2nd Workshop on Game Theory and Information
Institut Henri Poincaré (11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris)
8-9-10 juin
PROGRAM
MONDAY 8th Amphithéâtre Hermite (Batiment Borel)
9:00–9:30
Welcome Coffee (Cafetaria)
9:30–10:15
Michael Jordan (INRIA)
Nonnegative Supermartingales, Sequential Testing, and Statistical Contract Theory
10:15–11:00
Margaret Meyer (Oxford University)
Dependence-Sensitive First-Order Stochastic Dominance
11:00–11:30
Coffee Break (Cafetaria)
11:30–12:15
Harry Pei (Northwestern University)
Replacement and Reputation
12:15–13:00
Julien Prat (IP Paris, CNRS)
Reputational Concerns in Liquid Staking Protocols
13:00–14:30
Lunch
14:30–15:15
Chiara Margaria (Boston University)
Recommender Systems and Self-Preferencing
15:15–16:00
Andrew McClellan (University of Chicago Booth)
Signaling with Plausible Deniability
16:00–16:30
Coffee Break (Cafetaria)
16:30–17:15
Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University)
Towards a Theory of Algorithmic Effort
17:15–18:00
Elliott Lipnowski (Yale University)
Agreeing to Implement
TUESDAY 9th Amphithéâtre Y. Choquet-Bruhat (Batiment Perrin)
9:30–10:15
Flore Santenac (HEC Paris)
Flexibility Allocation in Random Bipartite Matching Markets: Exact Matching Rates and Dominance Regimes
10:15–11:00
Jason Hartline (Northwestern University)
Truthful Measures of Miscalibration
11:00–11:30
Coffee Break (salon E. Noether)
11:30–12:15
Mark Whitmeyer (Arizona State University)
Comparing Experiments in Discounted Problems
12:15–14:30
Poster session & lunch (provided by the conference — salon É. Noether)
14:30–15:15
Tatiana Mayskaya (NRU Higher School of Economics)
The Effect of Correlation and Payoff Interdependence on Learning
15:15–16:00
Gregorio Curello (Mannheim University)
Voting over Time and Space
16:00–16:30
Coffee Break (salon E. Noether)
16:30–17:15
Maryam Kamgarpour (EPFL)
Learning in Games with Payoff-Based Information
17:15–18:00
Nicolas Vieille (HEC)
Changing Fundamentals and the Dynamics of Social Learning
WEDNESDAY 10th Amphithéâtre Y. Choquet-Bruhat (Batiment Perrin)
9:30–10:15
Paula Onuchic (LSE)
Disclosing Proxies
10:15–11:00
Frédéric Koessler (HEC-CNRS)
Informed Communication Equilibrium
11:00–11:30
Coffee Break (salon E. Noether)
11:30–12:15
Eduardo Perez Richet (Sciences-Po Paris)
Falsification-proof non-market allocation mechanisms
12:15–13:00
Maël Letreust (CNRS IRISA Rennes)
Strategic Communication with Capacity-Limited Mediation
13:00–14:30
Lunch
14:30–15:15
Michael Greinecker (CEPS, ENS Paris-Saclay)
Duality and Information Design
15:15–16:00
Krishna Dasaratha (Boston University)
Aggregative Efficiency of Bayesian Learning in Networks
16:00–16:30
Coffee Break (salon E. Noether)
16:30–17:15
Rakesh Vohra (University of Pennsylvania)
Constrained Bayesian Updating
17:15–18:00
Vianney Perchet (ENSAE & Criteo Lab)
Last Iterate Convergence for Uncoupled Learning in Zero-Sum Games with Bandit Feedback