Publications:
Coalitional stability under myopic expectations and externalities(Joint with Agustín Bonifacio and María Haydée Fornseca-Mairena), Theory and Decision (2026). Forthcoming.
Counting steps for re-stabilization in a matching market with fixed population. (Joint with Agustín Bonifacio , Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juárez and Jorge Oviedo) Social Choice and Welfare (2026). Link to the online version.
Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models. (Joint with Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juárez, and Jorge Oviedo) International Journal of Game Theory (2025). Link to the online version.
A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independence choice functions to a one-to-one matching market. (Joint with Jorge Oviedo). TOP (2025) Link to the online version.
Dynamic matching games: stationary equilibria under varying commitments. (Joint with Nadia Guiñazú and Jorge Oviedo) Journal of Dynamic and Games (2025). Link to the online version.
A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games.(Joint with Agustín Bonifacio and Elena Iñarra ) Games and Economic Behavior (2024). Link to the online version.
Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences. (Joint with Agustín Bonifacio, Noelia Juárez, and Jorge Oviedo) International Journal of Game Theory (2023) Link to the online version.
The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts. (Joint with Agustín Bonifacio , Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juárez and Jorge Oviedo) Theory and Decision. (2023) Link to the online version.
Preference restrictions for strategy-proof and simple rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains. (Joint with Agustín Bonifacio and Jordi Massó). Journal of Mathematical Economics. (2023) Link to the online version.
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings. (Joint with Agustín Bonifacio , Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juárez and Jorge Oviedo) Games and Economic Behavior Link to the online version.
Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings. (Joint with Agustín Bonifacio , Noelia Juárez and Jorge Oviedo) Mathematical Social Sciences (2022) Link to the online version.
Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets. (Joint with Noelia Juárez and Jorge Oviedo) Games and Economic Behavior 132, 255-273 (2022). Link to the online version.
A note on the lattice structure for matching markets via linear programming. (Joint with Jorge Oviedo) Journal of Dynamics and Games 8,61-67 (2021). Link to the online version.
On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional Matchings (Joint with Jorge Oviedo), Mathematical Social Science 110,1-13 (2021). Link to the online version.
Marriage Model with indifferences: a Linear Programming Approach (Joint with Noelia Juárez and Jorge Oviedo) Journal of the Operation Research of Society of China (2021). Link to the online version.
A characterization of strongly stable fractional matchings (Joint with Jorge Oviedo) TOP 28, 97–122 (2020). Link to the online version.
Submitted Papers:
A dynamically stable mechanism in many-to-many school choice. (Joint with Adriana Amieva and Agustín Bonifacio). Arxiv Link.
A polyhedral characterization of worker-quasi-stable matchings (Joint with Nadia Guiñazu, Noelia Juarez, Paola Manasero, and Jorge Oviedo).
On von Neumann–Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Markets (Joint with Mauricio Lucero Quevedo, Paola Manasero, and Jorge Oviedo).
Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture with needs (Joint with R. Pablo Arribillaga and Juan D. Moreno-Ternero).
Speudo-subsitutability in matching markets (Join with Nadia Guiñazu, Noelia Juarez, Paola Manasero, and Jorge Oviedo).
Working Papers:
Lattice characterization of stable sets in two-sided markets (Work in progress 2026). Autores: Mauricio Lucero, Pablo Neme, Marina Nuñez y Francisco Robles.
Equilibria of efficient DA dominating mechanisms (Work in progress 2026). Autores: Pablo Arribillaga, Juan Pereyra y Pablo Neme.
Work in progress:
Quasi-stability in matching markets with monetary exchange (Work in progress 2025). (Joint with Marina Nuñez and Francisco Robles).
Generalized TTC for many-to-many markets with substitutable preferences (Work in progress 2025). (Joint with Adriana Amieva and Flip Klijn).