9:00 Welcome to participants
9:20-10:10 Gerhard WOEGINGER (RWTH Aachen, Germany): The dimension of a simple game
10:10-11:00 Françoise FORGES (LEDa, Université Paris-Dauphine, France): Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the supermodular case
11:00-11:20 Coffee break
11:20-12:10 Peter SUDHÖLTER (University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark): Characterization of TU games with stable core by nested balancedness
12:10-13:00 Jean-Paul DOIGNON (Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium): Flow polytopes in the analysis of preference data
13:00-14:30 Lunch
14:30-15:20 Piotr FALISZEWSKI (AGH University of Science and Technology, Krakow, Poland): Committee scoring rules
15:20-16:10 Jérôme LANG (LAMSADE, Université Paris-Dauphine, France): Portioning using ordinal preferences: Fairness and efficiency
16:10-16:30 Coffee break
16:30-17:20 Agnieszka RUSINOWSKA (Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, CNRS, Paris School of Economics, France): Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies