claims in the Decisive Treatise that al-Farabi and Avicenna are not unbelievers; rather, al-Ghazali is the true unbeliever for writing the Incoherence of the Philosophers. In this paper, my aim is to present a sustained reconstruction of Averroes’ legal and philosophical argument for why al-Ghazali is an unbeliever. The crux of Averroees' argument is that al-Ghazālı̄ has expressed false allegorical interpretations of scripture to unqualified persons, which has led them into unbelief. By being causally responsible for other people’s unbelief, al-Ghazali is an unbeliever as well.

PhilArchive

Leibniz on Intellectual Pleasure, Perception of Perfection, and Power

Theoria, 2021

Leibniz is unclear about the nature of pleasure. In some texts, he describes pleasure as a perception of perfection, while in other texts he describes pleasure as being caused by a perception of perfection. In this article, I disambiguate two senses of “perception of perfection”, which clarifies Leibniz’s considered position. I argue that pleasure is a perception of an increase in a substance’s power which is caused by a substance’s knowledge of a perfection of the universe or God. This reading helps clarify the nature of Leibnizian happiness. Happiness is a cognitive process (akin to a mood), constituted fundamentally out of pleasure, which is grounded in increases in a substance’s power. A rational substance will sustain its happiness so long as it is more powerful than it is weak, and it is engaging in activities that increase its power.

PhilArchive

Scientia, Diachronic Certainty, and Virtue

Synthese, 2021

In the Fifth Meditation Descartes considers the problem of knowledge preservation : the challenge of accounting for the diachronic certainty of perfect knowledge [scientia]. There are two general solutions to PKP in the literature: the regeneration solution and the infallible memory solution. While both readings pick up on features of Descartes’ considered view, I argue that they ultimately fall short. Salvaging pieces from both readings and drawing from Descartes’ virtue theory, I argue on textual and systematic grounds for a dispositionalist solution. On this view, the diachronic certainty of scientia is achieved through virtuous habits of belief.

PhilArchive

Al-Ghazali and Descartes on Defeating Skepticism

Journal of Philosophical Research, 2020

Commentators have noticed the striking similarities between the skeptical arguments of al-Ghazali's Deliverance from Error and Descartes’ Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. However, commentators agree that their solutions to skepticism are radically different. Al-Ghazali does not use rational proofs to defeat skepticism; rather, he relies on a supernatural light [nūr] sent by God to rescue him from skepticism. Descartes, on the other hand, relies on the natural light of reason [lumen naturale] to prove the existence of God, mind, and body. In this paper, I argue that Descartes’ solution is closer to al-Ghazali's than commentators have allowed. A close reading of the cosmological argument of the Third Meditation reveals that there is also a type of divine intervention employed in the Meditations, which helps Descartes defeat skepticism. This reading may buttress the case made by some that al-Ghazali influenced Descartes; but more importantly, it requires us to rethink key features of Descartes’ epistemology.

PhilArchive

Descartes: Ethics

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2020

This article describes the main topics of Descartes’ ethics through discussion of key primary texts and corresponding interpretations in the secondary literature. Although Descartes never wrote a treatise dedicated solely to ethics, commentators have uncovered an array of texts that demonstrate a rich analysis of virtue, the good, happiness, moral judgment, the passions, and the systematic relationship between ethics and the rest of philosophy. The following ethical claims are often attributed to Descartes: the supreme good consists in virtue, which is a firm and constant resolution to use the will well; virtue presupposes knowledge of metaphysics and natural philosophy; happiness is the supreme contentment of mind which results from exercising virtue; the virtue of generosity is the key to all the virtues and a general remedy for regulating the passions; and virtue can be secured even though our first-order moral judgments never amount to knowledge. Descartes’ ethics was a neglected aspect of his philosophical system until the late 20th century. Since then, standard interpretations of Descartes’ ethics have emerged, debates have ensued, and commentators have carved out key interpretive questions that anyone must answer in trying to understand Descartes’ ethics. For example: what kind of normative ethics does Descartes espouse? Are the passions representational or merely motivational states? At what point in the progress of knowledge can the moral agent acquire and exercise virtue? Is Descartes’ ethics as systematic as he sometimes seems to envision?

IEP

Cartesian Imperativism [w/ Joseph Gottlieb]

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2018

We propose a novel reading of Descartes' views on the nature of pain, thirst, and hunger: imperativism. According to imperativism, rather than (exclusively) having intentional contents individuated by a set of correctness conditions specifying the way the world is, pain thirst, and hunger have contents individuated by satisfaction conditions, which specify the way the world ought to be. Unlike representationalist treatments, the imperativist reading satisfies the unique health-preserving role Descartes sets out for pain, thirst, and hunger, without inflating his austere metaphysics of res extensa.

PhilArchive

Generosity, the Cogito, and the Fourth Meditation

Res Philosophica, 2016

The standard interpretation of Descartes's ethics maintains that virtue presupposes knowledge of metaphysics and the sciences. Lisa Shapiro, however, has argued that the meditator acquires the virtue of generosity in the Fourth Meditation, and that generosity contributes to her metaphysical achievements. Descartes's ethics and metaphsyics, then, must be intertwined. This view has been gaining traction in the recent literature. Omri Boehm, for example, has argued that generosity is foundational to the cogito. In this paper, I offer a close reading of Cartesian generosity, arguing that the meditator cannot acquire generosity in the Second or Fourth Meditation.

PhilArchive

On the Systematicity of Descartes' Ethics: Generosity, Metaphysics and Scientia

Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago, 2018

Committee: John Whipple, Sam Fleischacker, Daniel Sutherland, and Alan Nelson

Descartes is not widely recognized for his ethics; indeed, most readers are unaware that he had an ethics. However, Descartes placed great importance on his ethics, claiming that ethics is the highest branch of his philosophical system. I aim to understand the systematic relationship Descartes envisions between his ethics and the rest of his philosophy, particularly his metaphysics and epistemology. I defend three main theses. First, I argue against the recent trend in the literature that claims that the chief virtue in Descartes’ ethics—generosity—is acquired in the Meditations. On this view, the presence of moral virtue in the Meditations shows that ethical practice is intertwined with metaphysics and epistemology. I argue that generosity cannot be acquired in the Meditations because acquiring generosity presupposes several metaphysical and physical truths that the meditator cannot access given her epistemic position. Thus, I maintain that metaphysics and epistemology is foundational to ethics. Second, I resolve the tension between Descartes’ description of distinct virtues, and his insistence that there is only a single virtue—the disposition to judge well. Drawing from his theory of conceptual distinction in his metaphysics, I argue that Descartes offers a unique account of the unity of the virtues. Although Descartes describes different virtues, he thinks that all of them are identical to each other because they are reducible to the disposition to judge well. Nonetheless, we can conceptually distinguish between the virtues because we can regard the disposition to judge well in different ways given the various applications it has in different types of moral situations. Third, I show that some of Descartes’ ethical concepts inform his epistemology. I draw from Descartes’ theory of virtue to address “the problem of knowledge preservation,” that is, how to render perfect knowledge— scientia—stable in light of the instability of clear and distinct perceptions. I argue that Descartes intends to preserve scientia by grounding items of scientia in virtuous habits of belief. These habits of belief are established through repeated engagement with cognitive routes to clear and distinct perceptions, and are ultimately grounded in memory. This reading has the advantage of explaining Descartes’ notoriously confusing remarks about memory in response to the Cartesian circle.

PhilArchive

On the Attainment of Cartesian Generosity: Ontology and Generosity

MA Thesis, San Francisco State University, 2010

Commitee: Alice Sowaal, David Landy, and Mohammad Azadpur. 2010.

In this thesis I argue that foundational to attaining Cartesian generosity, both as a passion and as a virtue are the clear and distinct perceptions of mind, God, and body. I challenge Lisa Shapiro’s account of generosity, and her suggestion that generosity regulates the passions expressed in the Meditations. Unlike Shapiro I attend closely to the distinction between the passion of generosity and the virtue of generosity, and how to acquire these different states of the soul. I propose that the passion of generosity cannot be aroused in the soul until after the meditations have been completed and the full inventory of clear and distinct perceptions attained. I interpret the meditations as orienting the meditator towards attaining virtue; by putting her in a position to attend frequently to the nature of free will after the six meditations have been completed. I interpret this frequent attendance to the will as a “Seventh Meditation,” which arouses the passion of generosity. After the passion has been attained, the virtue of generosity can then be acquired through self-cultivation, which instills generosity as a habit of the soul. The virtue of generosity is what allows one to gain mastery of the passions, and I provide an account of how this can be done through a process of reconditioning the passions.

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