Operation Loyton

The following is a transcription of WO218/202 Operation Loyton.

It now includes an additional transcription of a document relating to an Independent task to the North of the Loyton area (go to end of transcription)

I have used a fixed width font so as to reproduce the original documents as precisely as possible . I have reproduced spelling mistakes etc. and made comments where I believe necessary.

I have transcribed 35,000+ words!

Once Google find and cache the website, the contents should show up in Google searches.

Hope you find it interesting and worth the effort! Tim (Grandson of Edward Williams, 2SAS who was actually on Operation Pistol just to the North at the same time)

O P E R A T I O N L O Y T O N

C O N T E N T S

SUMMARY - including damage inflicted on the enemy.

OPERATION REPORT - PHASE I Page

Capt. Druce’s reconnaissance party 1.

OPERATION REPORT - PHASE II

Report by Lt.Col. B.M. Franks, M.C. 14.

Appendix A - (1) Report by Major P.le Poer Power on period

prior to joining Loyton Base.

(2) Report by Lieut. McGregor, D.S.O.

(3) Report by Lieut. Marx on periods absent from

base on independent tasks, 7 - 14 Sep.

and 19 Sep. - 3 Oct.

(4) Report by Major P.le Poer Power on jeep actions.

(5) Report by Sgt. Thorpe on period absent from base

on independent task, 21 - 29 Sep.

Appendix B - (1) Exfiltration of Capt. Druce and F/O Fiddick and

the re-infiltration of Capt. Druce

and Pct. Pendli.

(2) Exfiltration of Lt.Col. B.M. Franks, M.C., and party.

(3) Exfiltration of Capt. McGibbon-Lewis,M.C., and party.

(4) Exfiltration of Lieut. Silly’s party.

(5) Exfiltration of Lieut. Marx and party.

(6) Exfiltration of Lieut. Swayne and party.

Appendix C - (1) Lt.Col.B.M. Franks, M.C. - Comments on Operation.

(2) Facsimile of Intelligence on Loyton area brought

back by Capt. Druce.

(3) General situation in the Loyton area. (Translation

of French document brought back by Capt. Druce.)

Appendix D - Nominal roll of personnel engaged.

Appendix E - Re-supply and comments by Capt. Burt, Quartermaster.

Appendix F - Casualties.

Appendix G - Intelligence information passed by signal.

(Photographs of a target sent by signal under

bombing attack are included in copies 1, 2, 4,

and 10 to 16 only.)

S U M M A R Y

This operation was planned against enemy road and rail

communications in the eastern frontier area of France. It was intended

that parties should operate against the main lines westwards from Strass-

burg (Strassburg - Zabern, branching then to Metz and Nancy, Strassburg -

St. Die, Strassburg - Mulhausen - Belfort), and in addition harass soft

transport on the road network complementary to the railways mentioned

above.

It had been hoped to mount this operation shortly before or

immediately after D-day, at a time when the area was relatively lightly

held by enemy forces and while there were in France many other areas of

partisan activity which would distract enemy attention from the presence

of S.A.S. troops in so sensitive a position astride their main communic-

ations with the Reich.

Not until too late, however, was it discovered that 38 Group

were unable to despatch men or supplies to this area until the beginning

of the longer hours of darkness in August. This entailed a considerable

delay: by the time Capt. Druce’s recce party dropped on the night of

12/13th August the Normandy beachhead had expanded to reach the Loire

and the Germans were having the conviction forced upon them that a far

reaching retreat was inevitable. The difficulties encountered by Capt.

Druce, whose chief pre-occupation soon after dropping was to avoid the

enemy patrols which were searching the district, and the further hindrance

of the loss of his wireless sets, delayed reinforcements by a further

nineteen vital days. (Capt. Druce had requested reinforcement in the

intervening period but as his signals had to be passed through the

Regional F.F.I. controller at Nancy his message was confused with another

received the same day, both giving different D.Zs., and Major Power was

dropped 25 miles to the West of the Loyton area. Although he set out

eastwards to try to contact Capt. Druce he was out of touch for four weeks.

Col. Franks sent a signal instructing him to remain and operate in the

area where he had dropped but this signal was never received.)

When, therefore, Col. Franks’ main party landed to Capt. Druce’s

reception on the 1st September, the Germans had abandoned all hope of a

stand on the Marne and it seemed extremely likely that the difficulties

of the Vosges terrain, coupled with the sentimental consideration of the

incorporation of Alsace and Lorraine in the Reich, indicated that a con-

siderable stiffening of German resistance would occur on the western slopes

of the Vosges.

This belief was justified, and the subsequent history of the

Loyton force is rich in examples of the difficulty of maintaining a base

on the back-stage of a battle in an area where ordinary security forces

are augmented by the B echelon and reserve troops of the enemy’s battle

line.

Two days after Col. Franks, Major Reynolds and 14 men arrived.

Thereafter the story is one of constant moves and German search parties,

of shortage of food and German reprisals against these farmers who gave

assistance. The operating base organisation, which would have been in

balance with the original scheme, was now out of proportion for so

circumscribed an area. Nevertheless, the parties sent out were able to

do considerable damage and kept a large number of enemy troops occupied,

but the fact that they did not do that damage at a greater distance from

the base may have had its repercussions. Resupply in an area already

short of D.Zs. was made more difficult by German picketing, and diffi-

culties of movement out of the area to reach other targets were corres-

pondingly increased. The arrival of six jeeps and crews on the night

of 21/22nd September did not add fluidity because after one or two

sorties they were traced to their base and eliminated as a mobile force.

On the 9th October, as the winter was approaching in this

inhospitable area which was now being prepared by the Germans as an

alternative front line position, Col. Franks decided to order his parties

to exfiltrate independently.

The conditions for S.A.S. work vary for each operation, and

while it would no doubt have been possible to have established a large

base from which all operations could have been organised and directed over

a wide area in the early summer months, by the autumn the only ‘secure’

base was small and of necessity constantly on the move. It is, therefore,

highly creditable that the Loyton party not only succeeded in adjusting

itself to the changed conditions but was also able to provide the list of

damage to the enemy included in this summary.

Operation Pistol which was mounted independently in the area

immediately to the North, on a basis of small parties with no contact with

the Maquis, and with set tasks to complete before exfiltration, makes an

interesting comparison.

For Lt. Col. Franks’ detailed comments see Appendix C (1).

They provide an excellent summing up of the difficulties of the operation

and valuable lessons which should not be neglected.

A number of valuable bomber targets were sent by signal (see

Appendix E). Of these, at least two sent by Major Power were acted upon

- a school at Vincey, Z 955717, in which S.S. troops were billeted, and a

large petrol dump at Nomexy, V 995685. Photographs have been taken of both

the raids and if available will be included in this report.

In addition to both his trips through the lines, Capt. Druce

brought back valuable information (see Appendices C (2) and C (3) ). It

would not seem that the American forces in this sector fully appreciated

the potentialities of liaison with the S.A.S. parties, a liaison which might

have been mutually beneficial.

DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY. (As all parties have not yet returned this

list is necessarily incomplete.)

Killed : 40/50

Vehicles destroyed : 15 ( 6 Staff cars, 1 T.C.V., 5 trucks and 3 ambulances

carrying explosives(see appendix B (6) )

Vehicles immobilised through damage : 11 ( 8 trucks, 3 half-tracks.)

Trains derailed : 1

Trains probably derailed : 2

OWN CASUALTIES (See Appendix F for full details.)

Killed : 2

Missing, believed P.W. : 5

Missing : 23

OPERATION - LOYTON - PHASE I

CAPT. DRUCE’S RECONNAISSANCE PARTY.

My party consisted of:-

Capt. Druce Attached

Capt. Hislop Phantom.

Capt. Goodfellow Jed “Jacob” team

Lieut.Dill

Sjt. Hay Capt. Gough

Sjt. Lodge Capt. Barreaux

Sjt. Davis Phantom. Sjt. Seymour

Pct. Crossfield

Pct. Hall

Pct. Sullivan)

Pct. Stanley ) Phantom.

Pct. Johnson )

Our task was to recce the area of the Vosges as to its

suitability as an area for operation “Loyton”, and also to find and est-

ablish a safe base and fresh D.Zs for re-supply and personnel dropping :

further, to recce or find out a suitable D.Z. in the South towards Belfort.

This was all with the object of cutting the railways Strassburg - Saarburg,

Strassburg - St.Die, Mulhausen - Belfort, as main targets. Also naturally

as the railways became neutralised so we should be in a position to cover

the roads the Germans would be likely to use in their place.

My knowledge of the Vosges was not good, but I had been there

before “en passant” and so, with ground photos, I knew fairly well what

to expect in the way of terrain.

We were to take with us arms for about 200 men. Col. Franks

had told me I was to use these in the way I thought fit, but not to give

them away without knowing exactly where they were going. One Jedburgh

team, code name “Jacob” led by Capt. Gough, was to come with us to arm

the Maquis who had given us the D.Z. and were arranging the lights.

The two Stirling planes took off from Fairford aerodrome at

about 22.00 hrs.

I thought it would have been better for Capt. Goodfellow to

have gone under his own name or an assumed French name. However, it was

really too late to make a change.

The trip was uneventful. Major Power came in the aircraft.

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August 13th.

We arrived over the D.Z. between 01.45 - 02.00 hrs. The D.Z. at

La Petite Raon, V 460782 was lighted by bonfires which were visible from

miles away, both by Allied and German aircraft, if about. This was however

their first experience, which we corrected for future reference. The

bonfires were too hard to control.

It was a good accurate drop, in 2 sticks of 7 and 6 each at quarter

hour interval. Unfortunately my leg bag slipped off my leg and on to my foot,

where I could not reach it to release it or to pull it up. Landing backwards

I concussed myself slightly and talked nonsense until about 04.30 - 05.00 hrs.

In the meantime Capt. Goodfellow had contacted Col. Maximum the

Maquis chief, and was organising the collection of containers. Several leg

kit bags were broken and arms etc lost, but later recovered. Some cigarettes

were looted. All S.A.S. were able to move away under their own power, but

one "Jed", Sjt. Seymour, had twisted his ankle on landing, and had to be

assisted. Capt. Goodfellow remained behind and we moved off to the Maquis

camp 'B', in the woods.

Capt. Goodfellow, Col. Maximum and all his staff, Capt. Jean,

Capt. Marks, Lieuts. Felix and Jean Serge caught us up about lunch time when

a conference took place. I found that Capt. Gough spoke very little French.

Felix was the only one of the French who spoke any English.

Apparently all the containers had been found. The French took

for granted that the arms belonged to them as a reward for getting us there.

This, Capt. Goodfellow assured me was in order and had been more or less the

price arranged for the use of their field. It was agreed that, for such

time as we wanted, we were to be fed and housed and also defended by them.

It seemed a fair bargain. It was also arranged that Planet, the regional

controller of Maquis, was being summoned to meet me on the following day, or

day after. Through him I hoped to get all the information I required, and

in return for the arms already given, any other aid we might need.

At that time guides seemed as if they would be of great assistance.

(Later on we found this proved to be absolutely false). Although feeling

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much better, I was still a bit muzzy in the head, and determined not to force

myself into any statement that I might want to retract, so I decided to put

all questions and demands off until the following conference.

We then went to the camp 'A' commanded by Lieut. Felix. It

consisted of wooden huts made from cut down trees: position pt. V 483864

(pt 687) on the top of the hill in a good defensive position. The camp

seemed well organised and well run, and the Maquis in this camp consisted

of about 80 men who previously had about 10-15 assorted old and rusty rifles.

The other camp had also about the same number of men and material, and was

commanded by Lieut. Jean Serge, a regular officer. These later included

about 15 ex-Russian P.Ws. Their Company Commander was Capt. Marks. On

arriving we had an excellent meal and slept the clock round.

August 14th.

Planet, who it was rumoured lived in Nancy, had not been able to

come. However, I was not worried about this as it gave us time to take

stock of the situation, also for Capt. Hislop to send our position to

London, and to instruct the Maquis in their new weapons. Col. Maximum

insisted on the radio not transmitting within 5 miles of the camp, owing

to the danger of D.F. This seemed a very reasonable precaution especially

for our own safety. However it was very hard on Phantom team, since they

had to lend one operator to Capt. Gough, whose own operator, Sjt. Seymour,

was unable to walk.

Lieut. Felix proved a very nice man, but not good at handling his

men. The men at the time did not seem too bad, with a certain amount of

military discipline instilled by a small nucleus of ex-regular soldiers.

August 15th.

A Canadian pilot called Fiddick joined us. He had been shot

down and had injured his leg, which made walking difficult.

There was still no sign of Planet, but I was powerless to do any-

thing about it.

Capt. Hislop found that one of his sets had disappeared, but at

this stage it caused no alarm, since we felt sure of re-supply of men and any

material needed during the next few days. His traffic seemed to be in good

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shape.

August 16th.

Planet at last arrived, and we were taken over to the other camp

to meet him and Col. Maximum. I had decided that Capt. Goodfellow for our

part should do most of the talking, since his French is bi-lingual, and

his task as liaison officer necessitated plenty of contact between both sides.

The meeting opened with Planet taking the chair and leading the conversation.

As soon as he had had his say, Planet decided he must be getting back (he had

come by train) and before Capt. Goodfellow had said our bit, he had gone.

Naturally I was annoyed, especially as I was no nearer to fulfilling my

task, so I decided that I would get my own information and help through

Lieut. Felix and his little band.

We arrived back at our own camp to hear tales of German troops

having come into the Valley of Celles in large numbers. Rumours as to

strength ranged between 1,000 - 5,000. There was no news of any Germans

so far in the Valley of Senones. We were not unduly worried since the

Germans might have been there for any reason at all. However, all the

male population of Allarmont had thought it wiser to take to the hills

and join us. This was a nuisance, since there were no arms to give them.

We doubled the guards and went to bed.

Col. Maximum had promised to come over from the other camp early

the following morning. There had been some rumour of a new D.Z. near

Celles. However we were really rather working in opposite directions,

for Col. Maximum was looking for container D.Zs so that he should have arms,

and I for D.Zs for men. The position as a base did not seem so good from

the point of view that obviously D.Zs were going to be a trouble. However

Col. Maximum assured me that if we moved to say the Chatras area, V 482738

the Germans would be able to locate and eradicate us all too quickly; so I

decided that the base must be in the wooded High Vosges itself, and if

necessary we must go a little way out for re-supply D.Zs. The Germans had

paid a visit to the D.Z. on which we had arrived, which proved at least

that they were alive to the situation.

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August 17th.

The French party which had set out to bring Col. Maximum to see me

was attacked by a German patrol, and lost one killed. Their report was not

at all clear as to what had happened. Rifle fire was not far away, and

the French said they were only 1,000 yards from the camp when they had been

attacked. I arranged a plan of defence, but every time a shot was heard

the French withdrew right into the camp. Wild reports of huge numbers of

Germans in the valley of Celles kept coming in. Eventually I decided to

abandon the camp 'A' and join the other camp 'B' under Jean Serge. Unfortun-

ately we used the unarmed men from Allarmont and Vexaincourt as porters.

My idea was to detour the Germans, and having left a rear party under Capt.

Goodfellow of Sjt. Lodge, Sjt. Hay, Crossfield, Hall and Fiddick to cover

our withdrawal, we set off. Unfortunately he was too slow in leaving, and

lost us. We waited at the bottom of the hill and sent back, but there was

no sign of him and we decided to push on. They had an R.V with us at

pt. V 470902 for such an eventuality.

After two hours difficult marching across the hills we came on a

path: going along this for about 400 yards we bumped into a German patrol

who were busy eating. We retracted 200 yards, got off the track and hid,

with the idea of moving on once the patrol had finished eating and passed us.

Unfortunately one German saw the last man in our column and shouted "Achtung",

whereupon he was shot by the man he had seen. (It later transpired that we

had been betrayed, and out position sold to the Germans by one of the Maquis.

His name and particulars are held by Capt. Jean). The patrol seemed about

30-40 strong, so at first I decided to attack them, but within a few minutes,

shouts were coming from farther up the path from reinforcements. Our position

was unfavourable, as we were on a slope of the hill, with a path above and

below us, and there were Germans on the top path already in unpleasantly

large numbers. Fearing that the enemy would soon be on the lower path also,

I decided it best to make for the R.V. in small parties, since my task was

to bring in the reinforcements for the area and therefore I was not keen on

risking our necks for a few Germans. Unfortunately this meant leaving

Sjt. Seymour as a P.W., for he could still not walk. I told Capt. Hislop

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to take the radio. Unhappily the porters who were carrying the radios made

this quite impossible, as most had already fled. (I did not know this

until next time I saw Capt. Hislop, who also told me that Sjt. Davis was

missing). I attached a time pencil and 10 lbs plastic to my Bergen; we

heard that a loud explosion had occurred. Several weeks later we found

Germans had ransacked our Bergens, so I hope that one was caught.

Lieut. Dill, Felix and several Frenchmen came with me down the

hill; Capt. Hislop, Johnson, Sullivan and Stanley were separated from me.

A German with a Schmeisser was by this time across the lower path, but he

was a bad shot, and I do not think he hit anyone. Lieut Dill went back to

try to remove him, but he was too well concealed. Lieut. Felix said he

knew a place for the night near Moussey, V 4781, so under his guidance we

went southwards into the woods where he contacted Pere Georges, who said

we could sleep in his hay. We got a good meal "chez madame" at the house

below, pt. V 489808, and went to bed.

On the way down the hill we found that half the Maquis arms were

thrown away. Information was that there were about 500 Germans in Moussey,

and at the Chateau Belval a General who was in command of the troops searching

the area. Certainly, even that evening, there seemed a great deal of traffic

(mostly m/cs) on the Moussey - Belval road.

August 18th.

In the morning Lieut. Felix and his serjeant left us to report

the position to Col. Maximum at Raon l'Etape. His papers were in order, so

his chances seemed good in spite of German patrols. I asked him to send a

message via Col. Maximum to England, explaining the situation and reason for

delay in calling in the rest of the Loyton party. Four of the French who

were left had their papers in order, so they were told to make off by them-

selves. This left Lieut. Dill, 3 Frenchmen and myself.

We contacted M. Douit, who promised to feed and hide us and

collect any information. This became difficult since the Germans had

forbidden anyone to circulate in any village other than their own. We moved

into his barn that night, and made a hole as a hideout. It was right on

the main road, so we heard all the German traffic passing for the next four

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days within 3 yards of us.

The Germans were still searching the woods to the North, and

movement towards the R.V. was, we were assured, impossible for the moment.

The Germans had obviously taken a serious view of our presence. In all

it seemed there were about 5,000 Germans chasing us.

August 19th.

During the next two days we remained in hiding. The weather

was very hot, and the news was always the same. No civilian movement was

allowed, and troops were still searching. We were eating excellently all

the while. A guide who lived at Moussey had promised to come to take us

to the R.V., but never turned up, so we decided to wait one more day before

pushing on to the R.V.

Forty-three males from Moussey had been taken off to the camp at

Schirmeck and elsewhere by the enemy.

August 21st.

I was awakened by the sound of Germans in the back garden. We

gripped our guns for a final fling, but then found that they were only

putting a telephone line up.

During the day the guide could either not be located or would not

come. However we heard of a Col. Marlier who could get us out of the region

and back to the new Maquis H.Q. M. Douit and his prospective son-in-law

acted as our guides to the R.V. with Col. Marlier's contact. Col. Marlier

would not say who he was or his position. I gathered him to be an S.O.E.

agent.

Apparently the Germans were beginning to abandon the search of the

area for us. No one seemed to know where they were going. They were said

to include some Russian and Polish.

We set out at dusk and met Col. Marlier's contacts. These were

3 policemen from Senones, V 441776. The French were quite incapable of

moving without making a tremendous noise. We slept in some straw in a house

in Senones. There were about 100 Germans in the school, who were probably

from the Todt organisation or a Motor Company; they seemed to have a lot of

transport.

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August 22nd.

We met Lieut. Felix who told us that a camp had been set up at

pt. V 413848 of both centuries. He also said that Capt. Hislop, Pcts.

Sullivan, Stanley, Johnson, Capt. Barreaux and Capt. Gough were in this

camp. I explained that I was anxious about the R.V. and was keen to get

up there as soon as possible. He could still move about as his papers

were in order, so I suggested he went and had a look and posted a sentry

there. Lieut. Felix did this, though without any success. He was very

upset since Col. Maximum had degraded him to "simple soldat" for abandoning

the camp. My opinion of Col. Maximum was getting very bad. The position

was ridiculous since, at any rate ha had acted under my orders, and I

promised to do my best to settle the matter.

Our next guide arrived at mid-day to take us to Moyenmoutier,

where we could cross the valley and so join the new camp. This guide,

Etienne, proved a good man now and especially later (see jeep drops on Sept

20th), but even so got us lost although he was a "Guard Forestier". I

decided that I was better at reading a map than they were at guiding.

We arrived towards 20.00 hrs, and I was introduced to Clement,

chief of one of the unarmed Maquis centuries. These were still living at

home, and were just a prospective hundred men. He said he knew where

Col. Maximum could be found. I made him take me to him, dressed in civilian

clothes, and went on a bicycle to a house at the outskirts of Raon l'Etape.

Here there was a terrific row over Clement bringing me to the hide-out of

Col. Maximum. Eventually it soothed down, and Maximum and his staff generally

attacked me and Felix (Felix most particularly), for having left the camp.

I explained that I was not there to fight pitched battles for the Maquis at

any time, and my task was to bring in more S.A.S., hence it "helped" if I was

alive to do it. He assured me that the Germans did not know anything about

our camp. However, Col. Maximum had told me the camp had been sold by one of

the Maquis from it. It seems hardly likely however, he would have taken the

Germans to within 1,000 yards without finding it exactly.

I was in a bad position all the while since Col. Maximum had told me

that Capt. Hislop had no radio, confirming what I had already found from Felix.

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Thus my only contact with London was via Col. Maximum.

The area was again almost free of Germans. Capt. Gough had

obviously also lost his set and did not seem to have had much success with

London anyway, for Col. Maximum was only too keen to pass a message for me

as long as it had some mention of arms in it. As the war situation was so

fluid in France, the area reasonably safe and the food situation at the

time not bad, I decided to ask for seven sticks to stand by to come to a

D.Z. at Veney, V 319857. Col. Maximum had mentioned this D.Z. and I

decided I would recce it immediately. To appease Col. Maximum I added to

the message that aircraft should be filled with arms. He promised to send

a further signal confirming the field as soon as he heard from me.

My idea of the seven sticks was that after 1 day rest, they would

all move to their target areas, on the railways and roads previously mentioned.

H.Q. would then come in and allow me to go South towards Belfort to complete

my task. Col. Maximum also informed me that Capt. Goodfellow, Sjt. Hay,

Pct. Crossfield and F/O. Fiddick had arrived. Things appeared to be much

better, and Col. Maximum seemed soothed slightly by the time I had left.

Lieut. Dill was very relieved at the turn of events. I found him most

helpful and level headed throughout the entire operation. I had a perilous

journey back to Moyenmoutier for although it was still light, 20.30 hrs,

curfew was at 19.00 hrs. There were plenty of Germans on the roads and I

only had a gun as papers but we were not stopped.

August 23rd.

After Clement had lost us several times, we bumped into a German

patrol, and watched Germans searching the house at La Presle. We

eventually arrived at the camp and met the others of my stick. Except for

their individual stories, there was no news.

On leaving the Maquis camp 'A' at V 483864, Capt. Goodfellow's

party had tried to move South over the watershed which at that time was

patrolled by the enemy. At V 472840 on the 18th August they ran into a

German party, Pct. Hall was killed and the remainder, less Sjt. Lodge who

became separated on the way North to Allarmont, made their way by Pierre Percee

to the Scierie La Jus, where they were contacted by the French and led to the

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Maquis camp 'C' at V 412848.

Capt. Hislop's party which had been separated from us during the

brush with the enemy on August 17th, moved North towards the R.V. without

Sjt. Davis. Crossed the Celles valley and finding no-one there returned

to the Senones area, from where they were guided to Maquis camp 'C'.

There was a rumour of 2 Englishmen being seen on the way towards St. Die,

who might have been Sjt. Lodge and Davis, but it was never confirmed. We

kept a sentry at the R.V. in case anyone should turn up. There were and

always had been fantastic reports of dead, wounded and prisoners, also

horrible rumours of Sjt. Seymour having (a) shot himself (b) been shot, and

future information. Information received from Capt. Jean himself was however

always reasonably accurate.

The new camp commanded by Jean Serge, was very open and cold at

nights. The food was good. Capt. Barreaux was doing good work for S.O.E.

August 24th.

I recced the D.Z. at Veney and found it satisfactory. It was now

only a question of waiting for the answer to my signal.

August 25th.

We heard that Col. Maximum's radio had been taken by the Germans

in Neufmaisons, and the operators captured. However, my message had been

sent up to Nancy, to go via Planet. In the meantime communications between

ourselves and Nancy were broken, meaning we were neither able to change,

cancel or receive any messages. This being the case, I sent Capt. Goodfellow

to go through the lines to report on the position, the Maquis and our lack

of communications. He was not fit and would not have lasted out. Also

his position as liaison officer was redundant, for the time being at any

rate, since I spoke good enough French for any liaison necessary with Col.

Maximum. Felix was to go with him as well, as guide and help.

Capt. Goodfellow should have gone through without delay, but he

waited two days getting papers etc., instead of setting out immediately. I

had hoped he would get to England in time to put the people coming to us into

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the picture. The trouble was that Capt. Goodfellow was a Frenchman and

always taking their part. Yet from the French side he was only an

Englishman who spoke good French, and neither commanded the respect nor got

the cooperation of the French as Capt. Barreaux did. I had expected him

to cross the line in 48 hours.

August 26th & 27th.

We thought we heard aircraft overhead flying very low, and F/O.

Fiddick assured me they were Stirlings. We had no radio message via B.B.C.

so were not expecting anything until a message arrived, but I was sure the

aircraft was ours. Accordingly on the third night, August 28th, all men

available went to the D.Z. at Veney, but without success. It had been a

lovely night so felt we must have been mistaken about the other nights.

There had still been no news of Sjt. Lodge or Davis, so I gave

them up as missing. We were feeling very depressed and helpless, and with

strong temptation of going off and shooting up what we could find.

August 29th.

Were forced to move camp owing to the possibility of a German

attack. Men were coming in from all corners wishing to join, mostly

because the Germans were combing the villages. The volunteers were all

without arms and once again the danger of unarmed, untrained Frenchmen

became apparent to everyone. The Maquis leaders spent a considerable

amount of time killing Milice. Two Milicien prostitutes, aged 15 and 16,

were brought to the camp, where they were kept by the French under lax guard.

It was a foolish action to bring them near the camp for after they escaped

it became dangerous for anyone in civilian clothes, because the two girls

went round towns and villages with the Germans, denouncing anyone who had been

with the Maquis.

Food was short for the next few days, owing to the sudden increase

in numbers.

August 30th.

On the evening of 30th, a German patrol was observed near the

Veney - Bertrichamps road. They fired on our men but without success. In

front of this patrol was a Frenchman called "Fouch" who claimed he was

- 12 -

looking for mushrooms. He was taken to the camp for interrogation. In

the meantime at 19.00 hrs a message via runner came, saying that there was a

parachutage that night. Obviously with German patrols so close great

care had to be taken. I decided to move off as fast as possible to the

D.Z. with the English, and Capt. Barreaux and the French should follow as

soon as they could strike camp.

I arrived at about 22.30 hrs. Just about 03.00 hrs Capt.

Barreaux reported that he and his men had arrived, and a few minutes later

the aircraft were overhead. Some containers and two men went into the

trees. There had been a rumour of Germans moving into Pexonne, V 3587, in

force, so I was very anxious to get clear of the field as quickly as poss-

ible, especially as one container exploded and one pannier burnt up on

landing. I wanted to get Col. Franks and new arrivals away immediately,

but now we did not have a camp.

Whilst we were discussing a good new camp, and while the contain-

ers were being collected (and looted), the prisoner Fouch snatched a Sten

gun and tried to escape. His guards, who were Russian, and whose common

language with us was German, cried "Achtung". The French thought we were

being attacked, started firing in all directions, or fled. Eventually

Fouch was recaptured and I ordered him to be shot. Capt. Barreaux shot him

through the heart at point blank range. (His body had gone when Capt.

Barreaux went back next morning. Afterwards it was said that he had been

wearing a bullet proof waistcoat.)

This shooting had caused Col. Franks to withdraw into the woods.

I went in search of him but could not find him. I rounded up all the

Englishmen I could find, about 14 in all, and with these decided the area

was too hot for us to remain once it got light. Most of the containers had

been looted by the Maquis. One Frenchman died of over-eating, another of

a stroke after eating plastic explosive, and another was wounded by a bullet

during the melee.

September 1st.

At daybreak Capt. Whatley Smith, SSM. White, Sjt. Hay, most of

Lieut. Marx's stick, and I, set off to cross the Veney - Bertrichamps road.

-13-

(We heard enemy shellfire directed on to the old camp at pt. V 412848 during

the morning). Most of the packs were too heavy, and unnecessary material

had to be abandoned. By nightfall we were above Celles. We crossed the

valley that night and slept in the woods. It was becoming hard to sleep

at night without a sleeping bag.

September 2nd.

We went to the old H.Q. of the Maquis at La Trouche, where we got

food, shelter and news of the others. The men were very tired, so whilst

they slept I went and met Col. Franks at pt. V 312848. The party was

complete. I reported events up to the time of his arrival to Col. Franks.

-14-

OPERATION LOYTON - PHASE II

REPORT BY LT. COL. FRANKS, M.C.

September 1st.

My party, for composition see Appendix D, left Fairford aerodrome

shortly after midnight in two Stirling aircraft. The trip was uneventful

and the sticks from both planes dropped successfully on the D.Z. at V 320850

near Veney. A few of the party dropped on trees however, and all had

difficulty with their leg bags. The party collected quickly round the

lights on the D.Z. Containers were dropped at the same time, one of which

exploded and caught fire on the ground. I was met on the D.Z. by Capt. Druce

and also by a large number of Frenchmen making an almost unbelievable noise.

Capt. Druce, however, appeared to have the situation under control and the

removal of containers etc. from the D.Z. was, to start with, well organised.

However, after we had been there about an hour and a half there was consider-

able shouting and shooting and I was told that the Germans had attacked,

which news did not surprise me in view of the noise made by the French.

Lieut. Dill and I with a small party moved round on the flank of

the firing to see if we could assist or discover what was going on but

found nothing there at all, and the firing by then had ceased. After

searching around for some time we left to lie up for the day in the woods

to the South, during which time we heard distant firing and some shelling

over our heads which we afterwards discovered to have been directed at a

Maquis camp evacuated the day before.

Towards the evening Lieut. Dill went off to make a recce and

returned with the news that the Maquis leaders were in a farmhouse at

V 312848 not far away. They were anxious for me to go there. I reached

the farm after dark and met Capt. Marks and Capt. Barreaux (Jedburgh).

Capt. Gough (Jedburgh) had been with me all day. Food was found at the

farm at which were the Maquis and some of my party. It was not known to

what area the others had disappeared. It appeared that the firing on the

D.Z. had been caused by some Russian members of the Maquis who spoke only

German and were mistaken for enemy. Also, one Russian had eaten a stick of

plastic and died noisily, which added to the confusion.

- 15 -

September 2nd.

I met Col. Maximum, Reciproque the F.F.I. representative, and

Capt. Jean. Col. Maximum was not particularly pleased to see me as he

considered that his D.Z. was now compromised and he still had 400 unarmed men

in the immediate area for whom he had expected weapons on the night before.

I promised that I would do my best to obtain arms for him as soon as possible.

He agreed to give me a certain number of reliable Frenchmen as guides and

porters. I sent Capt. Miller and Lieut. Marx with a small party to

reconnoitre the Baccarat - Raon l'Etape road. I told them to try to buy

a car.

September 3rd.

Capt. Miller and his party returned early in the morning and

reported a fair amount of traffic on the road moving East. They had seen

20 trucks of all types and a fair amount of horse-drawn transport. No

traffic was seen by them at night. They had the promise of a car which was

collected later in the day from Bertrichamps.

Capt. Druce, whom I had not been able to see for more than a

few minutes since I dropped, arrived at the farm with the rest of his and

my party. Col. Maximum, Capt. Druce and I had a conference on future

operations.

Of the contents of the containers which dropped on the night of

my arrival, only the plastic and the ammunition had not been looted.

September 4th.

I sent Capt. Druce to Pierre Percee to recce the area for a new

base since it seemed to me certain that the farm we were in would be attacked

sooner or later since the French were so very indiscreet. I wanted to

remain until the arms Col. Maximum required had been dropped. I went with

Capt. Sykes to reconnoitre Baccarat and found a gunsite close to the town

on the edge of the wood. During that afternoon we heard considerable small

arms fire from about a kilometre away from the direction of Veney. We

heard later that the Maquis had destroyed an enemy lorry with 8 Germans.

Shortly afterwards the French were attacked by a large force and surrounded.

About 250 French were killed.

-16-

Capt. Druce returned in the evening and reported that the Pierre

Percee area was suitable for a base. He had contacted M. Michel, the Mayor,

who said that no Germans had been near his village for a month. On the way

back Capt. Druce had tried unsuccessfully to steal the car of one Fouch who

had been working for the Germans.

Immediately afterwards, towards last light, a fairly large body of

Germans, about 1 company, were seen approaching the farm; they were about

600 yards off. The whole party, which included many unarmed Maquis and the

farmer and his wife, left by the back of the farm for the woods. The farm

was burnt down later that night.

September 5th.

As soon as the moon was up I took my immediate party across country

to Pierre Percee after telling Capt. Druce to follow with the remainder.

We marched all night and arrived at the new base as V 398854 near Pierre Percee.

At about 11.00 hrs when we met Capt. Druce, Jojo - one of the Frenchmen -

was made an aspirant to deal with the 20 brought with us. The codeword Wren

was sent during the morning and we received our first re-supply that night

on a small D.Z. next to the base. There were said to be no Germans at all

in the immediate area. The re-supply was brought by two aircraft, one of

which carried arms for a 100 men. A number of panniers and containers fell

in the trees. The food, explosives, etc., were distributed in two different

cache areas. Two containers had candles, and all contents were smashed.

September 6th.

The day was spent in organising the base and in making arrangements

for the supply of food from one of the inhabitants of Pierre Percee village.

Capt. Druce heard of a pannier having fallen in the village of

Pierre Percee. He collected this and then I sent him off with Capt. Whatley

Smith to the D.Z. at V 356852 north-east of Neufmaisons for the arrival of

Major Reynolds and reinforcements.

September 7th.

The first plane arrived carrying Major Reynolds, and immediately

afterwards the ground fog obscured the light they were using on the D.Z. as

a rallying point. Eventually, the whole party was collected less Sjt.

Fitzpatrick, Conway and Elliott. A rumour which we heard later was that

-17-

three English soldiers, one of whom had both legs broken, had been discovered

by Germans hidden in a house in Pexonne, V 3587. The second plane carrying

Capt. Scott’s stick returned reporting no reception. This was probably due

to the ground mist.

I went with Capt. Druce to meet Lieut. Henri and Jean Serge, who

were in their old H.Q. at La Jus, V 397823 in a forester’s house. I discussed

the handing over of arms received the day before. As I did not wish them to

know the exact location of the base, an R.V. was arranged. On the way there

we recced the town of Celles. There were very few Germans there at the time,

but the population was frightened.

September 8th.

I sent Lieut. Marx’s stick to operate against soft transport on the

roads Celles - Allarmont and Badenvillers - Allarmont in the area of the

junction of these two at V 433867. Commandant Derringer was sent off to

contact Capt. Jean, the Maquis intelligence officer, and Lieut. Black to

observe the Celles - Raon l’Etape road. During the past few days there had

been several desertions from the 25 Maquis who were with us, so I decided

that I must find an alternative base as soon as possible. The arms which

had been dropped for a 100 men were handed over to the Maquis at the cross-

roads V 375863. On the way Capt. Miller found a pannier in a tree.

Capt. Druce returned from a recce and reported a number of men digging

in near Neufmaisons. He had heard that a party of Germans about 150 strong

had searched the woods near Neufmaisons and had found some of the parachutes of

Major Reynold’s party. The Germans were supposed to have come from Baccarat.

There was no re-supply on this night because of weather conditions.

September 9th.

Major Reynolds and Capt. Whatley Smith left to recce a new base

area. The Germans arrived in transport at about 11.00 hrs and fired on

RQMS. Taylor who was just leaving the secondary supply dump. The main base

stood to in order to prevent enemy approach. The exact strength of the enemy

was not known but there were probably four lorry loads total about 120 men.

Many of these were seen eating our rations some 600 yards away, unfortunately

in an unassailable position, and we heard more to our rear. Owing to this

-18-

I decided to leave and all our stores had to be abandoned. I sent Capt.

Druce to recce a way out since it seemed possible that we had been surrounded.

This, however, was not the case, and we left the area without further contact

with the enemy. We lay up at pt. V 392834.

Capt. Druce went into Celles in civilian clothes and found a

platoon of Germans busy foraging. He also met Jean Serge who told him that

his Maquis had temporarily dissolved and the arms had been hidden.

September 10th.

At 03.00 hrs we crossed the Celles valley at V 395817 and set up

a new base at V 359814. I sent Capt. Miller to recce the immediate area

for D.Zs., while, accompanied by Capt. Druce, I went to make arrangements

for food and to make a general recce near Celles, also to look for Pct.

Bennett who had been left at the R.V. to look for Sjt. Fitzpatrick's party.

Capt. Miller returned to say that the D.Zs in this area were not

satisfactory. The new base was easy to defend and was commanded by an

excellent Bren gun position, which at this time was unfortunately manned by

the French to whom I had given definite orders that should the enemy approach

they were to wait and not to open fire at more than 30 yards range (at that

time I did not realise how hopeless the French were).

A broadcast was sent to Major Reynolds, Capt. Whatley Smith and

Lieut. Marx to R.V. at pt. V 405816.

September 11th.

Between 09.30 and 10.30 hrs an enemy patrol of about 30 advanced

up the gully towards the new base and I waited for the Bren gunners to open

up. This they did not do and I found later that they had deserted their post:

the enemy, although only 5-10 yards from my position were hidden by trees

and we were unable to open fire. It is not clear as to whether the enemy

know for certain that we were there or not, but they fired into the bushes

unpleasantly close. I sent Lieut. Black and his stick to cut them off and

ambush them down the path but unfortunately Lieut. Black was not sufficiently

quick in obeying my order to catch them in time. Meanwhile the French had

moved off up the hill.

It was now obvious that the base was compromised, and I therefore

moved my whole party - less Lieut. Black's stick which did not rejoin me,

-19-

although I waited for them - to the pre-arranged R.V. at Lac de la Maix,

V 512865. Capt. Miller thought that he heard Bren gun fire half an hour

after leaving.

We spent the night close to Lac de la Maix. On arriving here,

Capt. Druce went off to a forester at pt. V 406825 to collect food. There

he found RQMS. Taylor, L/Cpl. Webb and Cpl. Redhead, who had been separated

from us at Pierre Percee, and Jojo. He returned with them to Lac de la Maix

and subsequently made a second expedition to Vexaincourt to find more food.

There were a number of German patrols about near our R.V. and it was

clearly no place for a base, so I decided to move to the area V 4981 near

Moussey. I then sent S.M. White to keep an R V. with those who were still

missing, which included Major Reynolds, Capt. Whatley Smith and Lieut. Black

and his stick. I also sent a message asking for re-supply at a known D.Z.

(Anatomy) in our new area.

September 12th.

We established a new base at V 497816 at the head of a gully, north-

east of Moussey. We spent the night on the D.Z. hoping for re-supply, which

did not arrive. Only one plane for Special Forces put in an appearance, but

I believe there were no fewer than 3 drops arranged for that night on DZ anatomy.

September 13th.

We spent the day in a barn hoping for re-supply at V 475817 that

night. Again it did not arrive: visibility was too bad for R.A.F.

S.M. White returned having failed to find anyone at the R.V.

September 14th.

We made contact with a new Maquis commanded by Col. Marlier, for

whom I said I would endeavour to obtain arms. In return he promised to lend

me some men to help on D.Zs. I recced another area for D.Zs and found two

suitable; one at Le Rain de la Vierge, V 484823, for normal re-supply, and the

other at V 478816 for personnel and jeeps. Re-supply was received on the

night 14/15 September. We were assisted by French sent by Col. Marlier; in

particular Etienne and thirty of his men who were first class. Etienne

himself was a really good leader; he later died of heart failure.

-20-

September 15th.

Lieut. Marx returned. He had started off with nine O.Rs and two

Maquis, and had with him two Bren guns and eighteen tyre bursters. On the

8th September they had laid three nests of six tyre bursters each on the

roads Celles - Brouville and Badonvillers - Celles. They subsequently

heard from the French that at least two German vehicles had been blown up.

The following day they encountered a German patrol near La Chapellotte,

V 425875; the Germans withdrew. Later in the day they shot up a 5 - tonner

with Bren fire in the same area. On the return march they were fired on

by Germans and Sjt. Terry-Hall, Cpl. Iveson and Pct. Crozier became separated.

As Lieut. Marx had received my message not to return to camp but to

wait for instructions, he continued on his own, and on the 10th September

found Pct. Bennett whom I had left behind for this purpose, at V 403831.

I had heard from Etienne that Major Power had reached the neigh-

bourhood and a French runner found Cpl. Robinson from his party; I sent him

back to fetch the remainder.

There was a re-supply of 18 containers on the night 15/16th.

No tyre bursters or grenades were included, which I had particularly requested.

September 16th.

At this time there were no Germans in the village of Moussey and

only a few in transit in the immediate area. Therefore, it appeared at

last as if it might be possible to establish a base without too much enemy

interference.

A broadcast was sent to Lieut. Black to R.V. at V 494837.

September 17th.

I again met Col. Maximum who was in hiding. He admitted that his

Maquis were now dispersed and useless. He gave some useful information

about German dispositions etc., and I promised to signal S.F.H.Q. for a

wireless set and operator for him.

Major Power and his party consisting of himself, Cpl. Robinson,

Pcts. Marchand and Weaver arrived; they had been guided back by Cpl. Robinson

and Pct. Robb. Major Power had left Lieut. McGregor on the far side of the

Meurthe. (for the full account of Major Power's activities since landing,

-21-

and for Lieut. McGregor's story see Appendix A).

We heard from "Agent 162200" that there were four trains loaded

with tanks and ammunition at St. Die station, and that the line was blocked.

We passed this information by signal but the trains were still there unharm-

ed two days later.

That evening I met Col. Marlier and discussed the arming of his

Maquis.

Re-supply failed to arrive.

September 18th.

Capt. Druce informed me that he had been in touch with a certain

"Rossi Millelire", who told us that he had recently left Berlin where he had

been working in a factory constructing a new weapon said to cut all W/T

communications. I sent a signal and offered to have him guided through the

lines, but eventually received instructions that he was to await the arrival

of the Americans.

Col. Marlier was very much worried about two French Arab agents

of the Milice in the area. Capt. Druce managed to round these up after

considerable difficulty and they were both shot.

Capt. Miller was sent off with a party to attack the railway line

Celles - Allarmont. He returned on the 20th.

The drop of reinforcements on the night of 18/19th was cancelled

owing to bad weather.

September 19th.

Lieut. Marx with L/Cpl. Garth, L/Cpl. Pritchard, Pcts. Ferrandi and

Salthouse, left for operations in the St. Blaize area, V 5778.

On the night of the 19/20th, three jeeps, six men and nine contain-

ers were successfully dropped on the D.Z. at V 475817. We heard later that

the remaining aircraft had been recalled owing to bad weather.

September 20th.

I went out with two jeeps with Major Power and Lieut. Dill for a

recce of the Senones area. We laid several ambushes which were unsuccessful

owing to the lack of targets.

Capt. Miller returned with his party. They had laid a charge on

-22-

the light railway line at V 455870 between Celles and Allarmont with time

pencils as well as fog signals. As he had subsequently retired some distance

he could not observe results but a train was heard half an hour before the

explosion. Considerable small arms fire started immediately afterwards.

That night we went to the D.Z. but nothing arrived.

September 21st.

I sent Capt. Miller with a bazooka to attack transport on the road

Moyenmoutier - Senones. He succeeded in firing at a staff car with the

bazooka at 100 yards range. The bomb failed to explode (it was training

pattern), but it passed through the car which stopped and its lights went

out. This successfully stopped a large convoy for over two hours.

I went out with Major Power (see also Major Power's report) and

Lieut. Dill on a second recce, and found some tanks in the woods on both

sides of the road at V 4373, four kilometres South of Senones. They were

very well camouflaged, and after reconnaissance I decided to attack at last

light. The approach was very difficult and it was after dark when I was

able to drive both jeeps up as close as possible and put on the headlights

with the intention of firing at any movement seen. This manoeuvre was

carried out twice without results.

Three jeeps and fourteen men, including Capt. McGibbon Lewis,

dropped successfully on the same D.Z. at V 475817. One jeep dropped in

the trees and was very difficult to extricate.

Sjt. Thorpe and 4 men left on the night 21/22nd for Provencheres

area.

September 22nd.

A signal had been recieved that the Americans were expected to

reach our area by the 19th September; I therefore decided to deploy my force

as follows:

Capt. Miller and a small party on the road Senones - Moyenmoutier,

with Lieut. Silly and Lieut. Swayne and 6 men; and six jeeps under me to work

in pairs. The jeep crews were as follows:

1. Lieut. Col. Franks - driver

Cpl. Kubiski - front gunner

Capt. Sykes - rear gunner and navigator

Pct. Mason - fitter

-23-

2. Lieut. Dill - driver

SSM. White - front gunner

Cpl. Austin - rear gunner

3. Major Power - driver

Pct. Bennett - front gunner

Cpl. Robinson - rear gunner

Pct. Weaver - wireless operator

4. Capt. McGibbon Lewis - driver

Pct. Brown - front gunner

Sjt. Neville - rear gunner

5. Capt. Druce - driver

Sjt. Hay - front gunner

Pct. Kasparovitch - rear gunner

6. Lieut. Manners - driver

Pct. McGovern - front gunner

Pct. Church - rear gunner

Pct. Hopkins - fitter

All six jeeps set out together at 17.00 hrs and crossed the

valley via Moussey and made for the Celles woods. We harboured for the

night at V 447841.

September 23rd.

Capt. Druce and Lieut. Manners left at dawn with their two jeeps

to ambush the Senones - Moyenmoutier road at pt. V 450794. Their presence

was given away by the French, and the only transport engaged was an ancient

electric brougham, driven by M. Pi the local maire: he was luckily unhurt

although his car was shattered. He later sent me 2 bottles of champagne, with

a note which read as follows - "Merci pour le salve tire en mon honneur ce

matin".

Jeeps 1, 2, 3 and 4, under me, set off at 08.30 hrs to recce the

Celles valley with the idea of operating on and crossing the main Celles -

Raon l'Etape road. On the way I stopped at a friendly farm at V 435856 to

obtain information, sending Major Power and Capt. McGibbon Lewis with their

jeeps to ambush the main road at V 434858, where I was to join them later.

Whilst in the farm I heard the Vickers K firing and went outside

to see Major Power and his two jeeps come past shortly afterwards. I covered

his withdrawal and followed him to a temporary base. He had found a large

convoy and had accounted for three staff cars and one troop carrying 3 tonner.

-24-

This early ambush meant that I could not cross the road, as planned

to operate in the Foret de Recles. Therefore I decided to go with Lieut.

Dill in his jeep across country to Allarmont and ambush the road at V 465875

from there. After a very difficult journey I arrived there with Lieut.

Dill, only to find the track down which we had come was too steep to return

by; the village of Allarmont was strongly occupied by the enemy and my track

led out on to the main road only about 3 kms from where Major Power had

effected his ambush.

After reconnaissance I decided to drive down the main road,

hoping to find a suitable position from which to ambush transport.

According to the map there was a good escape route down the track at V 4586.

We got on to the main road and I reconnoitred this track for a

distance of about 600 yards; I found it satisfactory so returned to the main

road to join Lieut. Dill. We were probably seen by a bicycle patrol.

However, we found a grassy bank on which we waited with both jeeps. Shortly

after getting into position, a German on a bicycle came slowly towards us

and we heard men debussing from transport round both corners. We had been

unable to test our guns so I decided to fire at the cyclist, who presumably

was killed. We were then fired on from a house on the opposite side of

the road which was apparently occupied by Germans. Both jeeps gave the

house several bursts and then started to make towards the track; in doing so

the rear wheels of my jeep slipped and the jeep overturned. I was obliged

to abandon it and went up the track on the bonnet of Lieut. Dill's jeep.

After travelling some 800 yards the track was found to be blocked by some

tree trunks. As infantry were now deployed on both sides of the track and

coming towards us, we were obliged to abandon the second jeep and eventually

made good our escape.

We spent the night at Pere Georges' barn.

September 24th.

The Germans arrived early in the morning in the Moussey area and

we had to leave and return to base at V 496816.

It had now been raining continuously for four days and was bitterly

cold. I found morale at the base low, and therefore decided to disperse

-25-

temporarily and billet as many men as I could at houses in the area, with

H.Q. at Pere Georges' barn.

The local inhabitants were very nervous and frightened of the

Germans but eventually everybody managed to get somewhere dry to sleep.

September 25th.

Major Power returned with three jeeps. Capt. Druce had already

arrived at base with one jeep which was defective. He had had some good

shoots at Germans in La Petite Raon, Le Puid, Le Vermont and Moussey. Over

400 rounds expended at different groups of Germans at close range; minimum

killed 15/20.

After I had left them on the 23rd, Major Power had remained until

Capt. Druce rejoined him towards the evening. They harboured the night in

the same area. On the 24th, less Capt. Druce's jeep which was in too poor

a mechanical condition and was sent back, the party moved to a forester's

house at Coichot, V 418806, intending to move westwards. However, the tracks

were too poor and there was no way of taking jeeps across the Celles valley

except through the town of Celles. The following day they ambushed and

fired on a staff car on the Senones - Moyenmoutier road at V 406762.

Definite results were not observed. This attack provoked a great deal of

random enemy firing in the area.

Major Power reached base just before dusk on the 25th. he brought

with him the order of battle of the 21st Panzer Division which had been

handed to him by Commandant Marcel.

September 26th.

Day spent in refitting.

Capt. Miller, Lieut. Swayne and Lieut. Silly returned from their

expedition to the Senones - Moyenmoutier road. Lieut. Silly had used some

home made mines of plastic and fog signals. He was successful with these

and got two staff cars and one 3-ton truck for certain, some further possibles,

and killed a number of Germans with the Bren gun.

Lieut. Swayne had had a brush with a German patrol. He brought

back some useful information.

-26-

September 27th.

Major Power and I recced a new jeep base at V 456816 and moved

the jeeps to this area.

September 28th.

I set off with Capt. Sykes for Pierre Percee about mid-day in

order to try and contact Major Reynolds who we had heard was in a farm in

that area, but were unable to get so far as we were ambushed. There were

no casualties on our side but at least one German was killed. We turned

aside to the house where Capt. McGibbon Lewis was at V 456816. I saw two

German prisoners at the house; they stated the Americans were at Badonvillers,

but this was in fact untrue.

The rest of the day was spent in arranging food and billeting.

I decided to send Capt. Druce through to contact the Americans,

explain our position to them, and to give them any information they might

require as well as the captured documents which Major Power had brought in.

A re-supply dropped that night, was successful but it gave us great

trouble as it was dropped from a height of at least 3,000 feet and was

scattered in the woods.

September 29th.

Sjt. Thorpe and his party returned about mid-day (for his report

see Appendix A). He had got 4 trucks with tyre bursters and also laid

a charge of the railway Saales - St. Die. It is more probable that this

charge was set off by the time pencil than a train as one train had already

passed over it without causing detonation.

He brought much useful information of the conditions in the St. Die

area.

Capt. Druce and F/O. Fiddick left for the American lines with

information and the captured papers (see Intelligence Summary No 20, appendix

C).

I sent off two foot parties, one under Lieut. Silly to the Belval -

Col du Hanz road to ambush transport (I would not have sent him there if I

had known Lieut. Marx was already operating in the area), and the second

under Lieut. Swayne to the Celles valley to obtain information and ambush

-27-

transport.

I also decided to send Major Power with the three remaining jeeps

to the St. Die area.

September 30th.

I met Col. Maximum who brought Capt. Gough with him. Capt. Gough

was to leave for the American lines that afternoon, and Col. Maximum stated

that his Maquis had no intention of operating until after the arrival of

the Americans in the area, when he hoped for a large arms drop.

October 1st.

Major Power, SSM. White and I, recced the Belval area which now

had a German artillery unit billeted in it and a number of Germans were

stationed in all the small villages around.

We planned an attack on the area V 5080, north-east of Belval.

We received a signal that Capt. Druce had arrived in the American

lines.

October 2nd.

Lieut. Silly returned having destroyed two half-tracks and a staff

car near Belval. He reported that traffic was taking a minor road towards

Col du Hanz, so I sent Sjt. Neville and two others to recce this road and

operate if possible.

Lieut. Castellain, and his party from Pistol operation, joined my

base after blowing up the railway line near Sarreguemines.

October 3rd.

Lieut. Marx returned with his party from the Saales area. He had

de-railed a train north-east of Saales at V 591821, and successfully attacked

transport near Belval on his way back.

The Germans attacked the house occupied by Capt. McGibbon Lewis

and also the jeep base. Three jeeps were extricated and hidden. The

remaining jeep, which was defective, was booby-trapped with grenades.

In a 20 man engagement in which Capt. McGibbon Lewis' party used

Brens, a number of Germans were killed.

It was rumoured that an S.A.S. captain and 4 others had been

captured near La Petite Raon. I sent Capt. McGibbon Lewis and Marchand off

-28-

to find out. They found that 5 British had been captured on September 30th

and were kept there with their hands tied.

October 4th.

We left Pere Georges' at 05.00 hrs and returned to the old base

V 497816 in the mountains.

Lieut. Swayne and his party returned, and the information he had

obtained was passed back by signal.

Two strong German patrols came up both sides of the base but did

not attack.

October 5th.

I dispersed the base at first light with orders to return at

18.00 hrs.

Three ambush parties were sent off.

Lieut. Marx encountered a party of Germans looking for containers.

He killed five of them.

The other two parties were unsuccessful.

October 6th.

The jeeps and hidden stores were found by the Germans who were

very active.

I decided to move to Coichot, V 420807 in the woods South of Celles,

and gave an R.V. at 18.00 hrs on the 7th October. I left Lieut. Dill behind

to contact Capt. Druce who was expected back again on foot, and to kill a

German before he left in order to make it appear that we were still operating

in the Moussey area.

Col. Marlier arrived at base at dusk, anxious to contact a guide.

I sent him off with Capt. Sykes who last saw him heading for the house of an

agent in Moussey.

October 7th.

We moved to Coichot and R.Vd with all parties at 18.00 hrs, except

Phantom who were missing. I decided to stay in that area for the night.

Capt. McGibbon Lewis was sent out to Recce: he reported the area

to be full of enemy, food short and the French too frightened to help.

October 8th.

The Phantoms reappeared. We met Lieut. Swayne and his party on

-29-

their way back from the north-west, where they had destroyed two staff cars

at V 342838, South of Neufmaisons.

I went with my party to the Celles valley to try to get through

and contact Major Reynolds. I had received a message from Major Reynolds

and sent one to him.

I bought a sheep and some potatoes which we were to fetch next

day.

We returned to find both the forester's house and the mill

at Coichot in flames. The Germans had been there.

October 9th.

The position now was that rations were very short indeed - approx-

imately one box of 24 hr rations per man. We had no explosives and the

likelihood of having a re-supply drop appeared negligible. The Allied line

appeared static and the weather which had been bad enough before was now

worsening.

I decided to end the operation and instruct parties to make their

way to the American lines as best they could. I gave an R.V. at V 404823,

near the Celles valley, where I would be for the next 48 hours.

October 10th.

I moved to the R.V. and spent the night 10/11th in a deserted house

there. I had with me Major Power, Capt. Sykes, SSM. White, Capt. Hislop and

Cpl. Owens.

October 11th.

Having received a message from Brigadier McLeod saying that he

agreed with my arrangements, my party left for the American lines.

A P P E N D I X A (1)

REPORT BY MAJOR P. LE POER POWER.

The party consisting of: Major P.le Poer Power

Lieut.J.A. McGregor.

Cpl. Arnold.

Cpl. Robinson.

Cpl. Mikolayczak

Pct. Sutton

Pct. McQueen

Pct. Green

Pct. Marchand

Pct. Weaver

left Fairford on the night 27th August, intending to drop on D.Z. approx-

imately Z 8986. The D.Z. had been signalled by the Maquis Leader Planet.

A certain amount of confusion had arisen owing to the fact that Planet had

signalled us two different D.Zs. on the same day, one at V 305845 and the

other at approximately Z 8986. We had decided on the last, as this was the

D.Z. mentioned in the later signal, although it was considerably further

from the area where Capt. Druce was thought to be.

The party dropped on the night 27/28th August from 7/800 feet at

00.30 hrs. The D.Z. on which we landed was, however, at V 075810, 8 miles

east-south-east of where the pilot thought he was dropping us. As the D.Z.

was lit it was an understandable mistake, but in spite of this only Lieut.

McGregor and I were dropped on the edge of the D.Z. The remainder were

strung out over the surrounding woods. Two panniers containing food and

W.T. equipment were pushed out before the stick. We were met on the ground

by unarmed Maquis, who seemed surprised to see us. The whole party was

collected in about three quarters of an hour, with the aid of much shouting

and torch flashing on the part of the Maquis. We returned to the centre

of the D.Z. where the light party was still in operation. No containers

had been dropped.

Shortly after we arrived, an aeroplane made a run in and to our

surprise instead of our containers, dropped a 20 stone bearded major named

Brown with his Jedburgh team. We were all taken to a farmhouse, and all

leg bags, panniers, etc., were assembled there. We checked them all. Our

leg bags and our 2 panniers were there, but definitely none of the contain-

ers were ours. On discussing the situation with Major Brown, I discovered

that we had been dropped on his D.Z. in mistake for our own.

The Maquis reception committee were a group who had only been

formed that day. They had no knowledge of either the S.A.S. or Planet.

August 28th.

They arranged to take us to some nearby woods, V 110813, by truck,

with all our kit. We left the farm at 02.30 hrs and reached the wood at

dawn.

We separated from Major Brown and arranged a meeting at 11.00 hrs

with him. During the morning the woods filled with newly formed and undis-

ciplined Maquis, who were virtually unarmed. We decided that it would be

better to leave them as soon as possible.

At 10.30 hrs I went to see Major Brown to tell him of my descision,

but found that he had gone away with his party, in civilian clothes, no one

knew where. I never heard of him again. About mid-day some Maquis officers

arrived and offered to escort us to a well organised Maquis, half an hours

march away in the same woods, and said that they had contact there with a

British Major. We accordingly went with them. We found their Maquis to be

an exceptionally well disciplined party of about 230 men, but very poorly

armed.

That evening their Commanding Officer, Capt. Marseil came to visit

us. He told us he had a Jedburgh team commanded by Major Denny at his

command post in the Foret de Charmes, Z 980780. He said he would bring

them first thing in the morning.

August 29th.

Capt. Marseil arrived with Major Denny.

To employ my time when waiting, I asked the Maquis to get me all

possible information of bombing targets, disposition of troops etc. I

selected as the two best bombing targets an S.S. H.Q. at Vincey, Z 955717

and a dump of 3 million litres of petrol at Nomexy, Z 995685. Subsequent

information proved that these targets had been bombed successfully. Four

hundred S.S. were killed while parading to move out. The petrol was all

destroyed, and the glows of the fire could be seen on two successive nights.

Major Denny explained that he had been dropped four days before,

but had broken his "Jed" set. He had been on the D.Z. on Planet's instruc-

tions, the night we should have dropped there. He knew nothing of S.A.S.

or what arrangements had been made for us.

Capt. Marseil arranged to send a man on a bike to Planet for

information. Major Denny asked us if he could use our wireless set to arrange

a parachutage for the Maquis. He came again in the afternoon with an

American operator and sent a message.

August 30th.

The American operator came again and sent another message. There

was still no news from Planet.

In the afternoon news came that 300 Germans were proceeding tow-

ards the Foret de Charmes from north-west and south-west, presumably to

attack Maquis. We stood by to move.

August 31st.

The Germans had apparently not attacked the Maquis in the Foret

de Charmes: our group however decided to move that night. We moved out

after dark to area V 005855. Very wet day, no food. The woods were small

and vulnerable and on my advice the Maquis moved to a larger wood that

night, area V 025825.

September 1st.

The Maquis had a message that there was to be a parachutage that

night at V 003787 in the woods south-west of St. Remy. Accordingly we

moved to that area after dark. I met Major Denny on the D.Z. and asked for

message from Planet. Major Denny said he had seen Planet whose only remark

was that we had dropped on the wrong D.Z. through our own fault and he could

do nothing for us. Although he had been in touch with Capt. Druce he gave

no indication as to his whereabouts. I told Major Denny that Planet would

have to be hotted up. He said he agreed that he (Planet) had behaved in a

most high handed manner in his dealings with the "Jed" team as well as with

us.

It was now no longer possible to contact Planet as he lived in

Nancy which was by then under martial law. I asked Major Denny if he could

arrange a truck for me to take my party towards the Vosges as roads at the

moment seemed fairly clear of Germans. Major Denny said he could arrange

this the following day through Capt. Moran, another Maquis leader.

The parachutage was successful. Arms for 200 men were received.

I sent a bombing target, a large ammunitiondump at V 085815, but we never

received news if this was bombed.

September 2nd.

I was unable to contact Capt. Moran. The Maquis took over the

village of St. Remy, V 005805, in which we took up residence. Good food

and good quarters. The newly armed Maquis seized the town of Charmes,

Z 930757, in the afternoon.

September 3rd.

I arranged to go by truck to see Capt. Moran at his H.Q. at Z 911846.

I took Marchand with me and arrived at the H.Q. in large chateau. Shortly

after I arrived, mortar bombs fell in the chateau grounds, and tracer flew

through the trees. I found that a battle had been going on for several hours.

Shortly after, Capt. Moran's body was carried in. His 2 i/c tried to arrange

a truck for me, but news came in that our road home had been cut. We set

out on foot with Marchand and a Maquis crowd and walked into Germans in the

open, advancing in open order; we turned round and walked away. The Germans

did not fire.

We took a circuitous route, but ran into German half-tracks at a

bridge Z 933832. We waited until they passed and returned to St. Remy.

On arrival we heard that 2 tanks had approached the village during our absence,

but had turned away on being fired on by Maquis small arms.

September 4th.

The Maquis procured 10 bicycles for us from Charmes, and we set off

by road for Thiaville. We met a Maquis truck on the way, and they agreed to

bring our kits on in the evening, with Cpl. Arnold, as his bicycle was broken

down. An R.V. was arranged just inside the Foret de Ste. Barbe, V 290775.

The Maquis truck over-took us just outside Ste. Barbe. We met with Cpl.

Arnold as arranged and selected houses V 291786 as lying-up area.

We arrived there shortly after dark and were told that there were

20 or 30 Germans in Thiaville, V 311798. Lay up for the night in the woods

behind the houses, having contacted a Guard forestier.

September 5th.

I got the Guard forestier to find us food and information. In the

evening we contacted an ex-Maquis boy named Jean. Asked him to get us food

and a guide across the R. Meurthe, as all the main bridges were guarded.

September 6th.

Jean arrived with a girl Maquis named Simone, bringing food and said

it was impossible to cross the R. Meurthe, as there was an M.G. post which

covered all approaches, on the East bank of the river. He offered to guide

us to a better part of the forest.

September 7th.

I took a party to ambush the road Ste. Barbe - Thiaville, but saw

nothing.

September 8th.

Took party to ambush the road St. Benoit V 258739 - Raon l'Etape

V 338788. Saw nothing. I asked Jean to recce foot bridges in the area

St. Blaise, V 350760.

September 9th.

Simone brought reports that Germans were about to surround us in

the woods. I thought this improbable, but lay up in thick undergrowth for

the day. Jean received instructions from a Maquis Lieutenant to report to

area Pierre Percee, V 408858, but had instructions not to bring us. He

had found suitable bridges in the St. Blaise area to be unguarded.

September 10th.

We prepared to cross the R. Meurthe, and then received a wireless

message from Brigade telling us to blow up railway Luneville V 090998 -

St. Die V 415655 at all costs. We had no explosive, so I sent back Cpl.

Arnold, Marczak and Sutton to get some from the Charmes Maquis. I left

Lieut. McGregor and Green (sgmn) with receiving set to wait for them, and to

do the demolitions. I told Lieut. McGregor to blow up a train and follow us

or not across the R. Meurthe at his discretion. I crossed the Meurthe after

dark with Cpl. Robinson, Weaver and Marchand. (For rest of Lieut. McGregor's

operation see Appendix A 2).

September 11th.

In the morning we contacted a Guard forestier at pt. V 376774, and

heard conflicting accounts of British in the area.

September 12th.

Three escaped Russian P.W. joined us.

September 13th.

An officer from Col. Marlier's Maquis came to see us. He said

that British were with a Maquis at Senones, V 438775, and were at the point

of moving to Moussey area, V 470810. He offered to arrange contact when

the location of new base was known.

I moved to sawmill at V 405825, where the Guard forestier was in

touch with Maquis. Sent message asking for parachutage of arms on D.Z.

"anatomy" for Col. Marlier. I received a message from London giving the

Colonel's location as Pierre Percee, but I had been told by locals that all

British had been attacked and chased from there 5 days before. The forester

arranged a meeting for the next day with Col. Marlier's representative.

September 14th.

Col. Marlier's representative arrived late in the afternoon, but

know nothing of the whereabouts of S.A.S. I decided that I would go to

Pierre Percee to look for them. We crossed over the Celles valley that

night and contacted forester at V 405823, who said that all British had left

Pierre Percee definitely, but that he would try to get us information on

the following day. He said Capt. Druce had been at his house the day before,

and that another party of 25 had been lying up in the wood close by.

All these acounts of British were very confusing to me. as Brigade

had not kept me informed of what parties had dropped. The news that the

Colonel had dropped was only picked up by chance through hearing Major

Scratchley talking to the Colonel in clear speech on a broadcast.

September 15th.

The forester returned late in the evening with no news, but several

useful contacts had come during the day with information and food.

September 16th.

A local chemist brought a man who said he could deliver a note

to some British, but would take 2 days to get a reply. Two parties of 5

and 8 were reported to be in the vicinity; I gave a note to this runner and

returned to Robinson and Weaver at 14.00 hrs to hear the wireless news.

Here I found that a messenger had come from the Colonel, and had taken

Robinson to meet him, leaving at 08.00 hrs that morning.

September 17th.

Cpl. Robinson did not return until late in the evening. He said

that he had contacted the Colonel and we could all go over to join him the

following day. He brought Pct. Robb as an extra guide. I heard that

several parties were missing, including Major Reynolds.

September 18th.

I sent Marchand and Robb back to Celles valley to see if there

was any answer to my note, as I thought that the British reported in that

valley might be those missing from the Colonel's party.

Pct. Weaver, Cpl. Robinson and I set out for the Colonel's H.Q.,

which was reached at 14.00 hrs.

A P P E N D I X A (2)

EXFILTRATION OF LIEUT. J.A. MCGREGOR.DSO, AND PARTY.

September 12th.

We decided to move to area St. Die to blow railway, and marched

via St. Benoit, V 255738, road junction V 290705, to V 374673. At V 296676

we picked up a Hindu ex P.W. from Epinal; he stayed with is and did sentry

duty, but he was a terrific nuisance, lousy, and came back through the lines

with us; name unknown - called Rastus by us.

September 15th.

At V 374673 we contacted 2 Maquis men who had been with the Colonel.

They guided us through Germans in village to railway bridge V 374694.

We laid a charge successfully with pull switch, at 21.30 hrs, and

waited all night; however, there were no trains on Planet's railway on that

or any of the succeeding three nights.

September 19th.

We laid a charge with fog signals, and on the following day a

train appeared and removed the fog signals with a supposed cow-catcher.

September 26th.

We moved to V 296677 where we stayed at a farm and found the

Madame to be very courageous. Germans were often passing and several times

she fed us upstairs while there were six or seven Germans downstairs. She

also brought us up German cigarettes and fresh information of the American

front line location.

September 30th.

Still no news of the Colonel's location, so we decided to ambush

and block roads Rambervillers, V 183728 - La Salle, V 325696, Housseras,

V 240684 - La Bourgonce, V 325684, and Autrey, V 222669 - La Bourgonce, V 325684

Thinking the Americans would be pushing up these roads very soon we cut down

very large pines over the last two roads. Lumbering was very difficult as

the trees were about six feet from the road and traffic was passing at the

rate of about thirty vehicles per hour. We had a woodman (French) for

professional advice.

We ambushed this road and also the road Rambervillers - La Salle,

killing a fairly high ranking officer and his entourage, (carbines scored

a ½" group in the officer's head).

On approximately 28th September, Pct. MacQueen had malaria very

badly, and on one patrol he passed out; we had no quinine.

October 2nd.

Mikolayczak, myself and a French guide decided to try to contact

the Americans and get them to give us some special roads to block or ambush

in conjunction with their attack, and then to return to my troop.

From Madame's German information we gathered the Americans were in

Autrey, V 222669, so we decided to contact them there.

We reached area V 240660, stepped on a camouflaged M.G. post and

my Mountain Div. type hat (and new badge) was shot off. Mikolayczak had a

burst through his sleeve but no blood was spilt. After the recce we decided

that the Americans were not in Autrey, so returned to base.

October 4th.

The Germans moved in downstairs, and Guard mounting and other

shouting was disturbing.

Madame was getting worried and food not appearing.

We moved out to woods, leaving MacQueen, as I thought he was too

sick to walk.

We waited hopefully in woods for 48 hours, watching Germans eating

our anticipated food and digging M.G. emplacements less than 20 yards away.

October 6th.

Tightened our belts and took Benzedrine.

October 7th.

We moved to farm at V 264716, and I decided that as there were

Germans in every house and we were considerably weakened by lack of food,

we would cross the lines on the following day.

October 8th.

Crossed lines with 15 noisy Frenchmen, via Jeanmenil, V 221712 to

Rambervillers.

A P P E N D I X A (3)

REPORT BY LIEUT. MARX ON PERIOD 7 SEP TO 14 SEP ABSENT FROM BASE.

September 7th.

The Colonel sent me, 9 O.Rs and 2 Maquis on a task. We had with

us 2 Bren guns and 18 tyre bursters. Pct. Griffin was left behind as he

was medically unfit.

We set out at 11.00 hrs and arrived at pt. V 441872, West of

Allarmont, V 464873 at 18.45 hrs. I sent the Maquis for food, which they

obtained.

September 8th.

Sjt. Terry-Hall and I made a recce of the roads Celles-sur-Plaine,

V 417843 - Brouville, V 270890; Badonvillers, V 377890 - Celles, V 417843.

There was very little traffic and we found an ambush at the crossroads was

impossible. We moved into a blockhouse near the leaguer, as it was raining

hard.

I sent out Cowing and Garth with the tyre bursters at 20.30 hrs.

Six were to be laid at V 452860, six at V 430861 and six to be laid on the

other road in the same square. They returned at 00.20 hrs on the 9th Sept.

September 9th.

One of my Maquis had gone home as he felt unwell, taking with him

my belt with compass and colt, and leaving his Bren.

At 10.00 hrs Pct. Ferrandi and the other Maquis set out to get

more food. They returned without any, but were told by a farmer's wife

that two German vehicles were supposed to have blown up on the main road.

Damage could not have been very great as they were towed away.

At 10.45 hrs we left the blockhouse and moved to V 428872. We

stripped and cleaned the Bren guns; had a light meal of the remaining food

and then I set off with Sjt. Terry-Hall and Cpl. Iveson to recce a position

for an ambush. Lost Cpl. Cowing and Young; Sjt. Terry-Hall went back but

could not find them.

We moved down to La Chapelotte, V 430874, and as we were approaching

it we suddenly saw six Germans come out of the wood opposite. A slit trench

nearby provided us with cover. The Germans shouted to us to come out, and

started to shoot over our heads into the woods. After about ten minutes

they disappeared into the woods, making a lot of noise and accompanied by a

fair haired woman.

We then made our way back to the remainder of the party who told

us the patrol had passed on the road immediately below them.

I then split the party into two sections:

1. Ambush party - Pct. Pritchard and I, with one Bren.

Sjt. Terry-Hall and Pct. Crozier, with one Bren.

Chanson (Maquis), Ferrandi and Cpl. Iveson.

2. Pct. Garth with T.S.M.G. and Pct. Lewis with a carbine, to ambush the

patrol in the event of their return.

The kit was left near to where the 2nd party was operating and

Pct. Lewis remained with it.

No 1 party went to the slit trench which was ten yards from the

road at La Chapelotte. I left Chanson and Ferrandi 40 yards to the

rear to guard there. The Brens were placed in the slit trenches. The orders

were to open fire when they heard my Bren fire. We waited about 10 minutes,

when a 5-tonner was seen coming slowly up the hill to the village. I

waited until it was 20/30 yards away and then ordered Pct. Pritchard to fire.

He put one complete magazine straight through the windscreen of the truck,

causing it to stop abruptly. The other Bren fired one round then I saw

Sjt. Terry-Hall retreating hastily through the woods.

I moved with Pritchard and Cpl. Iveson on to higher ground to try

to get another shoot, as the truck had stopped behind a mound, and was just

in time to see some Germans from the back of the truck disappear into the

woods opposite. We remained two or three minutes but there was no further

movement, so I ordered Pritchard, Ferrandi and Chanson to return to the R.V.

and bring up the rear party.

At the R.V. we collected our rucksacks and I gave Sjt. Terry-Hall

my carbine and took a Bren gun before setting off for base. After walking

about five minutes we were fired on by Germans in the valley and I ordered

the party into the hills. Evidently Sjt. Terry-Hall, Cpl. Iveson and Crozier

could not have heard me as they started to run straight along the track.

I halted the remainder 300 yards up the hill and made them lie down in the

bushes. In the distance we saw Germans with dogs running after Sjt. Terry-

Hall, Cpl. Iveson and Crozier.

We rested for about half an hour. The party now consisted of

myself, Garth, Pritchard, Ferrandi, Lewis and Chanson, with two Brens.

We went slowly back on a compass bearing towards the base. I

halted the party at 18.00 hrs as I did not wish to enter the base without

first making a recce of it, and by now it was too late to do so that evening.

At 19.00 hrs I heard much M.G. fire from the direction of base.

At 20.00 hrs I received a W/T message saying "Do not return camp. Further

instructions later".

September 10th.

On awakening we heard Germans talking just below us. Pierre Percee,

V 405859 was very busy and German trucks were in and out continually. We

moved off at about 11.30 hrs and marched to V 406843. We leaguered there.

We saw plenty of Germans in Lauville and Celles-sur-Plaine, V 419842.

At 18.30 hrs I sent off Chanson and Ferrandi for food, as we had

had nothing to eat for 24 hours. They returned with Pct. Bennett and no

food. He had been left by himself in a house at V 403831. I sent Chanson

and Ferrandi off again; they came back with a few potatoes.

September 11th.

At 10.00 hrs I received a W/T message telling me to go to an R.V.

with 2nd in command and adjutant at 11.00 hrs daily at V 406816.

We got some food that evening.

September 12th.

We set off on foot at 05.00 hrs, crossed road at V 400820 and

arrived at D.Z. at 07.30 hrs. The 2nd i/c and adjutant did not turn up.

At 14.00 hrs we received a W/T message cancelling the R.V. and

stating further instructions following. We got a little more food and local

information that one S.A.S. man was taken prisoner yesterday. I suspect it

was Pct. Griffin.

September 13th.

We received a W/T message at 14.00 hrs saying "R.V. at V 498816".

We set out at 14.50 hrs.

September 14th.

Arrived at R.V. at 13.45 hrs and contacted new base.

REPORT BY LIEUT. MARX ON PERIOD 19 SEP TO 3 OCT ABSENT FROM BASE.

September 19th.

We left base with L/Cpl. Garth, L/Cpl. Pritchard, Pct. Ferrandi

and Pct. Salthouse, carrying 5 lbs of plastic per man in addition to 1 dozen

tyre bursters, 4 pressure switches, 2 boxes of fog signals, detonators,

primers etc. and 2 - 24 hour rations per man. We marched to V 512798 by

19.00 hrs.

September 20th.

We left V 512798 at 10.10 hrs and arrived at V 506792 at 11.15 hrs.

In the afternoon I made a recce of the road Belval V 493790 - St. Blaise La

Roche, V 575785.

In the evening I went with L/Cpl. Garth and laid 3 tyre bursters with

¼ lb plastic on each, on the road.

September 21st.

At 05.30 hrs I removed the tyre bursters as there had been no

traffic during the night.

At 09.15 hrs I sent L/Cpl. Pritchard and Salthouse to the Colonel

as detailed, with a message.

At 21.30 hrs we again laid 3 tyre bursters at V 509791.

September 22nd.

At 07.25 one tyre burster was set off by a truck. It removed the

wheel and the truck crashed.

At 14.30 hrs two men returned from base with a message from the

Colonel. I sent out Ferrandi and Salthouse at 19.15 hrs with 1 lb plastic

and pressure swithch which they laid at V 511790.

September 23rd.

At 05.55 hrs a half-track blew up on pressure switch operated charge.

We moved to area Champanay V 537795. Local information was that

French Maquis Colonel and liaison officer had been arrested.

September 24th.

I went with Ferrandi to house at V 546802 for food. We walked out

of the back door as the Germans walked in at the front. We had been sold by

the woman in the house. Local information said that there were 600 Hitler

Jugend at Champanay building fortifications in the Colle du Hantz at V 521782.

Moved to small shelter V 555827.

September 25th.

I sent out L/Cpl. Pritchard and a Frenchman for food. They

returned at 15.00 hrs with food, and a German Serjeant Major. Pct. Ferrandi

and Salthouse took him up into the woods and shot him.

I recced area V 560840 but found it unsuitable as it was patrolled

fairly heavily by Germans.

We moved to V 570819.

September 27th.

We layed a charge of three 1 lbs on each of the railway lines at

V 590821, and used fog signals on each line. A train was derailed at 22.15 hrs.

September 28th.

I went with Ferrandi to house at V 560820 for food. We got a

little and were told that the frontier guard had been reinforced from 14

to 21, as one had mysteriously disappeared. Also that a train which had been

derailed that morning had been bombed by the R.A.F.

At 15.30 hrs we left the area and marched to V 537818 which we

reached by 18.45 hrs. A W/T message was received at 20.00 hrs saying "Do

not return base. Further instructions later".

September 29th.

At 13.00 hrs we moved off and arrived at V 512797 at 16.00 hrs.

We went for food in the evening and were told that the Germans had moved all

the male population from the village, and that there were six truck loads of

Germans living in the village.

September 30th.

The Germans searched the wood in which we were hiding. L/Cpl.

Garth and I went to V 508791 with three tyre bursters, three pressure switches

and 6 lbs plastic, and laid them at 21.30 hrs. I sent Pritchard and Salthouse

with six tyre bursters and 6 lbs plastic to V 522783, which they laid at

22.00 hrs. I received a W/T message at 20.00 hrs giving an R.V. at V 486829.

At 22.30 hrs a truck passed over the mines and set off two tyre

bursters; sympathetic detonation set off the other four and scattered the truck

everywhere.

October 1st.

At 05.15 hrs a car passed over the mines laid by Pritchard and

Salthouse, and blew up. We moved to V 521813 and heard Germans searching

our old wood pretty thoroughly.

October 2nd.

We moved to V 486829, and I went down with L/Cpl. Garth to a saw-

mill. The Frenchmen inside told us that one of our officers was expected

at 20.00 hrs.

At 20.00 hrs I met Capt. Miller and had our first good meal and

smoke for 14 days. All watches were put back one hour to B.S.T.

October 3rd.

Reported to the Colonel at V 482805. At 10.50 hrs we were chased

out of the house by Germans. R.Vd with Colonel at old base V 498817.

A P P E N D I X A (4)

REPORT BY MAJOR POWER ON JEEPING ACTIVITIES.

September 19th.

Three jeeps were dropped about midnight. One dropped in the

middle of the D.Z., one a short way away in a valley, and one in the woods.

Luckily it was possible to recover them all and drive them away. The one

in the woods had landed upside down and all the oil had run out, otherwise

it was undamaged. The brakes did not work, but this was not due to dropping.

The other two were also only ¼ full of oil, and no oil was dropped.

September 20th.

Spent until 18.00 hrs cleaning guns, which were packed greased up,

and reloading magazines which were dirty and defectively loaded.

At 18.30 hrs two jeeps went out with the idea of getting a "feel"

of the country. 1st jeep manned by Lieut. Col. Franks driver, Major Power

front gunner, Cpl. Kubiski rear gunner, Armand guide. 2nd jeep Lieut. Dill

driver, SSM. White front gunner, Cpl. Austin rear gunner, Pct. Bennett spare

man. Jeeps left the Foret du Val de Senones at V 488807 and proceeded

through Le Hacholet, V 489803, Le Saulcy Senones, V 483795 and Le Mont,

V 476792. Just outside Le Mont we saw a German D.R. riding along the main

road Belval, V 493791 - La Petite Raon, V 454787. We tried to cut him off

at road junction V 470785, but failed.

We waited in ambush at the point for ¾ hour, with no result, as

the light was failing we proceeded on through Vieux Moulin, V 455775 to

Senones, V 440775, and thence by a side road to La Petite Raon, where there

was said to be some Germans, though we saw none. We waited in ambush on

the road junction V 450788 for ¼ hour, and then went home via the main road.

September 21st.

Set out in two jeeps (same crews) at 18.00 hrs with the object of

shooting up a Light Aid Detachment in Senones, said to be in wood V 446782.

Drove through Moussey, V 475820, turning left at V 474814 and going to Le

Hacholet, Le Saulcy, Le Mont and Vieux Moulin. At V 480779 we stopped to

ask the form as there were tracks of Tiger tanks on the road. We were told

that 5 Tiger tanks were parked alongside the road a couple of hundred yards

further on, with their crews standing around. Col. Franks and I decided

to climb up on to higher ground on foot to do a recce. Whilst in wood

V 445776 we observed Germans in ruined (or half built) barracks (not marked

on map) at approximately V 445775. We returned to the jeeps and went

around to see if we could attack them from the rear. The Colonel and I

recced on foot and saw some Germans moving around in the vicinity of what

appeared to be a camouflaged tank. It was then almost dark. A few

minutes later when it was impossible to see, we heard the noise of hammering

on metal, and saw cigarettes being lighted. We returned to the jeeps and

took them down a track (unmarked on map) to within 100 yards of where we

saw the tank; we switched on the head lights and waited for any movement,

ready to shoot; however we saw no sign of any men, not could we distinguish

the tank. We waited about 2 minutes with head lights on then drove away.

We returned as far as road junction V 485791, where we waited for

¼ hour to see if anything came along the main road. Returned from there

to Moussey, where we had a large dinner in a house while awaiting parachutage.

Three more jeeps and a number of men were dropped that night.

All jeeps recovered successfully.

September 22nd.

All six jeeps set out at 17.00 hrs to make for the Valley of Celles,

and harboured for the night in the Foret Domaniale de Celles at V 447841.

September 23rd.

Capt. Druce and Lieut. Manners with Nos 5 and 6 jeeps went off at

dawn to ambush Senones - Moyenmoutier V 392758 road.

Nos 1, 2, 3 and 4 jeeps set off at 08.30 hrs to recce the Celles

Valley with the idea of crossing the main Celles - Raon l'Etape V 335786 road,

and splitting up into two pairs there; or ambushing from South side as

opportunity arose.

Col. Franks stopped at a farm he knew at V 435856. He kept

Lieut. Dill to cover him and asked me to go ahead with Capt. Lewis to see if

we could get a shoot.

We laid an ambush at road junction V 434858. After a few minutes

a staff car came into view, travelling from East to West at about 10 m.p.h.,

followed shortly by another. I let the first car go until it was nearing

the bend which would take it out of view, before firing, which was the signal

for all guns on both jeeps to open up. By this time there were 3 staff cars

and one 3 ton lorry in view, at a range varying from 80 to 200 yards. All

vehicles stopped and only one man was seen alighting. He was hit by Cpl.

Robinson with the Bren gun and seen to fall. The shooting lasted several

minutes; average 1½ magazines per gun (7 Vickers and 1 Bren). Sjt. Neville

in No 4 jeep, which was on higher ground, said he saw the roofs of 4 more

lorries behind, and there were probably more, but they were in dead ground.

We returned to V 447841, collecting Col. Franks and Lieut. Dill on

the way. Col. Franks said he would take his 2 jeeps to try to ambush the

road at Allarmont, V 465875, and return by 13.00 hrs. We waited all

afternoon but the Colonel did not turn up.

Capt. Druce and Lieut. Manners returned at dusk having ambushed

road at La Petite Raon, V 452788, and near Moyenmoutier. We harboured for

the night at the same location.

September 24th.

We set off with four jeeps at 07.00 hrs with the intention of

cleaning up the guns. These had been wet for two days at the top of a

mountain, on cross tracks, V 447807. I intended afterwards to take the

party across to La Trouche, V 374800, and thence into the Foret des Reclos,

V 375825, if, as it appeared to be on Club Alpine de France map, it was

possible to cross the Forest.

We had trouble with Capt. Druce's jeep. The fitters were imcompe-

tent and the party was delayed. It was mid-day before Capt. Druce's jeep

reached the cross tracks, and I decided that he had better go back to base to

refit, as his jeep was still in bad order. He went back, taking the fitters.

The three remaining jeeps set off for forester's house at Coichot,

V 419808, where I hoped to get information about motorable tracks. The

track we started down became impassable; two jeeps stuck and had to be man-

handled. We did not get them out until late afternoon.

We went the long way round to Coichot, spent the night in an empty

mill and were given supper by the forester. He told us there was no way of

crossing the hills to La Trouche road, other than going via Celles, which was

occupied by the enemy, in quite large numbers.

September 25th.

I decided to have one more shoot, then return to base, (a) because

there wwre only 3 possible places for an ambush, all of which had now been

used, and (b) the jeeps needed overhauling, twin Vickers mountings were

broken on 2 out of 3 jeeps. Lieut. Manners had to mount a single gun in

front, and Lieut. McGibbon Lewis had used our only spare mounting. Food

was also very short.

Heard firing on edge of wood towards La Petite Raon, and also

Senones; quite a lot of which appeared to be Bren fire. I went on foot with

Capt. McGibbon Lewis and Sjt. Neville to investigate. We saw running figures

outside the wood which appeared to be S.A.S. We questioned some men in a

house on the edge of the wood, who however, did not know what was happening.

They told us that Germans had occupied Moussey the evening before and taken

away all the men.

We decided to try to ambush the Senones - Moyenmoutier road from

V 406766 (15G inaccurate at that point; site was selected from R.A.F. map).

This had already been used by Capt. Druce and Lieut. Manners, but I prepared

to recce the spot on foot first.

Myself, Lieut. Manners, Capt. Lewis and one O.R. walked the last

mile to the ambush point. There was a good long field of view, but the

range was rather too long - 400 to 500 yards. However, we decided to have

a shoot. Lieut. Manners stayed behind to see if the noise of approaching

jeeps attractedany Germans. Capt. Lewis and I returned and fetched two jeeps.

While we were getting in place a 5 ton truck passed from East to West.

Shortly after, a staff car passed West to East. We fired, and observed

tracer all around it, but the car accelerated and passed down the road at

about 65 m.p.h. Result of shoot not known.

We returned to the 3rd jeep to find a Frenchman waiting for us.

He told us his name was Commandant Marcel (?) and that he had important

documents for us. We questioned him and he seemed to be genuine. He

produced an order of battle of a Panzer Division, picked up 2 days before.

(This was subsequently taken to the American lines by Capt. Druce). About

½ hour after the ambush, we heard terrific firing apparently from Senones -

Moyenmoutier road towards V 406766; heavy machine guns and light cannon.

The firing continued for about 20 minutes.

We brewed some tea and had lunch, then returned to Moussey. We

reached base just before dusk, and found that the Colonel and Lieut. Dill

had returned having lost the jeeps.

September 26/27th.

Refitted at base, and received parachutage and food. Capt. Druce

departed for the American lines.

September 28th.

The Colonel, with Capt. Sykes and SSM. White set off for Pierre

Percee, V 403858 about mid-day. I intended to take 3 jeeps out for a few

days raiding in the area bounded by roads Moussey - Moyenmoutier, Moyenmoutier

- Saales, Saales - Belval, Belval - La Petite Raon.

About mid-day I went with Lieut. Dill to make a recce of another

exit from the woods, V 511804. We heard cars starting up amongst houses,

V 502802; crept to edge of wood and found that the houses were occupied by

Germans. There was quite a lot of transport around the small roads near the

wood. We attracted the attention of a man working near the wood, and heard

from him that Le Saulcy-Senones, V 486795 was also occupied, and that there

were over 1,000 Germans in Belval. This was later confirmed by Lieut. Dill's

personal observation.

All roads except the main road Moussey - Senones, were therefore

barred to jeeps, as although jeeps could shoot their way out, they could not

return, as presumably Germans would have strong M.G. posts in anticipation.

We returned to the jeep base, V 485813 to meet Lieut. Manners and

Capt. Lewis, who were coming on a jeeping party. We found that they had

not come, but there was a long letter from Capt. Lewis telling me of German

prisoners taken by Maquis and brought to his house, and saying that his

house had been compromised, as a number of Maquis who had been living with

him were taken by Germans.

I set off with Capt. Hislop and Cpl. Robertson as a guide, to see

Capt. Lewis at his house V 456814. I found the Colonel and party with

Capt. Lewis, having been ambushed on their way to Pierre Percee. Germans

were searching the farm next door.

That evening we all moved back to area V 480810.

A P P E N D I X A (5)

REPORT BY SJT. THORPE ON PERIOD 21 SEP TO 29 SEP ABSENT FROM BASE.

September 21/22nd.

After having been briefed by Col. Franks, I set off with Cpl. Larley,

Crossfield, Robb and L/Cpl. Marchand. We reached our point V 479766 where

we stayed for the night.

At first light we set out and ran into a lot of Germans at Au

Renclos, V 470759. We made a wide detour and crossed the main road Menil

V 453756 - Chatas V 481738, and carried on to V 458737, where we contacted

some Maquis. They gave us information that the road Battant-de-Bourras

V 462711 - Denipaire V 428718 was guarded very closely.

We carried on until we reached V 454712 where we bumped into a

French working party guarded by German soldiers. The Germans saw us but

disappeared. We then carried on to V 449702 where we stayed another night.

Here we had information given us about the working party. According to this

information they were mining the road and digging extensively at pt. V 454712.

September 23rd.

At first light we went on to pt. V 486687, which we reached at

11.00 hrs. Cpl. Larley and Marchand went to about pt. V 490670 to recce the

road, and returned sbout 14.00 hrs with favourable reports regarding the

traffic.

That night we made a further recce and found that there were long

periods when there was no traffic during the night.

September 24th.

We moved slowly down to V 488669 where we laid up during the day.

About midnight we went down and laid prepared charges, tyre bursters and

explosives on the road between road junction V 495651 and Frapelle V 502663.

These were successful in the early hours of the morning

September 25th.

Marchand and I borrowed civilian clothes and cycles and travelled

along the road from pt. V 460639 to Frapelle, and found that we had blown up

4 vehicles, 1 of which was still on the road with a broken axle. A civilian

told us that one car had tipped down a bank, killing one and wounding another.

We checked up and found the marks on the side of the road. The other 2

vehicles had been repaired and gone on.

We went to Raves V 492628, coming back via Bertrimoutier V 493638

in order to recce the railway. It was being used quite a lot. On the main

road we passed many batches of infantry looking very tired and shabby;

obviously coming back from St. Die V 420650 to rest.

At Neuvillers-sur-Fave, V 482646 there were many Germans billeted,

and some horse transport. At Frapelle there were also many Germans, and

identification cards were being checked at the cross-roads.

The forester at Charemont V 489667 warned us that the roads were

being patrolled as from that night, so we did not operate on the night 25/26th.

September 26th.

On the night 26/27th we laid charges between Neuvillers-sur-Fave

and pt. V 490648. Charges were laid about 02.30 hrs, and Marchand and I

waited nearby for about an hour, with no success.

At about 05.00 hrs we heard a bang and found out from the civilians

that a horse had been killed, and that the Germans had searched the roads.

During the day of the 27th, the forester warned us that Germans were search-

ing fairly extensively. I decided to attempt to blow the railway at midnight,

and leave the area as soon as I knew that the charge had gone off.

Night September 27/28th.

Cpl. Larley, Marchand and I went down and crossed the Neuvillers-

sur-Fave road at pt. V 497658; we then crossed the river Fave and laid a

charge at pt. V 502646. I put a pressure switch to get the 01.30 hrs express,

and a four hour time pencil in case in case this failed. (Fog signal was

used as pressure switch). We went back to our lying up area by the same

route as we came. The 01.30 train did not explode the charge, but at 04.25

hrs the charge went off and a few minutes afterwards I heard a clatter of

metal, and I am fairly certain that a train was de-railed. (Capt. Druce

informs me that R.A.F. confirm a de-railment at this point).

We started back at 06.00 hrs, going back by much the same route

as we came, and by dusk we had reached pt. V 479766, and stayed the night

there. At first light, 29th Sept., we moved off, and at about 09.00 hrs crossed

the main road at approx V 480790. This road was being used extensively and was

quite difficult to cross. We reported to the Colonel at H.Q. at about 12.30 hrs.

A P P E N D I X B (1)

----------------------

Exfiltration of Capt.Druce and F/O. Fiddick.

September 29th.

I woke up at 03.00 hrs, better, and prepared to leave for the

Americans to give them information on the defences of St. Die, V 410650,

and area, and also a captured German document. (See American Army Intell-

igence Summary No.20 included in Appendix C, which contains the information

brought through).

F/O. Fiddick came with us and we reached St. Prayel, V 381771,

by 19.00 hrs. Here we met two Milice who only had pistols to our Tommy

gun, so they ran away.

After dark we bumped into a patrol of two men who heard us but

could could not find us, although they passed us within a yard. We could

not shoot them owing to the proximity of the river Meurthe which we were

about to cross.

The Raon l'Etape, V 340790, - St. Die road was patrolled by

Germans who passed every quarter of an hour.

We crossed the river by an unguarded bridge at V 350787, and

proceeded due West to pt. V 295765 where we stopped until it was light.

September 30th.

During the day we went west-north-west to pt. V 200820 where we

encountered plenty of slit trenches and several Germans. We decided this

was the front line and waited until dark.

That night we passed the lines without any mishap and hid in the

woods to the North of Domptail, V 171837, until the morning in order to

make sure that we really were past the front line.

October 1st.

In the morning I encountered the 1st Spahis Regt. of General

Leclerc's Division. These took me on to Division, to whom I handed as

much of my information as I thought would interest them.

-------------------

RE-INFILTRATION OF CAPT. DRUCE AND PCT. PENDLI.

October 2nd.

In the morning I reported to Moor Park the situation, received

letters for Colonel Franks etc., picked up Pendli, new radio and crystals,

a jojo set for myself, mail for Loyton and some stores for Major Miller-

Mundy, to give to any of our parties passing through the line, so that they

should have some clean clothes when we arrived.

October 3rd.

We returned to France to find that the G2 7th Army, Col. Quinn, had

said he did not want any more information from us. G3 said we were a G2

problem, therefore they could not direct our activities. I had a letter

from Col. Franks to the Army Commander.

October 4th.

I decided to return to the Colonel, and put him fully in the picture

of the situation for our future operations. Also to take Capt. Hislop's

badly needed set and new crystals.

October 5th.

Pendli and I set out that evening, escorted by a French patrol

as far as the edge of the woods at pt. V 223837. There was a German M.G.

post here, but the enemy must have been asleep because it did not fire.

We went a mile or so into the woods and waited there until daylight.

October 6th.

We followed the same route which I had come out on, moving rather

slowly in view of a 65/70 lb pack. By 05.00 hrs we were just South of

Raon l'Etape. Here I met two Maquis boys who took me to Capt. Jean. He

told me that our camp had been attacked and that Moussey was full of Germans.

We slept at Raon l'Etape.

October 7th.

In the morning I sent agents to see exactly what had happened.

The camp was deserted and Pere Georges' house burnt. In the meantime Capt.

Jean had procured information about the arrival of three new German Divisions

near St. Die, where I knew the Americans were supposed to be starting an

attack. I decided that (a) Col. Franks would now have decided to come home

and (b) the information I had of the three new divisions was so important

that it had to be transmitted to the Americans immediately. Hence I decided

that I could do no good even if I did meet Col. Franks, therefore my duty was

to inform U.S. Forces of the position. Capt. Jean was willing to come with

me to give the information himself, and also had other plans he wanted to

discuss with the French General Leclerc.

October 8th.

I set out in the morning on the same route for the third time and

met the French at Fontenoy at 22.00 hrs that night.

October 9th.

In the morning I met the French, who were alarmed at the information

and passed it on to the Americans who would not believe it. It afterwards

was proved by battle experience to be true. (See appendix C (3).)

I waited with Major Miller-Mundy to see who should pass through in case it

became necessary for me to return to pick up stragglers.

A P P E N D I X B (2)

EXFILTRATION OF LT. COL. FRANKS AND PARTY.

In view of information received, I decided that the best method of

contacting the Americans was to cross the River Meurthe in the area of St.

Blaise, V 350760 into the foret de Ste. Barbe, V 285775, thence to the Grand

Bois de Glonville, V 225820 to Domptail, V 170838 which was American occupied.

From previous information it seemed likely also that the French Armoured

Division was in the woods South of Baccarat, V 265840.

At approximately 09.00 hrs the party left V 400820 and reached

without serious incident V 356771 at approximately 18.00 hrs. Major Power

and I then made a reconnaissance of the immediate area and decided to lie up

in a ditch there until midnight when we would cross the road and railways

and river.

We set off at midnight, reaching the edge of the river at approxim-

ately 01.00 hrs without incident. Here I should say that Major Power had

crossed this river in this location before on his way to join me and knew of

some lock gates on which we hoped to cross. We could find no sign of a

bridge. Major Power and I recced up both sides of the river without success

until we found a large railway bridge. Leaving the rest of the party by the

railway bridge we continued on in the hope of finding the lock gates but were

unsuccessful.

It was now nearing 05.00 hrs and time was getting short, added to

which we were seen by the sentry on the railway bridge who fortunately had to

go to the guardroom to get a grenade to throw at us, by which time we were a

long way away. We were further handicapped by the fact that SSM. White was

unable to swim. However, I decided we would get him across somehow, and

discarding our equipment and hiding it, we waded into the river to find by

good fortune that it was a ford not higher than breast high. We all got

across safely but found large buildings on the other side and what was probably

a German sentry. We therefore continued up the river bank under cover for

some way before leaving the river. We then crossed the road on the other

side and made for the hills.

By first light we were well up the mountains in the Foret de Ste.

Barbe. We continued all day with only a short halt of half an hour through

the Foret de Ste. Barbe, reaching the main road Baccarat - Rambervillers at

approximately 16.00 hrs. We crossed this, being seen by one German on a

bicycle. We continued through the Bois de Glonville and made for the main

road at about V 203837 hoping to find American transport on the road. We

passed a gunsite in the woods which we skirted and then found ourselves in

the middle of a net-work of dug outs and well built shelters which appeared

to be uninhabited. It was raining hard and Major Power and I discussed

whether they might be friendly or enemy. While this discussion was going

on, two Germans came out of their burrows and we took to our heels with

several of them firing at us. We ran into a further position, skirted that

and lay up for a short time.

We then made for the edge of the wood to the South, where there

was just sufficient light to try to pin-point ourselves. While we were

doing this, a German patrol came right up to us and in fact looked over our

shoulders at the map and asked what we were doing. We took to our heels

again, pursued by the patrol who, considering the light, fired extremely

accurately.

We were now in open country and lay up in a potato field immediately

in the rear of what appeared to be a German front line position, where we

heard them getting their rations. The position appeared to be strongly

held and as we had already excited suspicion in the area, it was decided to

go back and try again by Rambervillers, V 183728. We therefore marched

carefully across country and re-entered the Grand Bois de Glonville at about

V 232799, where we lay up for 3 or 4 hours until dawn when we again crossed

the Rambervillers - Baccarat road into the Foret de Ste. Barbe on a south-

easterly course with the intention of continuing through the narrow wood

North of Bru, V 220728.

We continued on all day with very little rest and at about 17.00 hrs

reached the clearing at V 220740. We started skirting this clearing,

remaining under cover in the wood and then bumped into Germans again. Here

the party split into two - Major Power with Capt. Hislop and Cpl. Owens, and

Capt. Sykes with myself and SSM. White.

We had been seen by the Germans and lay up in some bramble bushes

for a short time. The Germans' field craft appeared to be very good and

they were moving silently about the wood prodding and poking the bushes

unpleasantly close. I decided that we must move to a suitable jumping off

place from which we could get going as soon as it was dark, and started

moving towards some furse bushes which appeared to be the end of the wood.

I think we were being followed but at the critical moment the Americans

chose to put in a small attack, not in our immediate area, but it appeared

to be sufficient to divert the enemy's attention from us and we reached a

suitable lying up area which was undefended at about 18.30 hrs.

We moved at 21.00 hrs in a southerly direction towards Bru,

meaning to turn West as soon as possible towards Rambervillers. After

moving across open country for some time, we arrived in a wood just North of

Bru, which I had been told was in American hands. I thought it was safer

to lie up in the wood as there was considerable activity going on all round

and although I felt certain we were now in the American lines, it seemed

better to approach them in daylight.

Next morning at 07.00 hrs, I started moving carefully across

country in the direction of Rambervillers. This entailed crossing an

entirely open space. While crossing this a machine gun opened up on us,

hitting me in the leg, but luckily there was some cover close by. We

remained in this scanty cover until nightfall. During the middle of the

day we were mortared for some two hours.

We continued down the line of the stream de Monseigneur, V 205727

towards Rambervillers, reaching some outlying houses at approximately 22.00 hrs

which we found to be occupied by the Americans.

Next day we were able to give 45 Division some useful information

of enemy positions including some gun positions.

A P P E N D I X B (3)

Exfiltration of Capt.McGibbon-Lewis and party.

October 9th.

At 12.00 hrs we moved off - a party of ten.

We got down to the Celles road at V 377800. Lieut. Silly and I

made a recce and then brought the party down. There was a lot of activity

on the road including bicycle patrols and some Germans working on wood

piles. We managed to get across in a quiet moment and then crossed the

railway and river and road again with no difficulty. I went north-west

on a compass bearing for two kilometres and then south-west on a bearing

for Bertrichamps, V 300814.

The Foret de Reclos, V 300814, had evidently been used by German

transport, but we saw none. Our fieldcraft was beginning to get quite

good and we got to within 25 yards of some wild deer before they heard us.

At about 18.00 hrs we crossed La Petite Raon, V 452787 - Pierre

Percee, V 403857, road. This was swarming with traffic, about five

vehciles a minute. The Germans had cut down the undergrowth to within

100 yards of the road and we took evasive action about ten times in getting

across. I reported this road to 2nd Armoured Div on arrival. We went

through some very thick woods on a compass bearing down into a forest road

which has a lot of trees cut down across it and a notice saying it was for-

bidden to enter. This led into Bertrichamps, and we moved down it past

some houses until we heard some Germans shouting. It was dark by now.

We struck North across the fields in single file to detour the

village. All went well until we came to a sunken road. We had difficulty

crossing it, and Sjt. Thorpe fell head first about 15 feet just when a

German truck passed; luckily we were not heard. We leaguered the other side

by a stream.

October 10th.

Sjt. Thorpe and Marchand asked for information at a house where

I was certain there were no Germans as the occupants were laughing and

talking inside. They told us there was a small bridge a bit higher up

where we could cross, but that the large one was guarded. Further, we were

informed there was a shifting population of Germans in the village and at

the time they numbered about 130.

We went over to a small wood and eat all that remained of our

food. We then moved on behind the house, through several vegetable gardens

and down on to a small road which ran some 50 yards from the main Baccarat

road. There was a lot of wire which I cut with an 'A' force knife: this

had proved invaluable throughout. This road was also being used and three

trucks passed about every five minutes. We crossed it, and also the rail-

way, still on a bearing to meet the river where it passed near the woods on

the western side.

We arrived at the river about mid-day; our difficulties then

began. The river was about 20 yards across at the narrowest point, had quite

a current, and looked deep. We spent three hours looking for bridges but

owing to the rain all the foot bridges had been washed away and we could not

even find the big one. Pct. Robb could not swim, and several of the others

did not feel too sure of themselves. Eventually I decided to swim it and

find out if it was difficult. I stripped and wrapped up my clothes, arms,

etc., in a gas cape, then set off. It was icy cold but I had only to swim

half the distance across, the rest could be waded. I reached the other

side and returned, but felt absolutely exhausted by the cold. Sjt. Thorpe

did the same. We did one more trip with equipment and then decided that

neither of us could face more than one more trip. Marchand crossed but the

rest felt they could not make it. Sjt. Thorpe and I again went over to the

other side and were joined by Lieut. Manners who decided to come. The

remainder under Lieut. Silly decided to go South and find a bridge. We

dressed and moved up into the woods.

Two trucks passed on the forest road, and some isolated houses had

a Red Cross on them. It was pouring with rain us usual and we felt very

low. We struck south-west on a bearing for two kilometres, and then north-

west. Going was difficult in the dark but got better as it brightened.

October 11th.

We arrived at the road running from East to West dividing the

Foret de St. Barbe and the Bois de Glonville at 09.00 hrs. We heard guns

firing very close and saw one in a clearing. We tried to cross the road

but there were a lot of Germans sitting about and another car and a cyclist

passed. We were heard by one German, but not seen. We retired 50 yards

and moved along to try and cross further West but again we were stymied as

a German sitting in the bushes about 25 yards away saw me and waved cheerily.

I waved back, and then we retired 150 yards down back into the forest where

we sat down. I made an appreciation as follows: that if the Americans were

where our information said they were at pt. 385, there must be at least mines

and listening posts between them and these guns in the woods. They would be

difficult to see as the forest was very thick and I decided, therefore, that

we must wait until dark before going on. We would listen to the firing and

see if we could find how far off they were by the time between the firing and

arrival of the American shells.

By this time I had my doubts about the accuracy of the information

of the line sent to us from U.K. I also decided, from previous experience,

that it would be better to strike West, where we knew we should eventually

hit the Americans, and get out of the forest where one was so easily ambushed.

I sent Sjt. Thorpe and Marchand to look at the Ste. Barbe road and

they returned having got to within 100 yards of it without difficulty. I

decided to go that way.

October 12th.

During the day we listened to the firing and were able by vision

to pin-point some six guns hidden in the woods. Also we heard the Ste. Barbe

road being used a lot and considerable numbers of troops in Ste. Barbe,

V 249780.

At about 14.00 hrs there was a direct hit on Ste. Barbe and the

Germans began yelling and shrieking.

At 17.30 hrs, just before we were going to move off, there was a

lot of activity on and near the road to our left, about 200 yards away, just

where we wanted to cross. We went up to observe and saw and heard a gun

which had just been moved in.

We struck North, crossed the clearing, and walked down a path just

parallel to the road running to Domptail, V 171837. It was difficult going

as trees had been cut across the path. We turned North and I decided to go

out into the open as we made so much noise. We had just crossed the road,

and were in an open field, when we heard some Germans coming. We lay flat

and three passed within five yards of us. One fell down and must have seen

our shapes as he said "What's that?". The others said "Oh! it's nothing

that moves - only a few logs", and moved on.

We returned to the woods and decided to go half a mile further up

and then due West. Quite a lot of Germans were passing on the road so going

was slow. Eventually we struck West, and I handed over the compass to Lieut.

Manners as I had a fever and could no longer see the luminous paint on it.

From this time on we had no difficulty. We kept well in the middle

of all fields and avoided woods, houses, hedges etc. We heard Germans and

saw their lights in the small woods on either side of us where, according to

our information, the Americans should have been.

October13th. We moved very fast and at about 13.30 hrs heard the shells

whistling over our heads and a lot of tank movement about half a mile ahead

of us. We did not know whose tanks they were. I felt sure they should be

ours but had lost faith in the information given us by this time.

Lieut. Manners and Sjt. Thorpe went to cross a bridge over a canal

and were challenged with "Halte la". They ran back to us and said they did

not know if it was Germans or who. I expected to run into the French, so

thought it was them. I moved up to the bridge to say we were French and

see what happened. As I climbed on to it a sentry opened up from about 10

yards with an automatic weapon. We ran back into the field. I knew it was

not a Schmeisser, so told Marchand to shout that we were French and not to

fire. This he did. The result was a further burst, very close indeed, so

we beat it. They again fired, so although I felt sure they were French I

was not going near that Frenchman again.

We moved back down the canal, but could find nowhere to cross, so

decided to move North of the bridge, see if is was more shallow, and try

there. This we did, and after an hour's detour waded across. (We were

subsequently told that the canal bank was heavily mined.)

About half a mile the other side we were again challenged with an

"Halte". We lay down and prepared to give battle this time. Marchand

ahouted "We are French parachutists returning through the lines". They

asked for the password. We said of course we did not know it but could

explain ourselves. Marchand went to talk to the sentry, who said we could

come up. We did so, and for some reason the sentry shot at Manners,

narrowly missing his foot. However, all was well, and this was the final

fling.

At the Company H.Q. they said there was a password for us, but we

had been told none. We were disarmed and sent back to Brigade.

(For the report of Lieut.Silly's party, separated at the Meurthe,

see Appendix B 4.)

A P P E N D I X B (4)

EXFILTRATION OF LIEUT. SILLY AND PARTY.

REPORT BY CPL. LARLEY.

October 9th.

We left camp to cross through the lines. The party which left

the sawmill at V 412802 was as follows:-

Capt. Lewis Pct. Herbert

Lieut. Lord John Manners Pct. Lewis

Lieut. Silly Pct. Marchand

Sjt. Thorpe Pct. Crossfield

Cpl. Larley Pct. Robb

We moved north-west across the Celles road and when we were a kilo

into the woods, we turned West and carried on in that direction all day until

we reached Bertrichamps, V 301815.

October 10th.

We crossed the road and railway at V 299819 and reached the river

Meurthe. Here Capt. Lewis, Sjt. Thorpe and Marchand stripped and swam

the river. As they got so cold, Lieut. Silly and the rest tried to find a

bridge, but Lieut. Manners eventually decided to swim and join the others,

which he did.

October 11th.

We could not find a bridge, so returned to the same crossing,

where Lieut. Silly, Herbert, Lewis and I swam the river. On reaching the

other side we moved due West, and had no trouble until we met a patrol and

were surrounded. Here Lieut. Silly and Lewis became separated from Herbert

and me as we had to scatter.

We two lay up near Menarmont, V 191809 for the rest of the day.

October 12th.

We started off at dusk and reached V 165815 where we lay up.

During the day the wood was shelled by Allied guns.

On the night we moved slowly West, as Herbert was wounded in the

buttocks and was suffering from exposure.

We reached the Gerbeviller, V 090890 - Rambervillers, V 180720 road

at about midnight, and I decided to go North up the road to St. Pierremont,

V 142828, where I wanted to find a barn to give Herbert some rest and warmth.

In the village I was challenged by a French sentry who I thought at first

to be a Milice, and after some talk he turned out to be of a forward platoon

of the 2nd French Division.

REPORT BY PCT. CROSSFIELD.

As Pct. Robb could not swim I stayed with him, and after waiting

until it became light, we contacted a Frenchman and stayed at his house for

three days. He gave us civilian clothes and hid our guns in a box. We

then started from Baccarat, V 260830, where the Germans were giving the

civilians 36 hours to evacuate.

We moved north-west, and near the village of Flin, V 200891, I

pulled Robb through the river Meurthe. We then marched West, into the

village where we contacted the Americans.

A P P E N D I X B (5)

EXFILTRATION OF LIEUT. MARX AND PARTY.

October 9th.

We lay up all day and R.Vd with the Colonel at 19.00 hrs, and

received instructions to make our way back through the lines.

At 22.00 hrs we moved into the cellar of burning house, to keep

warm.

October 10th.

At 05.45 hrs we marched to V 402808 and then to V 383782. We

skirted the edge of the wood and bumped into a German patrol of 15 men in

area V 360760. The Germans and ourselves took cover behind trees and

started shooting at each other. L/Cpl. Pritchard shot two, and enabled

the party to withdraw up the hill.

We rested half way up and took off our rucksacks. We were

surprised by an even larger patrol of Germans; abandoned our rucksacks and

retired quickly.

As we were almost without ammunition, I told those who had none

that they might dump their arms if they pleased. We came across German

signal cables (presumably to an O.P.) and I cut them.

The Germans searched the wood well into the night.

We left the wood at midnight while it was very dark; eventually

reached the river Meurthe at V 353770 and decided to look for a good point

for crossing. We tried to cross at pt. V 355765, but found it impossible.

October 11th.

We continued down the river and at 04.30 hrs managed to cross the

bridge at V 359761. (Both road and railway bridges unguarded).

At 14.30 hrs we marched to pt. V 300754. The crossroads, around

which there was a German battery, was being shelled by the Americans. We

crossed the road, which was very busy, at 18.30 hrs and lay up in the woods

north-west of the road.

October 12th.

At 06.00 hrs we started out to the West and observed Ste. Barbe,

V 248782 being shelled by the French. At V 240860 we stumbled on a German

battery H.Q., but luckily we were not seen.

Lay up near there all day.

At 20.00 hrs we moved north-west for about 300 yards to get clear

of the woods, and then moved on a compass bearing of 300° across fields.

We heard intermittent M.G. fire.

We were halted by a French sentry at Doncieres, V 184777 at 22.55 hrs,

who shot me through the sleeve. I eventually convinced him that we were

friends, and got taken back to Roville-aux-Chenes, V 160768 where we were fed.

A P P E N D I X B (6)

Exfiltration of Lieut. Swayne and party

13th Oct. I set out with Perrin, Kubiskie and Daines, two of whom

were not swimmers. We passed near Neufmaisons where Kubiskie heard that

an officer and three men had been taken prisoner the day before in the

Celles valley. We were warned against going to Baccarat and so I made

for a railway bridge over the river Meurthe at Thiaville, V 312805.

When half way across we were challenged and fired upon by sentries.

The three men behind me immediately ran down the embankment and away

into the undergrowth. I am certain none of them were hit. I fell

down the embankment, crawled into the undergrowth, and hid for half an

hour while German sentries searched with torches.

I next made for our R.V. which we had used all that day,

and waited until dawn to see if my three men would return there. They

did not, and I have not seen them since.

I set out at dawn and moved N.W. through the Bois de

Granmon, just East of Baccarat, V 260340. I hid in a farm that day

and night.

I set off at 19.00 hrs the next day, 15th October, crossed

the Meurthe at V 254856, and found French troops (Division Leclerc)

at Glonville, V 226856.

Report by Cpl. Kubiskie

13th Oct. The bridge was guarded by a German sentry who opened fire

and we turned back. By bad luck our officer was separated from us. I

led the other two to the Foret de Petit Reclos where we spent the remain-

der of the night.

14th Oct. I thought it might be as well to try to get through at

Baccarat after all and we walked along the road between Bertrichamps

and Neufmaisons.

We laid two tyre bursters with 3½ lbs of plastic round each.

A convoy of three ambulances marked with a red cross came along the road

towards the front line. The first ambulance hit the mines and in the

resulting explosion, which was extremely severe, all three ambulances

completely disintegrated. We found no bodies and only occasional

fragments of the ambulances lying in the surrounding area. I think

they must have been full of explosives.

On the way along the road I spoke to some children whom

we met as we were in need of information and some food. These

children brought their uncle who was a member of the Maquis living in

the Bertrichamps area. This man gave us some food and introduced us

to a woman named Leblanc who offered to look after us. She gave us

civilian clothes, and at nightfall took us to an uninhabited house

where we spent the night. She told us that our officer had been

killed, and when I asked her how she knew this she told me that a party

of 5, including an officer, had tried to cross the Meurthe at nearly

the same place as we. I told her that this could not be our officer

as we were a party of 4, but she was sure that this party was 5 because

a friend of hers had given them a meal the evening before in the forest.

I asked her how they were dressed and she described our uniform and red

beret, and I concluded that it must be another of our groups. Mme.

Leblanc told me that the officer had been buried on the spot, and that

the Germans had put up a cross with his name written on it.

No one was able to tell me what had become of the other 4

of the party. Another woman told us that 2 days before (12th October)

two Americans had been shot at Neufmaisons. I asked how they were

dressed but she did not know as she had not seen them.

The same evening, Mme. Leblanc came back from Raon l'Etape

where she had been to have some films developed which she had taken of

us during the day in order to make identity cards. She was helped in

this by a gendarme at Raon l'Etape who helped the Maquis. This gendarme

told her that Capt. Druce was due to pass through Raon l'Etape the

following day.

I left with Mme. Leblanc for Raon l'Etape. She gave me an

identity card which I showed to the German sentry at the entrance to the

town: it passed the test well enough.

I stayed the night at her house, it being arranged that my

two comrades should arrive the following day.

15th Oct. In the morning I asked Mme. Leblanc to contact the gendarme

but she came back to say that the gendarme and three others had just

been arrested by the Gestapo, and therefore we had to go without our

new identity cards.

On the same day a baker from Baccarat had found Daines and

Perrin at Bertrichamps and offered to guide them through the lines.

Mme. Leblanc heard of this, and we went back together but unfortunately

we never saw the man again.

In the evening we all set off for Raon l'Etape. I went

in front with Mme. Leblanc, then Daines with the man from the Maquis,

followed by Perrin with a girl from Bertrichamps. On the way we met

some Germans who went with us as far as Raon l'Etape. Their presence

made it easier for us to pass the control.

16th Oct. Mme. Leblanc had decided to cross the lines with us via

La Haute Neuville, and left to make a recce but she came back to say

it was impossible to get through as the Germans had withdrawn

consequent on the occupation of La Chapelle, V 3080, by the Americans.

During one of the following days she brought back to her

house our uniforms and arms from Bertrichamps in a perambulator.

We always had enough to eat as a girl named Suzanne Coffe

who lived with Mme. Leblanc cooked for the Germans and often used to

bring us tinned foodstuffs.

We decided to wait for the Americans.

Some days later a woman came to tell Mme. Leblanc that

there were two officers at Pierre Percee who wished to cross the lines

at whatever cost. One of these officers was said to have been severely

wounded in the hand a fortnight or three weeks before but had been

cared for by a French nurse at Pierre Percee. He was soon cured and

now he wished to cross the lines. Mme. Leblanc decided to leave at

once to bring these two officers back to her house. I gave her a note

written in English by Daines, and also his pay book. I told her to

send the officers off by the forest paths and to R.V. with them in the

evening outside Raon l'Etape at a point which I showed her on the map.

Unfortunately, however, they cannot have followed my advice for she

dressed them in civilian clothes and they all set off down the road

together; they were arrested by a German sentry on the outskirts of

La Trouche. Mme. Leblanc and the officers were taken to the Gestapo

at Celles.

Mme. Leblanc was tried by the Gestapo, and although she

asked for mercy on her knees and implored them to have pity on her

two young children, she was shot.

I do not know what happened to the two officers, but I

think that if they had been shot there I should have been told by the

civil population.

As soon as we heard Mme. Leblanc had been shot we hid our

uniforms and arms as we expected a razzia by the Gestapo. We also

reconnoitred an escape route over the roof tops towards the forest in

case they came. Strangely enough the expected visit never took place.

Meanwhile, Suzanne Coffe looked after us very well.

When the Americans started to shell Raon l'Etape by day

and by night the population took to the cellars.

A week later the Germans began to fall back. I watched

their tanks moving past, about 30 of them - all Tigers and Panthers,

many of them marked with a red cross. I also saw about 50 other

vehicles.

The next day Perrin left for the other end of the town

where it was quieter. Daines and I remained behind.

On the day following, the Germans blew up a bridge about

50 yards from the house, which was made uninhabitable by the force of

the explosion. It had been raining, and our cellar had filled up

with more than a metre of water.

At this time, the Germans collected all the men they could

find under 50 years old, took them to the Celles valley, and shut them

up in a factory. The man from the Maquis who was also at Mme. Leblanc's

house, decided to go to Celles with Mme. Leblanc's two children. The

Germans, however, took him to the Kommandantur, and I do not know what

happened to him or the two children.

During these German searches for men, Daines and I stayed

hidden in the cellar - the Germans did not look in there because it was

full of water.

After this we moved into another uninhabited house and

dressed in womens' clothes when we needed to go out. I borrowed

some rouge from Suzanne Coffe, but Daines had a big beard which he

muffled up with a scarf.

On the same day it was said the Germans gave an order for

the population to evacuate the town within two hours - between four

and six oclock. The inhabitants left immediately and carried out the

order of the Germans to make for Baccarat and Bertrichamps. Once

they had left the town, however, the Germans opened fire with M.Gs.

and a great number were killed. The remainder came back to the town

and were told by the Vichy French authorities that the order had been

given by an S.S. Lieutenant on his own initiative and was not correct.

Three days later, two Germans came to our house and asked

for some food saying they had had nothing for four days. They ate

some of our German tinned food and said the Americans were just

outside the town.

The following day the Germans began to withdraw and,

wearing our womens' clothes, we contacted some American troops who

seemed surprised to see us.

Perrin has also come through the lines.

A P P E N D I X C (I)

LIEUT. COL. B.M. FRANKS, M.C. - COMMENTS.

GENERAL

1. The limiting factors in this area were:-

(a) Owing to the large wooded and mountainous areas it was an obvious

place to hold a large Maquis.

(b) The Germans had all their experience of the rest of France behind

them to deal with Maquis and S.A.S.

Alsace strongly guarded and patrolled to the East, and the river

Meurthe to the West. Both North and South of the final base area

was densely populated with the enemy.

(d) Movement was difficult and slow in the mountains and forests,

particularly when carrying loads.

(e) The local population were terrified of the Germans.

(f) The area was systematically pillaged by the Germans and food was very

short.

(g) The lack of D.Zs. There were only three really good D.Zs suitable

for dropping men in the area. This was realised by the enemy who

kept close watch on them. For instance, two weeks after the D.Z.

at Veney had been used, the enemy still had 3 armoured cars covering

the D.Z.

(h) The totally incompetent and unarmed Maquis, well infiltrated with

informers and with no fighting spirit.

(i) Weather - which towards the close of the operation became increas-

ingly cold and wet.

BASE ORGANISATION.

2. My first consideration was to find a reasonably secure base from

which to operate. It was not until the fifth attempt on 14th September

that I found an area in which we were left in comparative peace. With the

twenty French whom I kept as porters, guides, etc. the base frequently

numbered up to fifty. This was too large but it was nevertheless necessary

to have sufficient bodies always at hand in case it was possible to arrange

a re-supply at short notice. It was also necessary to have a large number

of men available to carry up supplies of food, etc. On the whole the base

fulfilled its function and worked comparatively well and the organisation

could have dealt with many more operational bodies. It was extremely useful

having the R.Q.M.S. and a Q corporal there, and both did excellent work.

Having lost the whole of Lieut. Black's stick and half Lieut. Marx's stick

I was very short of operational men.

INTELLIGENCE.

3. A good network of intelligence was organised, though some of the

rumours and statements made by the French were very wild, and confirmation

from another source was alwaysobtained before passing it back to London.

Towards the end of the operation we lost almost all our contacts.

Capt. Jean, Maquis I.O. was excellent and could be relied upon.

RELATIONSHIP WITH COL. MAXIMUM AND THE MAQUIS.

4. Col. Maximum was not pleased at first to see me and my party as he

had been expecting an arms drop and had 3/400 unarmed Maquis collected in the

woods close by. However, he soon realised that I was the only link with

the outside world, and I promised to get him arms as soon as possible. On

the day before these were due, the Maquis were attacked and completely

dispersed.

Col. Maximum himself went into hiding and remained more or less

in hiding after that. I met him from time to time: he agreed that his

Maquis was finished.

5. In the Moussey area I met Col. Marlier who had an unarmed Maquis of

about 1,000. I promised to do my best to obtain arms but while I was await-

ing news from London, the Germans rounded up all males in the area between

16 - 60, and this successfully put paid to the Maquis. I last saw Col.

Marlier the night I finally left the base when he was going to attempt to

get through the lines.

Two small groups of Maquis (one 10 strong and one 25 strong) asked

me for orders. I gave them tasks, but in neither case did they go to the

areas agreed, and the larger one was rounded up by the Germans after they

(the Maquis) had pillaged some French houses.

6. The twenty French I had kept as porters were more trouble than they

were worth. I had thought that Commandant Derringer would keep them in

order but he was an alarmist and only served to increase their fear on every

possible occasion.

RE-SUPPLY.

7. Re-supply was difficult to organise since apart from weather diffic-

ulties I had to seize an opportunity to demand re-supply when I knew the

Germans were not in the immediate area. Further, we did not have sufficient

labour to collect and carry containers in order to clear D.Zs by dawn, although

for the jeep drops Capt. Druce was able to recruit some French from the local

village who worked very well indeed.

8. The following points should be noted for future operations which

entail re-supply:-

1. Send what you are asked to send. If it does not make up an aircraft

load, increase the amounts of what has been specifically demanded.

Example: On the last re-supply it must have been obvious that food

was the item mainly required, yet the first two containers opened

contained Bazookas and bombs, which had NOT on that occasion been

asked for.

2. Some of the equipment sent was in a disgraceful condition:-

(a) Carbines - Some of those sent were literally solid with rust

and had to be buried.

(b) Ammunition for Vickers K was bent and dented, and would

certainly have caused a stoppage. It had to be sorted out

round by round, with its attendant waste of time.

All had to be reloaded.

(d) No oil was sent for the jeeps. One jeep was only half full.

With great difficulty and trouble some oil was obtained from

the village.

(e) No fittings for extra petrol tanks were included.

(f) A number of defective Bren magazines were sent.

(g) T.S.M.Gs were sent but no magazines.

(h) Training bombs were sent with Bazookas. (The only one fired

in anger did NOT explode).

(i) Eureka sent without batteries.

There are many other small points which are not worth setting down

here.

3. Panniers were not satisfactory and seldom arrived. Containers

should be used when possible.

4. 10 - 15% of containers Roman Candled.

5. Containers were usually scattered over a wide area. As re-supply

D.Zs were small, it often took nearly two days to collect containers

particularly when it was necessary to fell big trees.

6. The Quartermaster's special comforts container was invaluable, and

"Uncle Tom's Comforts" was the main topic of conversation during a

drop.

ENEMY REACTIONS AND TACTICS.

9. The initial recce party was chased unmercifully by Special Troops

brought from Strassburg. These troops combed the woods and did not keep to

the paths and tracks (see Capt. Druce's report). Later the troops were never

in such large numbers but the woods were regularly patrolled, with the enemy

showing a marked distaste for leaving the paths and tracks. They made a lot

of noise shouting and continually firing at thick bushes and generally spray-

ing the woods with fire. In my experience they never entered the woods at

night. They took a long time, generally 48 hours to react to any particular

operation. For example, several attacks were made on transport on the

Moyenmoutier - Senones road, but it was 48 hours before they started to patrol

the wooded hillside in strength - they continued to do so for at least a week.

10. Considerable use was made of bicycle patrols on main roads.

11. There was only one specific case of the enemy laying an ambush -

when Capt. Sykes, SSM. White and myself were ambushed in the Celles woods -

it was a very bad ambush, SSM. White claims what one of the Germans was killed.

12. On the whole the Germans seemed very scared of us. Judging by

local reports our numbers had been much exaggerated. I think we managed

to delude them for a long time into thinking we were operating from the Celles

woods.

13. Before we had been found in the Moussey area they started visiting

all farms near the woods and then billeting soldiers in them. If they had

any suspicions, they razed the house to the ground and shot the occupants.

EQUIPMENT

14. On the whole the equipment was good.

Sleeping bags were excellent but the covers were unsatisfactory.

The top of the cover is not waterproof and they sweat inside. Their weight

(6 lbs) is excessive and it is thought that some improvement, both lighter

and stronger could be found.

Rubber soles for boots had a very marked pattern, which was quite

obvious on the muddy tracks which we continually used. I had the pattern

cut off, but even so the heels showed up, and I am of the opinion that our

second base was compromised owing to these boots. It is suggested that

American boots with plain soles are ideal for these operations.

Leg bags. The present leg bag is quite uselsss. This has been

proved and pointed out time and again. An improved type bound with static

line and incorporating a metal hook was given to S.A.S. Troops early in July,

but nothing has been done. Present leg bags MUST NEVER be taken on an

operation again.

Carbine is an excellent weapon but each party of five should carry

one automatic weapon, either T.S.M.G. or Sten. A proportion of Brens is

absolutely essential despite the difficulty of carrying them.

No.36 Grenades proved valuable.

Tyre bursters with 1 lb of plastic round them made an excellent road

mine, and were used with great effect.

Jumping Jackets would be greatly improved if they were waterproof.

Some type of waterproof windproof suit is essential for jeep crews operating

in that climate.

Mountain cap is the best type of headwear for S.A.S. operations.

Red berets are much too distinctive and should never be worn.

24 hour rations are absolutely first-class and can be made, with a

few additions, to last two days and even more.

Sweets, cigarettes and matches etc. should be wrapped in plain paper.

It seems impossible to teach some soldiers discretion in this way, and many

Pascal sweet wrappings etc. were picked up.

Face veil is an excellent piece of equipment but gets lost, and

should be automatically included in re-supply packing.

Rucksack was excellent but in that mountainous area not more than

40 lbs could possibly be carried over any period. Many rucksacks were lost

owing to the men putting too many non-essentials in them and having to

discard the whole rucksack.

Bazooka is no use in wooded country since it cannot be carried

satisfactorily on foot and is always catching in trees etc.

New type Midget receiver was good, east to work and carry, but if

future operations of this type are mounted they should be issuable on the

scale of one to five men. We did not have nearly enough which made control

very difficult.

Jeep Mountings. Four out of six jeep mountings were useless owing

to the welding going before the guns were fired. Admittedly they travelled

over rough tracks, but the mounting is much too heavy for the spindle.

PERSONNEL.

15. Some of the men sent with the jeeps as final reinforcements were

quite unsuitable. They arrived very nervous, and were either so scared as

to be useless or so confident that they were extremely careless. Most of

these men were recent recruits who were clearly not of the right type and

had not had sufficient training. This operation showed very clearly that

both officers and men who had not had previous battle experience were very

nervous, and inclined to spread this disease amongst others. The experienced

men were good and could almost always be guaranteed to get away with it.

The ideal operational party does not exceed five, and often three

is enough. The smaller the party the more likely they are to be successful.

Small parties can usually get food, where a large one cannot.

JEEPS.

16. By the time the jeeps arrived the area was very enclosed. A spec-

ial jeep base was formed and the jeeps concealed there. There were, however,

only two main routes - one through Moussey, the other through Le Harcholet

and Le Mont, through which the jeeps could go out and return. Tracks were

purposely made on every possible route and track, but after initial operations

the Germans put posts on these roads which successfully bottled the jeeps up.

It had been my intention to operate with the jeeps in the area

bounded by La Petite Raon - Saulxures - Saales - St. Die - Moyen Moutier, but

this could only be on a short term basis, it would not have been possible

to have found a secure base. Had it been possible to receive jeeps earlier,

they could have operated in the Cirey Blamont area, but it was too late.

It is quite certain that the appearance of the jeeps astounded

and irritated the Germans, and made them redouble their efforts to destroy

our party.

INTER-COMMUNICATION.

17. The wireless worked extremely well throughout, though I understand

that the set was on its last legs at the close of the operation. I can not

say too much in praise of Capt. Hislop and his operators. A great deal of

traffic was passed and they had to work continuously day after day, often

coding and decoding in pouring rain; yet if a party was required to fetch

rations or some similar duty, Capt. Hislop's party was the first to volunteer.

POLITICAL ASPECT.

18. The French civilians were on the whole helpful, although in the area

between Moussey and St. Die, they would seldom assist us, owing to fear of

German retalliation. All the villagers of Moussey were first class. In

Celles and the Celles valley, the people were terrified, and of little help.

In Moussey where we were welcomed, we were obviously looked upon

as the spear-head of the Liberating Forces. The fact that we have now left

the area and brought much misery and unhappiness to the villagers, is a point

which should not be overlooked, and I feel they will consider themselves let

down by us. I consider that this point should be made to the French author-

ities since it seems unlikely that they will be liberated for some time.

CONCLUSION

19. Had it been possible, as was the original intention for S.A.S.

parties to have been dropped in this area prior to D day, I think that a

satisfactory organisation could have been built up, but it would have to have

been with the help of an organised and efficient Maquis. Although my

experience of the Maquis is so unsatisfactory, I believe that if competent

leaders and instructors could have been sent out with arms prior to D day

to organise them, it might have been a very different story, and in fact I am

of the opinion that the area could have been entirely denied to the enemy.

As it was, it was the Germans, and not ourselves, who were thoroughly

organised; and the Maquis consisted mainly of young men with no military

experience who could not hope to have any confidence in their arms or their

leaders. I consider it a great mistake that arms were not somehow dropped

to this area at an early date.

The lack of appreciation in England of the situation in the area,

in spite of the signals which I sent, was abundantly shown by a signal I

received about the middle of September which stated that the area was now

Top Priority for arms for Special Forces - what about a daylight drop?

At the time of receipt of this signal, the Maquis had been entirely dispersed

and the only offensive operations in the area were being carried out by us.

It was difficult enough to have a night drop, and this always under the noses

of the enemy.

A P P E N D I X C (2)

I. DEFENCES

Report on St. Die - Badonviller - Saales Area 011700A Oct 1944

(a) The following information supplied by a British SAS officer who

has been operating in an area generally from St. Die (V 420651) to Raon

l'Etape (V 342788) to Badonviller (V 375892) to Raon sur Plaine (V 526901)

to Barembach (V 626865) to Saales (V 534723).

This SAS unit was parachuted into its present area beginning 12/13

August. Their strength is now about 50 officers and men (British), one

surviving member of a 3-man Jedburgh team and approximately 60 French Maquis.

Armament consists of 4 jeeps with .303 mags, tommy-guns, carbines, bazookas,

grenades and about 700 pounds of plastic explosives.

Initial mission of this unit was sabotage of roads, railroads, communic-

ations, and to attack targets of opportunity. A further mission was to con-

tact, organize, encourage and employ all Maquis and resistance elements.

II. MAQUIS

(a) General Comment.

1. They are disbanded, inoperative or in hiding because of:

(a) Poor leadership

(b) Faulty organisation

(d) Informers within their ranks

2. The SAS camps and supply points were "tipped off" to the

Germans on six occasions in two months. This duplicity is

believed to have been within the Maquis as the result of:

(a) Fear

(b) Rewards

3. Maquis in this area, with few exceptions, are considered:

(a) Unreliable

(b) Unwilling to fight, to undergo the hardships of Maquis life

(b) Specific Comment.

1. The Alsace Maquis Group (defunct).

This group operated in the area generally from the Lemont -

Beval Valley (415790-495790) North to Pexanne (355874). It was organised

in July and August 1944 and was composed of 200 men armed by the SAS and led

by Col. Maximum (Fr.). On or about September 6th, Col. Maximum with approx-

imately 800 men (600 unarmed) successfully attacked a German truck, but

attracted so much attention that German elements surrounded the Maquis, killed

150 and dispersed the remainder. Weapons were buried, hidden or thrown away

and Maquis members made no subsequent effort to reassemble. This decisive

defeat, due in part to a poorly conceived commitment of a partially armed

force is believed to have completely broken their spirit and rendered them

useless for future efforts.

2. The Morel Group (underground, inoperative).

This group operated in the area generally from the Lemont -

Beval Valley South to Saales - St. Die area. Under the direction of an

extremely cautious Frenchman named Marlier, living in Le Harchelot. This

was a "regular" armed group of 200 men with a possibility of a total muster

of approximately 1400 (1200 unarmed). Marlier was a bargainer and postponed

all action pending specific guarantees of arms, munitions. Before plans

with London could be consummated, however, Marlier was betrayed by one of his

own Maquis. He escaped and went into hiding. His home was destroyed and

his son arrested and severely beaten. About 40/60 of this group now operate

under SAS orders but the others are dispersed, underground, inoperative and

its personnel considered questionable.

3. DO NOT DISSEMINATE

Capt. Druce is so definite in his opinion of the Maquis as

he has observed them that he makes the following comments and recommendations:

The Maquis with few exceptions have shown a decided disinclination to undergo

the hardships of guerilla fighters and an unwillingness to engage the enemy

They have hidden and thrown away weapons and on occasion have disappeared

during combat.

Working with Lt. Col. Franks, SAS unit is one Capt. Gough (Br)

(pronounced Goff), the surviving member of a 3-man Jedburgh Team (Radio

transmitters). Capt. Druce states that Gough made a rather poor impression

and was only awaiting an opportunity to make his way through to the American

lines (a feat which Druce claims to be rather simple). Capt. Druce says

that Capt. Gough upon contact with Allied forces will propose the following:

Capt. Gough and Col. Maximum (Fr) will request an air drop of ten planes to

supply arms to the Maquis. This drop will be proposed for approximately

10 hours prior to Allied arrival in Alsace. Capt. Druce states that this

proposal is based on political motives, does not represent a "will to fight",

and is for the purpose of "making an entrance" into Alsace in company with

Allied troops. He states that Col. Maximum may have 10/15 Maquis who were

originally porters and guides but later deserted the SAS. These will be

represented as the nucleus of the Gough - Maximum scheme. Capt. Druce

believes that these men will almost literally "never fire a shot", that

they cannot now muster any appreciable force, that their leadership will

probably be weak and that their effort would in no way justify the expenditure

of a ten plane drop.

III. ENEMY MOVEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION

(a) General

Enemy movement is almost as heavy during the day as it is at night.

Convoys often include a number of staff cars and up to 25 - 5 ton trucks.

These are generally of similar make and are gasoline operated. Miscellan-

eous civilian vehicles have been commandeered for inter-village traffic, etc;

but there is a definite impression that the German M/T system functions on

an organised basis with good, gasoline operated equipment.

Germans are quick to take advantage of bad weather to push through

increased traffic and avoid air attacks.

Machine guns are now mounted on a few trucks to protect against

ambush. No flak trucks or AA has been observed.

German convoys observe good road discipline. Distance is

maintained as vehicles pull off the road at a stop. Camouflage discipline

is excellent. On several occasions men have come within 75 to 100 feet

of German vehicles camouflaged along the roadside before realising the

vehicle was there. The Germans are described as artists in this field.

IV. ROADS

(a) General

Available secondary roads and footpaths are much more numerous

than shown on our 1/100,000 map, and occasional errors are found in the ones

shown.

Main roads in the area, in excellent condition, have good surface,

good shoulders and are wide enough for two-way traffic. All bridges are in

good condition and retain full road width. Practically all bridges are

prepared for demolition and the charges are in place.

(b) Specific

1. St. Die - Raon l'Etape, heavy traffic, mainly supply, not

many troops.

2. St. Die - Saales - Strassburg, heavy traffic. Note: About

20th Sept. Todt workers clearing East through St. Die - Saales - approx.

5,000 mainly on foot - some H/D transport and bicycles.

3. Moyenmoutier - Grande Fosse V 506713 - Saales, SAS attacks and

demolitions have reduced enemy use of this road by estimated 50% plus.

4. La Petite Raon - Belval - Saulxure V 551771, due to SAS

attacks and demolitions this road is no longer available to enemy traffic.

5. Ogevillers V 255947 - Badonviller - Raon sur Plaine section.

Note: About 25th September via Bienville V 453875, four staff

cars and leading 5-ton truck (of a 25 truck convoy) were subjected to 4

minutes concentrated fire from 8 Vickers MGs at a range of less than 200 yds.

It is estimated that 4,000 rounds were placed on the vehicles which were most

certainly destroyed. Within one hour's time, however, the road was completely

cleaned up.

V. RAILROADS

(a) St. Die - Strassburg, heavy traffic, increases at night, and due

to volume there is often a "lay over" of two or three trains at St. Die.

Most of this traffic moves South but some goes North-West. Main traffic

is generally supply. Occasionally a trainload of guns or tanks and once

a Red Cross train carrying ammunition. It was stated that aircraft attacked

this train after (based on an agent report of its content) it had been

designated as a target. The train exploded and was destroyed.

Railroad trains appear to run regularly without undue breakdown.

There was no report on types or condition of rolling stock.

(b) Raon l'Etape - Bienville, knocked out by SAS, not in use.

VI. DEFENCES

The following defences are listed from agent reports.

V 475665 4 batteries 155 mm guns, 2 btys 20 mm AA. These guns

have fields of fire West and South defending St. Die.

V 295825 1 - 88 mm gun expertly camouflaged. Trenches to accommodate

100 men. This position commands the Baccarat - Moyenmoutier

road and several secondary road junctions.

V 515705 Trenches between Sapt pass (to the West) and La Grande Fosse.

V 515723 Position unoccupied. No pillboxes. AT or arty positions

observed. Hill masses of pass easy to defend. Position

apparently prepared to cover loss of high ground.

V 532775 Trenches between Col du Hans, to the West and Saulxures.

to Position unoccupied. Additional information same as

V 531790 preceding paragraph.

V 500846 In vicinity of the shrine Le Coquin. Fifteen officers and

men (28th Sept) taking sights to the West and South.

Apparently laying artillery fields of fire.

V 435798 Four officers taking sights to South and East (29th Sept).

DEFENSIVE SYSTEM OF FRAIZE.

1. Broken line of trenches across valley 2 km before Fraize V 455542, near

to CR of National Highway St.Die - Fraize and 2nd class road which leads

toward Gerardmer via Clefcy V 439526.

2. Continuous line of trenches which follows slopes from Ste. Marguerite

V 435635 and which - following for one brief stretch the Fraize valley - cuts

across it 500 m. before the town and continues on the opposite slope up above

Clefcy. Line is flanked in the valley, by MG and AT gun emplacements.

3. At ditch which blocks the valley - parallel to line mentioned above - in

first houses of Fraize.

SYSTEM OF DEFENCES OF STE. MARGUERITE (V 435635) (Across Valley)

1. In front of and in immediate neighbourhood of bridge over the Meurthe:

some few foxholes, 1 AT gun in the house at the bridge.

The AT ditch (2m.) across road - 3m. in front of bridge.

2. Broken line of trenches as first line of defence behind the bridge -

starts at Brompont V 443645 close to the Fave river, follows the way from

Brompont to Ste. Marguerite, passes in front of village, is heavily reinfor-

ced in front of church - along Meurthe for 300-400 m., then up opposite slope

on side of hill.

3. Continuous line of trenches which runs across the valley North to South -

runs behind village of Ste. Marguerite to side of hill, where it continues to

defence works of Mandray V 449578 and Fraize.

4. AT ditch parallel to line mentioned above, cuts through valley from the

Fave river to side of mountains - passes just in front of RJ St. Die -

Saales and St. Die - St. Marie-aux-Mines V 450630. Ditch is V-shaped -

maximum width, 3 m., maximum depth 2½ m.

GENERAL VIEW

System of defences which extends behind St. Die comprises (omitting

names of passes defended by works)

1. Defences near the village of Ste. Marguerite to 3 km. East from St. Die.

2. Defences in the valley and village of Mandray V 450580.

3. Defences in the valley of Fraize.

These defences are connected with each other by a continuous line of

trenches which starting from the first slopes of the Ormon follow the sides ***TMW notes; Ormon is actually Ormont

of the hills overlooking the Meurthe Valley beyond Fraize towards Clefcy and

cut through the Fave River Valley at the height of Brompont - Ste. Marguerite.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

1. Defences also are established behind Anould V 415540 at foot of Plaford ***TMW notes; Plaford is actually Plafond

V 391521 Pass, following route St. Die - Gerardmer. Nothing exact known.

2. Defences of route St. Die - Fraize:

Up to bridge of Saulcy Nothing to report.

Bridge of Saulcy V 427599 itself is mined.

Old level crossing is defended by a barrier

of pine trees and some trenches on slope

of hill, dominating the place 50 m. to right.

50 m. in front of bridge Trees have been dynamited - once trees

block the road, a minefield makes it imposs-

ible to go cross country.

Before and in St. Leonard MG and AT gun emplacements and foxholes

V 412576 along the road.

Near Anould Foxholes and barrier (pine trees) across

small bridge over Meurthe in front of

defences of Fraize.

3. Temporary gas and ammo depot on old road of Gemaincoutte V 520615 to ***TMW notes; Gemaincoutte is actually Gemaingoutte

Wisembach V 532622, camouflaged under trees on sides of road - other one at

St. Die - Rue d'Ormont - extreme East of town.

The German defensive system behind St. Die can be turned by the slopes

of Ormont which are bare of any defensive works. For that, it is necessary

to take St. Die - Nayemont-les-Fosses V 461669, Pair-et-Grandrupt V 468650.

MANDRAY DEFENCE SYSTEM

Seems for the moment less important than that of Ste. Marguerite and

destined to prevent the over-running either of Ste. Marguerite of Fraize.

It includes:

1. The continuous line of trenches which goes from Ste. Marguerite to

beyond Fraize and which passes behind Saulcy a few hundred metres, near the

military cemetery, cuts the open valley and rejoins the opposite slopes.

2. About 3 kms. farther on, i.e., in the middle of Haute - Mandray, a

second line of trenches which extends from one hillside to the other.

3. Immediately thereafter, an AT ditch near East side of Fraize which

also cuts the valley.

DEFENCES INTENDED TO PREVENT OR SLOW UP PASSAGE OF MOTORISED COLUMNS IN

VALLEY OF "LA HURE".

1. Near La Hollande V 375721:

Two trenches parallel to National Highway St. Die - Luneville, with

slit-trenches for grenadiers and machine-gunners, have been dug on one side

and on the other of hilltop located at start of La Hollande - Hurbache

V 406727 road. No fortifications at present.

These two trenches go from the Voivre V 385705 to the Chene-cieux

V 380730 woods; workers, impressed into service at La Voivre, La Hollande,

Hurbache, under the direction of soldiers, are continuing these trenches in

the direction of the Rabache V 422679 and La Tete de Saint-Roch V 410675 ***TMW notes; Rabache is actually Robache

defence works, near St. Die.

An AT ditch is dug 1500 metres in rear of these two trenches, towards

Hurbache. It crosses the road leading from La Hollande to Hurbache, beneath

the light foot-bridge, destined for demolition.

These works are camouflaged by pines.

Avoidance of three obstacles:

An itinerary has been reconnoitered through Le Viller V 394699 -

La Louviere V 394704 - La Tampointe V 403718 - Hurbache, for light vehicles.

2. Between St. Jean d'Ormont V 446706 and Le Ban de Sapt (vic V 470721):

The road is mined on curve situated at Frabois sawmill V 460710. To avoid

it: Pass beside sawmill.

3. Towards Hermanpaire Pass V 485694 - La Petite Fosse V 495694: No

fortifications.

4. Towards Las Pass V 496712 and Saales V 534723:

Works of undetermined character are under way with cadre population.

St. Jean d'Ormont and Le Ban de Sapt furnished the workers. Notice given

that a demand will be made for them at Denipaire tomorrow. 22nd(?) Sept.

Large works are probably under way around Saales, where 3,000 workers and

many soldiers are said to be grouped.

To avoid passing through St. Die and Vanifosse, light elements may take

route: Hurbache - Denipaire V 430719 - Raids de Robache V 450691 - Trois

Maisons V 439683 - Pepiniere du Paradis - Dijon V 445664 - Nayemont V 474719.

VII. ENEMY TROOPS (as of 25-30th Sept.).

St. Die. Occupied by 2,000 to 3,000 Germans. Will not be defended

in the town but from the high flanking ground.

Denipaire V 428717. 300/400 enemy.

Moyenmoutier V 391757. 400/500 enemy.

Senones V 441775. 25 newly arrived men said to be the advance guard

for a large group (30 Sept).

La Petite Raon V 453787. Unoccupied.

Le Puid V 486772 - Le Vermont V 498766. 2 companies billeted with

local families in this area.

St. Stail V 508751. At the Chateau St. Louis North_east of the town,

150 Gestapo and 300 to 400 Milice. Notorious holding and questioning

headquarters of long standing.

Belval V 495790. 50 Feldgendarmerie. Next in importance to Chateau

St. Louis is a large house occupied by the Gestapo on the North side of the

road East of the town.

Allarmont V 465873. Probably a Brigade Headquarters. Designation

unknown. Located in hotel in centre of town. Bicycle patrols from here

towards Bienville.

Celles-sur-Plaine V 418842. 400/500 enemy.

Chapelle V 424748. 20th Sept 44, 15 Mk IV tanks dispersed in area

La Chapelle believed eventually moving East.

Schirmeck V 611869. A large political concentration camp with 1,000

prisoners. Guards but few other troops. Approximately 300 Milice truck

drivers, mainly French Colonials.

Chatas V 481738. 100 enemy.

Menilsenones V 451755. 100 enemy.

VIII. ENEMY ACTIVITIES

Enemy is extremely quick to react to Maquis activity or parachute drops

of men or materials. If such activity takes place in the vicinity of a

village, German reprisal usually takes the form of arrest and deportation of

all males from 15 to 55. Sometimes men are shot and the villages burned.

In the La Petite Raon - Belval valley recently 1,000 head of cattle

were requisitioned. A large percentage of farm horses have been similarly

looted by troops.

One instance is known of Germans bayonetting to death as SAS man who,

due to a broken leg, could not be moved when the camp was attacked.

Recently, a manifesto has been posted in all towns in the area ordering

that all automobiles and bicycle tires be turned in at the local town halls.

Surrenders are mainly from Russian, Polish, or other satalite elements.

The true German, though numerically small, is still a ruthless, determined,

hard-fighting soldier who should not be underestimated.

When ambushed, enemy reaction is usually to spray the woods with large

quantities of MG and machine pistol ammunition for as long as 15 minutes,

then proceed. They appear to fear the woods and seldom enter them for

any distance even when attacked.

IX. INTELLIGENCE OPERATORS.

There is a group of about 20 natives in this area who are trustworthy,

intelligent and working under SAS direction gathering intelligence. With

this net and other means, it is believed that any enemy information requested

for the area under consideration can be supplied, i.e., generally Badonviller

- Raon-sur-Plaine - Barembach - Col-du-Hans - Sapt - Saales - St. Die - Raon-

l'Etape.

Troops entering the area should exercise caution in the use of Maquis

or other natives for guides or information.

Policemen helped the Maquis and SAS but most of them have been pressed

into forced labour groups.

All of the Forest Guards have been taken from the area by the Germans

with the exception of one who is with the SAS. Forest guards encountered

may be imposters.

The Priests have been consistent in their resistance to the Germans

and their help to the SAS.

Germans have ordered all Alsatians mobilised into the German Army.

It is known that at least 10 who had been so forced had deserted at the

first chance. Such deserters must be thoroughly checked for reliability

however.

Natives of the area are not dependable guides. Local people, even

those who are honest and loyal, do not seem to know the terrain.

Numbers of dark skinned natives believed Moroccans have been serving

as members of the Milice, Darnand's hated police. Numbers of those former

French Colonials are now saying they want to desert the Germans and join

the Maquis. They often appear in civilian clothes. It is believed that

they joined the Milice for good pay and looting rights. There are about

300 of these Moroccan Milice at Camp de Schirmeck. They are mainly truck

drivers. The SAS considered these apparent desertions from the Milice

as a possible effort to infiltrate their group.

X. GROUND

After 2 months during which 20 to 30 miles cross-country was often

daily movement, it is believed that cross-country travel off the road and

valley land should consider six kilometres in 4 hours as good time, due to

thick woods and steep, high ground.

Pine cover in the Col du Hans - Ban de Sapt area is mainly young

growth from 5' to 7' high but extremely thick. Approaches to within 15 feet

of enemy outposts are reported under cover of this growth.

Ground (vic 5278) on North and South of Col du Hans reported extremely

steep, heavily wooded and in many places strewn with huge granite blocks.

Cover along the roads is so thick and so close that it is virtually

impossible to avoid an ambush.

XI. WEATHER

Valleys are becoming very soggy and would probably not be passable for

trucks and tanks. There is a local saying "when it starts raining it stays

raining". Rains sometimes hold on for nearly a week with only slight let-ups.

Streams due to rainfall are often in flood - are fairly swift but

rarely more that 3 feet deep - usually have fairly firm gravel bottoms and

banks which are adaptable for entering and leaving the stream.

A P P E N D I X C (3)

Translation of French Document

G-2 Transl Sec, 7th Army

October 9, 1944

October 10, 1944

GENERAL SITUATION IN THE BADONVILLER - RAON L'ETAPE - ST. DIE SECTOR.

The Germans, since a month, after having been completely disorganised,

are now recovered. The Command has operations under control and the missing

units have been replaced by constituted units. The Germans appear to want

to prevent at all costs a crossing of the crest of the Vosges into the Plain

of Alsace.

They have set up a fortifications plan which is in the process of being

built and which we will discuss later. First, thousands of youths belonging

to the Jeunesses Hitleriennes (Hitler Youth Organisation) and young men from

Alsace 12 to 15 years old and conscripted by force, have been brought and

made to work on the first trenches on the right bank of the Meurthe. The

Todt organisation is supervising the work. These young workers were sent

back to Alsace 15 days later and replaced by civilians conscripted by force

from the towns and the villages of the Vosges. These are from 15 to 55

years old.

Numerous artillery pieces have been brought forward and set up in stra-

tegic places. All the bridges and footbridges over the Meurthe have been

mined. Sentries guard these bridges both day and night. All the roads

crossing the Meurthe have been provided with thick logs and are cut across

in two and sometimes three placed by a large and deep trench covered by heavy

planks, (carrying capacity of 60 tons), thus forming an anti-tank barrier.

Even those second bridges are mined and guarded.

Since October 1st, new troops numbering Three Divisions, one armoured,

one motorised and one infantry, have been brought into the sector.

Traffic has occurred almost exclusively at night and it has been

heavy in men, material and supply columns.

The arrival of heavy tanks (Panther and Tiger) indicate that the Germans

will not be content to stay on the defensive but will seize the right moment

to push to the offensive.

IDENTIFICATIONS:

One SS armoured division. 60% of its men belonged to the SS Division

"Feldhernhalle". (They wear the classic armband on the lower sleeve and

their trucks carry the Gothic F in yellow or white). 30% of the men come

from the SS Division "Totenkopf". (Insignia on cap). 10% come from

various organisations.

Conservative estimates place the number of Panther tanks at 8, the

number of Tiger tanks at about 30 and the number of lighter tanks at about

50. Armoured cars and combat cars are prevalent.

This division was transferred by rail from Alsace viaSaales and arrived

at St. Die and Saulcy sur Meurthe on October 2 and 3 respectively, and

bivouacked in the Arnould-Corcieux sector. The Commanding General's C.P.

was at Arnould. At 17.00 hrs on October 4th this division started in the

direction of St. Die Etival - Pass of la Chipotte. On October 5th, there

was no trace left of the division at Etival. An unconfirmed report indicates

that the division returned to the St. Die-Corcieux sector.

The men from this division are young, strongly built and have a very

high morale. Their general should not be over 40 years old.

A completely motorised division passed on the Neufmaisons (7 kms North

of Raon l'Etape) - Raon-St. Die road on the nights of October 4th and 5th.

Most of the trucks had tracks. The cannons, some of them with self-propelled

gun-carriages, were on tracks. (Selbstfahrlafette). It was not possible

to identify the division for the trucks were covered with branches that

covered all the inscriptions.

A division consisting of only two infantry regiments and one 105 mm

Arty Bn arrived in the St. Die region, coming on foot from Alsace through

the Saales pass. This division is very disparate (sic) and exhibits little

discipline and poor morale. It seems to have been directed towards Fraize.

All isolated soldiers are stragglers gathered in St. Die by the Military

Police (Feldgendarmerie) have been attached to the division.

There are no combat troops at Raon l'Etape. The greatest concentration

of troops seems to be South of St. Die near the Vosges passes.

DEFENCE WORKS:

The following passes cross the crests of the Vosges in the direction of

Alsace and have been fortified: The Schlucht pass, the Leutchbach pass, the ***TMW notes; ?Leutchbach

Bonhomme pass, the Ste. Marie pass, the Durbes pass and the Saales pass.

As the approach to the Saales pass is easiest the Germans have fortified this

pass more than the others and have placed numerous batteries nearby.

The Hantz pass is less well-defended, the Praye pass is hardly defended

at all and the Denon pass has neither any strong fortifications nor a strong ***TMW notes; ?Denon

garrison.

A line of trenched is being dug along the right bank of the Meurthe

between Raon l'Etape and St. Die. It consists in principle of a first

trench without any strong points or barbed wire, a second trench 100 to 200

metres away with a thin wire network with emplacements for machine-guns and

self-propelled guns at the road crossings. 100 to 200 metres farther back

is a third anti-tank trench 2.5 metres wide and 2 metres deep, covered in

some places with metal gratings and branches. At Raon l'Etape this anti-

tank trench starts at the fork between the Badonvillers and Prouche roads ***TMW notes; ?Prouche

(Coordinates 555000) and extends all the way to the hamlet of Chaveret

(535000 and 178600).

Another series of trenches is being dug along the line Veney -

Neufmaisons - Pexonne.

A battery of 120 mm Russian mortars (5) is in position at Trouche.

(Coordinates 537000, 1800000).

A battery of 150 mm cannon (3) is in position at the fountain at Macons.

(534500 and 180600).

A battery of 4 cannons (calibre not known) are in the Criquette valley

near the Baccarat - Raon l'Etape road. (533300 and 180200).

Ammunition Supply Points: An important Ammunition Depot is located in

the woods North-East of St. Die (543500 and 166600).

AA Batteries: 4 AA 88 mm guns are in position near the freight station

(gare de marchandises) at St. Die.

(signed) Capt. Jean.

A P P E N D I X “D”

Nominal Roll of Personnel on Operation Loyton.

Night dropped.

12/13 Aug. Capt. H.C. Druce.

Capt. J.L. Hislop (Phantom)

Capt. R.E.A. Goodfellow.

Lieut. D.G. Dill

Sjt. Lodge R.

Sjt. Hay R.

Sjt. Davis G.

Pct. Hall W.

Pct. Crossfield R.

Pct. Stanley W.

Sgmn. Johnston H. (Phantom)

Sgmn. Sullivan R.J.

27/28 Aug. Major L.P. Power.

Lieut. J.A. McGregor, D.S.O.

L/Cpl. Robinson G.

Pct. Arnold G.

Pct. Marchand.

Pct. Mikolajezak L.

Pct. Sutton H.

Pct. McQueen W.

Pct. Weaver E.T.

Pct. Green P.

31 Aug/1 Sep. Lt/Col. B.M. Franks, M.C.

Capt. C. Sykes.

Capt. I.C. Miller.

Capt. A.R. Whatley-Smith.

Lieut. P.B. Johnson.

Lieut. Derringer (French)

Cpl. Owens L.

Pct. Bell J.S.

Pct. Robb F.P.

Pct. Bennett J.

Sgmn. Bannerman P.

Lieut. F.R. Marx.

S.S.M. White J.N.

Sjt. Terry-Hall F.

Cpl. Iveson T.

L/Cpl. Ferrandi.

L/Cpl. Cowing T.

L/Cpl. Austin F.

Pct. Crosier J.

Pct. Pritchard G.

Pct. Young G.

Pct. Griffin M.

Pct. Lewis D.

Pct. Garth A.

6/7 Sep. Major D.B. Reynolds.

Lieut. J.D. Black.

R.Q.M.S. Taylor A.G.

Sjt. Fitzpatrick M.

Cpl. Winder H.

Cpl. Spencer J.R.

/continued

Night dropped.

6/7 Sep. L/Cpl. Redhead V.

L/Cpl. Webb S.

Pct. Elliott J.

Pct. Salter J.

Pct. Lloyd L.

Pct. Conway J.

Pct. Dawling J.

Pct. Salthouse D.

Pct. Zandarco.

19/20 Sep. Cpl. Kubiski J.

Pct. Perrin F.

Pct. Kasperovitch B.

Sjt. Thorp P.R.

Pct. Milliken T.

L/Cpl. Larley I.A.

21/22 Sep. Capt. D. McGibbon-Lewis, M.C.

Sjt. Neville P.

Pct. Brown S.

Lieut. Lord John Manners.

Pct. McGovern P.

Pct. Mason P.

Pct. Church R.

Lieut. L.J. Silly.

Pct. Herbert P.

Pct. Merryfield J.G.

Cfn. Hopkins G.

Lieut. D.R. Swayne.

Pct. Daines H.

Pct. Puttick F.

Pct. Pendli J (Did not drop but

accompanied Capt. Druce

on his return through

the lines.)

A P P E N D I X E

L O Y T O N R E S U P P L Y

CAPT. T. BURT, QUARTERMASTER

The first re-supply asked for by Col. Franks on the 2nd September,

was to be prepared and marked WREN. After two attempts had been made to

deliver the whole of this request, Loyton sent a message to the effect that

they had collected a total of 39 containers by the 9th September (consisting

mainly of Arms and Food, but no comforts or cigarettes etc.). Actually

some of these articles were included in the re-supply, but the procedure of

spreading comforts over the whole lot was not adopted yet; this was unfort-

unate.

We decided to re-demand WREN in full plus more cigarettes and

chocolate. After the Colonel had held back the aircraft on the night of

the 11th, 18 containers and 4 panniers were sent from Harwell on the 12/13th

September. The R.A.F. reported the load as having dropped alright, but

as on another occasion, it could have been that the load drifted too far

away from the D.Z. to be found.

We repeated the whole order again on the 13th, but this time the

weather was against us, and the aircraft had to be recalled whilst over the

Channel, and even back here the ground mist was so bad that the load had to

be jettisoned near and around the aerodrome. Luckily a search party recov-

ered the lot undamaged the following morning. We prepared to load up again

the same night, but it was cancelled. Finally on the night of the 16th,

18 containers were dropped, and received; but the four panniers (including

Phantom's) were brought back, through a mistake of the Despatchers dismantl-

ing the parachutes too soon. Thus the message from the Colonel "...contrary

to your message Eureka sent but no batteries..."

The next re-supply asked for, on the 18th September, was disappoin-

ting for us too, even though it had our very best attention. The weather

over France was most unfavourable at this time, the mission being on and off

for four nights consecutively. In addition, and to increase the difficulties,

we had to trans-ship the load each day from one aerodrome to another; first

Fairford then to Keevil; from Keevil to Harwell, and finally from Harwell to

Tarant Rushton. (This was something over which we had no control, and must

have showed very noticeably that centralisation of the aerodromes would be

necessary).

Whilst awaiting further orders, it was decided to increase the

re-supply from one aircraft to three (Halifax aircraft from Tarant Rushton)

and along with this move adopted the idea of spreading out the food, cigaret-

tes etc. over all the containers, thus making sure that whatever container

or pannier was received, it would contain something in the way of comforts

etc. The run of bad luck continued, however, as a message from Loyton

received by Capt. Burt at 15.00 hrs September 23rd read: "....no arms to go,

one aeroplane with re-supply only". This meant a 90 mile journey for the

Quartermaster, in order to superintend the unpacking of the 45 containers and

condense them into one aircraft load (15 containers). This was completed

at the aerodrome at 18.30 hrs, when word was received that the re-supply

was off for that night. As these 15 containers now held comforts of a

regimental nature, it was necessary to fetch them back to Fairford; one

Stirling aircraft being laid on from that aerodrome. However, a message

from Loyton on the 24th September read "....re-supply impossible until

further notice".

It was decided to send this load, now increased to 20 containers

and 4 panniers on the 28/29th, by a crack crew from Fairford. (Every care

was taken to see that the crew and the despatchers got the 'encouragement'

to do their best). Although the drop was considered a good one from the

de-briefing report, only 17 containers and 2 panniers were recovered by

Loyton, after a thorough search amongst the woods etc.

REMARKS ON RE-SUPPLY.

There is no doubt that much will have to be done if re-supply

is to improve. More can be done.

I am a layman at re-supply by air, but to me it seems that it

would go better if the following suggestions will be carried out:

(a) That re-supply is carried out regimentally. If it is not a

Quartermaster's job to re-supply his unit, whose else is it?

(b) Each regiment should have its own supply planes allotted, and

should deliver the goods by them. If despatchers and crew worked

together and got to know one another the result would be better.

Supply should not have to be scrubbed because there is something

else on. It must go if asked for.

one airfield to another takes time, causes a rush and therefore

mistakes occur.

(d) Each unit should have its own representative living in the aerodrome.

He would then look after regimental containers and panniers, if for

any reason they should not be dropped. Pilfering has occured

at airfields, and this would prevent it.

A P P E N D I X F

CASUALTIES.

Killed - 5337037 Pct. Hall W.

Pct. Kasperovitch B.

Missing, believed P.W. -

130856 Maj. Reynolds D.B.

113612 Capt. Whatley Smith A.

873213 Pct. Griffin N.

6201328 Pct. Puttick F.

315950 Pct. Brown S.

Missing - 262193 Lieut. Black J.D.

304006 Lieut. Silly S.L.

265704 Lieut. Dill D.G.

5550151 Sgt. Lodge R.

321375 Sgt. Fitzpatrick M.

4122304 Sgt. Terry Hall F.

2938162 Sgt. Neville P.

845212 Sgt. Hay R.

73377 Cpl. Iveson T.

3460628 Cpl. Winder H.

884882 L/Cpl. Robinson G.

6287803 L/Cpl. Austin F.L.

4200829 Pct. Elliott J.

14567132 Pct. Conway J.

14402126 Pct. Crosier J.

4200942 Pct. Salter J.

2063834 Pct. Lloyd L.

5346560 Pct. Dowling J.

900715 Pct. McGovern P.

2938122 Pct. Church.

14410728 Pct. Lewis D.

14219880 Pct. Bennet J.

1060893 Pct. Weaver.

A P P E N D I X G

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PASSED BY SIGNAL

BY LOYTON 103

17 September. Information. Population Moyenmoutier mobilised to mine

main route. Approximately 30 tanks seen 20.00 hrs 16th

September moving West from St. Michel V 3670 rpt V 3670.

More minings Saulcy-sur-Meurthe V 4260 rpt V 4260.

4,000 Germans in area Chatas V 4873 rpt 4873. Source of

all information messages is own French agent.

17 September. Source agent 162200. Four trains loaded tanks and

ammunition in station St. Die. Line blocked.

23 September. Have detailed information and sketch maps of St. Die

defences. Invaluable to Americans if delivered by hand.

Truckload of Germans in Moussey.

23 September. Source agent St. Die 22 September - Z K R.A.F. targets

in town. Gestapo H.Q. in Hospice-de- Foucharupt - South

East corner of town between railway station and cemetery.

Approximately 200 vehicles under trees along Quays each

side of river 300 yards North-east of railway station.

Troops in Chateau Picot 500 yards due South of railway

station.

24 September. Pass following to Americans soonest. Moussey sheet 15 G

V 4781 rpt 4781 filling with Germans apparently in retreat.

Give them our location 496817 rpt 496817.

25 September. R.A.F. targets. Big columns M.T. on following roads day

and night. Saales - St. Die. St. Die - Raon l'Etape.

Badonvillers - Allarmont - Neufmaisons - Pexonne -

Moyenmoutier - La Petite Raon. Many tanks seen road

Neufmaisons - Raon l'Etape. H.Q. at ? Allarmont largest

house south-west end of village, red roof, white walls.

26 September. Information. Tunnels at St. Marie - Saales, are ammunition

dumps. Stadium St. Die tank repair depot. At Rambervillers

enemy tanks seen painted with five pointed white star.

All bridges over Meurthe Rabedeau prepared for demolition.

Send location own nearest troops.

26 September. Have captured documents re order of battle, ammunition states

etc., date 16th September. Appears to include four, five

and two one Panzer. One and two Panzer Grenadier regiment.

Document dated 17th September states 112 Panzer Brigade

had two Panthers and 17 Pz XW four expecting five Panthers.

Documents may be great interest trained 10. Any hope R.V.

American patrol to hand over.

27 September. 21 - 55 mm guns, 3 tanks well camouflaged at 15 G 448775

rpt 448775.

29 September. O870. Reference our 862 correction. Gestapo at 385890.

2 October. Road La Petite Raon 4578 Belval St. Blaise 5778 being used.

Germans in all villages on route, also valley 4781 to 5080.

2 October. Second application R.A.F. target Chateau St. Louis West of

Belval 489792 rpt 489792.

2 October. Our 020845. Chateau is only grey roofed building in area,

with red building immediately East. Bomb earliest.

4 October. Locals report German Army H.Q. moved to La Trouche 3779 rpt

3779.

8 October. Foot pat just back report German Army H.Q. La Trouche 3779.

3,000 Germans Neufmaisons 3484. Vital bomb dusk or dawn.

BY LOYTON 603

26 August. Station radio location located Mich 62 PLI seven seven kms

north-east from Baccarat junction V0 ONE and V0 FOUR. Very

highly defended area. Suggest research station very suspect.

30 August. Target at White School Vincey 956726. 2,000 SS HQ.

30 August. Map 15G. Nomexy rpt Nomexy 3,000,000 litres petrol between

rail and road 000680 rpt 000680.

BY LOYTON 401

2 September. Observed line railway St. Die - Saales completely blocked

with stationary trains. Ideal target R.A.F.

3 September. 7 troop trains at Jarville sheet 14G 8709 11.00 hrs 3 Sept.

4 September. Source Alsace agent second September. German counter-attack

using GAS planned for ten September. Troops at Colmar

exercising in MASKS. 3,500 troops Mutzig. Further

information. Digging A/Tk guns line of Meurthe between

St. Die and Fraize. 700 Gestapo arrived tunnel Ste. Marie-

aux-Mines. Hitler Jugend digging in area. 50 Petrol

tankers road Chatenois - Selestat.

8 September. Probable enemy intention hold defence line on Meurthe.

Confirmed by personal observation three line trench defence

RA on Baccarat with A/Tk guns sites. Only one gun in position

sheet 15G 325804. Line Baccarat - Pexonne - Badonvillers

strongly occupied. Suggest information Americans.

10 September. Locals report 2,000 Germans moved Moutier - Amenmonmere (?)

Baccarat villages on route occupied. Civilian men, women

and children conscripted work.

It would appear from information received that only

the targets given on the 30th of August by Loyton 603 were attacked.

Map showing Allied lines of advance in France and the Loyton area of operation

Routes taken by Druce, Goodfellow and Hislop, showing Maquis camps A, B and C and the rendezvous with Franks

Bases, Dropzones and Rendezvous points

INDEPENDENT OPERATION IN AREA TO THE NORTH OF LOYTON.

The party under command of Lieut. Rousseau set off on the night

9/10th Sep. The main tasks allotted were the railway Nancy - Sarrburg and

the road Luneville - Blamont - Saarburg.

On completion of their tasks they were to join the main Loyton

base or exfiltrate through the lines.

The party in order of dropping consisted of:-

Lieut. Rousseau.

Cpl. Pichon.

L/Cpl. Galmard.

L/Cpl. Maziere.

Pct. Centolle.

Pct. Le Chevalier.

Pct. Camerena.

Pct. Martin.

Pct. Wilkinson.

Pct. Reichenstein.

The plane found the D.Z. and the party dropped blind to the East

of the Foret de Rechicourt at Q 395065 from about 300 ft.

There was a delay between numbers 5 and 6, and as a result the

stick grouped in two separate parties on the D.Z. and did not regain contact.

Lieut. Rousseau's party.

Report by L/Cpl. Maziere.

9/10th Sep.

On dropping I made contact with my Lieutenant, Cpl. Pichon,

Galmard and Centolle. We searched but could not find the others. About

900 metres away we noticed light signals, which we heard later came from

600 Germans working on fortifications. Lieut. Rousseau ordered us to move

to the wood at Q 372055 where we spent the night.

10th Sep.

At dawn, Lieut. Rousseau and I went out to recce the D.Z.,

we saw some people there who we could not distinguish as German soldiers or

civilians. We found no trace of our comrades and returned.

At about 10.00 hrs our officer and Centolle went to a farm

at Q 374064. The people there were surprised but were told that we were

from an advanced patrol. The farmer said the Germans came at all hours

every day.

10/11th Sep.

We waited until nightfall before setting off for our task,

but found out that we had arrived a day too late as the Germans had blown the

railway that same day and had destroyed the railway station at Avricourt.

12/13th Sep.

We moved on for three days and found a farm labourer who

brought us something to eat and also a guide. He took us to Repaix,

Q 335015, where we were lodged by the Cure in the church tower for five days.

19th Sep.

We heard from the Cure of Domevre, V 312961, that advanced

American patrols were at V 292993, and that the five missing men of our

stick had been found and would be brought to the church at Repaix.

Cpl. Pichon was ordered to wait there for them. Lieut.

Rousseau, Galmard, Centolle, and I, left at 21.00 hrs with the guide for La

Croix Blanche, Q 316009, where the Cure of Domevre was waiting for us. We

went by way of Verdenal and came to La Croix Blanche at 22.00 hrs.

Lieut. Rousseau was taken to the Americans by the Cure and

we slept the night there.

20th Sep.

We took five prisoners in action with the Americans, and

then wished to move through Igney, Q 319042, to Repaix to find our five

missing men. We arrived at Igney on foot at the same time as the American

armoured cars. The population was overjoyed, and asked us to dine. Just

then, firing began outside and we all jumped up with our arms. We fired at

a German S.S. officer in a car outside who was killed. The Americans with-

drew without saying anything to us, and the Germans began to arrive in strength.

Lieut. Rousseau decided to make for the wood of Igney. As we entered it at

Q 325046 there was a shot, and Centolle fell. The Lieutenant and Galmard

went to the right and I to the left. It was the last time that I saw them.

I returned to the village of Igney and hid with some civilians. Three

days later they told me that Lieut. Rousseau had been taken prisoner the

same day and shot at Avricourt, Q 315061, and that Galmard had been shot at

Foulcrey, Q 352048. The night after he was wounded, Centolle reached a farm

where he has been looked after. His wound made him too weak to follow me.

The two Frenchmen who told me about Lieut. Rousseau and Galmard are:

Jean Tribou, M. Verdenal,

Igney, Cultivateur a Igney,

Meurthe-et-Moselle. Meurthe-et-Moselle.

The former is now, I believe, at General Le Clerc's H.Q. I had

crossed the line with him and made contact with Allied Forces on the 10th

October.

Pct. Reichenstein's party.

Report by Pct. Reichenstein

9/10th Sep.

I landed with Wilkinson and Martin about 300 metres from

the village of St. Georges. We buried our parachutes and moved in the

direction of Ibigny, Q 385051.

About a kilometre further on we met Camerena and Le

Chevalier who did not know where the others were. We split up and searched

the area and then made for the R.V., the small wood at Q 375055. Here we

slept until morning, when we searched the wood without success.

10th Sep.

We waited there until nightfall as there were many Germans

in Ibigny. I heard a loud explosion from the direction of Rechicourt,

which we heard later was railway demolition undertaken by the Germans.

I found an enclosure in the wood round a farmhouse. I crept

up to it and saw some German soldiers.

At last light we moved off to the wood Southwards, and after

crossing the main road from Paris to Strassburg, we crawled past the

German frontier control post. We were heard but they could not find us.

We came to a wood in which work was in progress, and after a little while

we lay up for the night.

11th Sep.

We were awakened at 06.00 hrs by Germans going past on their

way to dig trenches at the edge of the wood. We moved off and came to a

farmhouse called La Vine Q 395055. The farmer was a Pole named Margovski.

He was very nervous as there were Germans in Cirey-sur-Vezouse. He put me ***TMW notes; Cirey-sur-Vezouze

in touch with a Gendarme from Cirey, who said that it was impossible to reach

Pierre Percee, the Colonel's base, as it had been raided, and that the party

had left a few days before. He also told me the Gestapo was patrolling the

area very thoroughly. We slept that night in the wood.

12th Sep.

The Gendarme came back again with news of defence work in

progress at Baccarat, Val et Chatillon, Petitmont, St. Sauveur, Bremenil,

Parux and Montreux. He also said the Gestapo was in Badonvillers and had a

2nd S.A.S. O.R. prisoner, and a captain who was either British or American.

He said he would bring us any further news of where Colonel Franks was.

15th Sep.

I was in the farm when some Germans came to requisition

food. We left by the back door and marched to the north, and went round

Frenchville towards a small wood at Q 359007. About 200 yards from the

wood we were fired on but managed to reach it.

16th Sep.

We moved off at 06.00 hrs to the west and called at a farm

for food. We continued during the night instead of lying up as we had seen

patrols out with dogs. On the way we walked 200 yards through water to

confuse them, and lay up in the wood at Q 386005.

17th Sep.

In the morning we saw a cowherd whom we sent to fetch food.

He came back with a message from the priest that one of our men was hiding

in the church. We found it was Cpl. Pichon. Five minutes after we had

met him, three German trucks loaded with ammunition came past. We attacked

them, taking one prisoner and killing the rest. We blew up the truck

with plastic. We then moved on to Autrepierre, Q 312016. On the way we

improvised some mines with fog signals and plastic, which we laid on the road

(we heard afterwards from civilians that these had knocked out some enemy

transport).

We met the Americans at Autrepierre, and slept the night

with a tank crew there.

18th Sep.

At 02.00 hrs the tank was attacked by two Germans with a

bazooka (Panzerraketenbuechse ) which knocked a hole in the turret of the ***TMW notes; Raketenpanzerbüchse aka Panzerschreck

Sherman tank. The Germans ran away, leaving behind a German steel helmet,

a gas mask (the property of Gefreiter Bender), and an S.A.S. jumping jacket

with D.B. Reynolds written on the collar.

I believe the Germans were captured by the Americans the

same day, but I am not sure as we were sent off to Luneville.

Map accompanying Loyton Independent Mission document

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